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5Abstract
Escobal, J. (2004): The Role of Public Infrastructure in Market Development in Rural
Peru. PhD Thesis, Wageningen University, The Netherlands. 254 pp.
This study provides a conceptual framework to analyse the impact of rural infrastructure
investment on market development for the enhancement of income generating opportunities
for the poor in rural Peru. The study uses descriptive methods and regression analysis together
with relatively new impact evaluation techniques, like propensity score matching, to understand
the causal paths through which access to new or improved infrastructure services affects the
livelihood strategies and livelihood outcomes of rural households. The data sources used in
this study include regional time series data, several cross-section household level data sets
coming from rural representative Living Standard Measurement Surveys, a household panel
data set coming from the same source, together with specialized surveys developed by the
author. The analysis shows that there are important complementarities in rural infrastructure
investment. While any particular infrastructure investment (related to roads, electricity,
telecommunication, water, or sanitation services) may be subject to diminishing returns if
done in isolation, this effect can be overcome if it takes place in combination with other
investments. In this way it is possible to get a sustained growth effect on rural incomes from
infrastructure investment. The study shows that infrastructure investments reduce transaction
costs and enhance the opportunity for spatial arbitrage, paving the way for improving market
efficiency. However, the study warns that efficiency and equity gains may not occur
simultaneously, because those that are better off in rural areas may obtain higher returns to
infrastructure investments because of a larger private asset base or because of a better access
to other public infrastructure.
Keywords: Peru, rural infrastructure, poverty, economic geography, rural roads, impact
evaluation, non-agricultural employment
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Setting of the problem
Nowadays, it is "common wisdom" to suggest that one of the fundamental causes of poverty,
lack of economic growth and high income inequality is an insufficient and unequal access and
possession of assets. In this respect, improving the asset base of the poor and raising the rate
of returns of the assets they pose now are key elements of any strategy that aims to improving
the livelihoods of the rural poor.
Despite the fact that accessing public and private assets continues to be restricted and
unevenly distributed in rural Peru, changes in the level and in the pattern of  ownership or
access to these assets during the last fifteen years have been quite dramatic. For example, in
1985 the level of schooling of heads of household was very low and unequal in rural sector. In
1997, average years of education had increased from 2.9 to 5, and inequality had declined:
among the poorest sectors the schooling of the head almost doubled while among the richest
the increase was 50 percent. The average family size in the poorest quintile was 50 percent
higher than in the richest quintile. On the other hand, accessing credit was relatively segmented,
being very low in the poorest quintile.  The 1997 Peruvian LSMS1 survey revealed that although
global access to credit had fallen from 23 percent of farmers to 16 percent, it had increased for
the poorest quintile and fallen for the other quintiles, particularly the richest. This could be
explained by the disappearance of the development banks, which concentrated on larger scale
agriculture. In the case of basic services infrastructure (electricity, telephone services and
water and sewerage), levels of access were low and highly inequitable in 1985. In contrast, in
1997, at least in the case of water and electricity, access had doubled: 27 percent and 24
percent of households had access to these services, respectively. However, dispersion in access
by spending deciles turned now to be much more pronounced than fifteen years ago. This is so
because the pattern of invest in public infrastructure had been biased against the poorest
segments in rural Peru, leaving them in a poverty trap.
Despite the obvious importance of infrastructure investments, it has not grown at the
pace needed for reshaping Peru’s poverty profile. As it has happened in many developing
countries, infrastructure investment has stagnated or fallen in response to fiscal difficulties
associated with structural adjustment. They may have also decreased because international
cooperation has identified it as a "low priority" in their agendas. Diminishing budgets for rural
investments puts an additional pressure to governments: they need to do "more with less".
1 In Spanish this survey is known as ENNIV (Encuesta Nacional de Niveles de Vida)
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However, the institutional setting does not help for making this possible. Usually national and
local bureaucracies do not coordinate and even compete in infrastructure allocation. The final
outcome of such an institutional setting is that the country misses the benefits of a coordinated
infrastructure investments and a better integrated rural development. Understanding how
complementarily works may give us a clue about how to maximize the welfare impact of
infrastructure investment.
1.2 Research questions
This study focuses in four inter-connected research questions:
1. Why and how is rural infrastructure important for fostering income generation,
income diversification and ultimately rural poverty alleviation?
2. Are there any complementarities in rural infrastructure investment? What are the
impacts of different combination of public infrastructure investment on output and
labor rural markets?
3. Can rural infrastructure investment help overcome an adverse geography, and allow
the poor accumulate assets and escape from the poverty trap they may be facing?
4. What kind of public infrastructure investment is better suited to improve market
integration and reduce transaction costs for the rural poor?
Although this research questions are relevant for most if not all developing countries,
they have been addressed in a specific context which is that of rural Peru. Peru is one of the
most diverse countries in the world (it encompasses 84 of the world 104 known living ecological
regions and 28 different climates) the link between this geographic diversity and development
has not been studied. As far as we can tell, this is the first study that ascertains how geographic
variables interact with infrastructure investments to explain per capita expenditure differentials
across regions within Peru.
We also discuss connections between infrastructure investment and market efficiency.
Although market efficiency and market integration has been thoroughly studied in Peru, there
are very few attempts to connect these concepts to policy variables (in particular infrastructure
investment). In the international literature this has been done as it is fully acknowledged in
Chapter 6 of this study. Recent analysis on the determinants of market integration has gone
from bivariate cointegration analysis to multivariate cointegration. At the same time there is
research that has explicitly connected key public infrastructure with bivariate measures of
integration. However, this has not been done yet in a multivariate cointegration framework as
we do in this study.
In relation to the microeconomic impacts of infrastructure investments very little effort
has been directed toward the measurement of transaction costs in rural markets. Following the
pioneering work of De Janvry et al. (1991), we develop a direct measure of the transaction cost
and show how they maybe be reduced through an adequate provision of public infrastructure.
Introduction
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Finally, although achieving clear causal links between infrastructure investment and
market efficiency outcomes or household welfare outcomes is obviously a difficult task; the
use of appropriate counterfactual scenarios provides a good approximation to this issue. In
this area, this study has also a methodological contribution, suggesting a two-step procedure
to evaluate the impact of certain investment. Identify first the group (town or region) that may
constitute a possible "match", and then use a simulation technique to further control for those
household specific characteristics that, although may not be important for the decision-maker
to allocate an investment, they certainly affect the outcome variables.
1.3 Data sets
This study uses a large number of data sets for answering our four research questions. Some of
the data bases are cross-section household level data sets coming from Living Standard
Measurement Surveys, which World Bank started implementing in the early eighties as a way
of improving the type and quality of household data collected by government statistical offices
in developing countries. These surveys are representative at the national and regional levels
and they are multi-topic questionnaires designed to study multiple aspects of household welfare
and behavior. For two of the rounds that were implemented in Peru (1997 and 2000) the
author of this study was able to include a few questions in the national survey so as to explore
issues related to accessing markets and transaction costs in rural Peru. In that way, we had the
possibility of connecting access to infrastructure and key issues of rural market development.
Additional rounds of LSMS type of survey run the government statistical office (INEI) for
2000, 2001 and 2002, allow us to have a better idea of recent trends in rural poverty and the
effect that recent infrastructure investments may have had in changing the poverty profile of
rural Peru. In Chapter 3, when we compare both sets of data, a careful comparison of
methodologies is done and proper adjustments for assuring comparativeness are performed.
An additional source of information is that coming from secondary sources that can give
us a better assessment of the characteristics of the infrastructure available in the regions where
these households are located. Community questionnaires, done at the same time these surveys
were conducted in addition with infrastructure census, done about the same time the data was
collected (1994 and 2000), give us precious information about the supply of infrastructure
which helps us to avoid potential endogeneity biases coming from the decision of a household
of not demanding a specific infrastructure service, even if available in its residence area.
We have also used in Chapter 4 aggregations based on Peruvian Census data for 1972,
1981 and 1993, and information from the III National Agrarian Census of 1994 to construct
district level indicators that are useful to characterize the sub-regions where the surveyed
households were located. To estimate per capita expenditure at provincial levels for Census
years 1972, 1981 and 1993 we followed the methodology suggested by Hentschel (2000) et
al. combining census and household level data.
Chapter 1
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Yet another source of data that was combined with the LSMS survey data was that of the
geographic characteristics of the areas where these households live. Since we had access to the
name of the cities, towns and villages where each household live, we were able to incorporate to
households data bases a wealth of information on average temperature, temperature variability,
altitude, soil characteristics,  slope of the terrain, etc., that may account for the geographic
conditions under which this household are making their livelihood. Finally, at the more aggregate
level, we also used an extensive data base on regional prices so as to evaluate how regional
agricultural prices were responding to exogenous shocks and whether or not the pattern of spatial
market integration is affected by differences in infrastructure endowments.
However, some of the questions related to this study cannot be answered with general
purpose LSMS-type of surveys. They lack the detail in relation to specific transactions and
details about how they connect to output and input markets, and specifically how they connect
to traders. Thus, in addition to the more general national level representative surveys, we have
also accommodated within the study two more small specific purpose surveys. One was aimed
to evaluate the impact of road rehabilitation and maintenance in relative large sample of
households coming 2,038 households, distributed among 314 of the poorest districts of Peru.
The other considers a very small sample of household that connects to markets through very
different ways (a first group through rural motorized roads and the other through non-motorized
tracks). This contrast allows us to record not only differences in transportation costs but also
in transaction costs and, more generally, in the ways these costs affect the complexity of their
market exchange relationships. The author of this study was involved in constructing the
sampling framework and questionnaire of the first survey, and was in charge of designing and
implementing the second one.
Although it should be obvious that such diverse databases may indeed have some
inconsistencies between them (to start, difference in the years when they were collected, and
different sampling frameworks), we strongly believe that we could not tackle the complexity
of our research questions if we did not have turned into this broad strategy. Of course, along
each chapter and in our concluding chapter we bring attention to the methodological
complexities that this strategy has generated.
1.4 Outline of the study
The study is structured according to the research questions described in section 1.2, combined
with the conceptual framework that is laid down in detail in Chapter 2, where the research
questions we address are shown in the context of what the literature has said about the
relationship between rural infrastructure investment, market development and rural poverty.
It is important to highlight that this literature review is done using as a base, a adapted livelihood
conceptual framework, where as we will see in Chapter 2, infrastructure investments can be
connected to livelihood outcomes (improved access to services, changes in productivity, labor
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allocations, marketing decisions, income sources, and, ultimately to income, expenditures,
and asset accumulation) through a number of mediating factors related to macro-policy,
geography, social relations and institutions or, even, external shocks.
Figure 1.1 provides a road map about the different components in which the study has
been divided. As we can see here, we can have different pathways through which rural
infrastructure investments may affect market development, rural economic growth, and
ultimately the livelihoods of rural Peru. The connections between rural infrastructure provision
and market development and economic growth could operate at macroeconomic or at
microeconomic level. In the first case, we may see changes in the level and composition of the
asset base and changes in the rate of return of private and public assets. These rates of return
are affected by the characteristics of the specific locations where the poor live and may also be
affected by any complementary infrastructure investment that takes place. Evaluating these
connections will help us to respond the first three questions presented in section 1.2. At the
microeconomic level, the connections between rural infrastructure and rural livelihoods may
occur at market level, through lower transaction costs, higher spatial market integration and
changes in relative prices which affect how household react to market changes, how they
connect to them and the impact that this connection may have in their livelihoods. These
household specific impacts may be related to changes in factor allocation (labor allocation,
land usage, crop choice or input mix) or changes in marketing patterns (sale mix or marketing
channels). All of these pathways, through which infrastructure affects market development,
may ultimately have an impact in the livelihoods of rural inhabitants, shaping poverty, income
distribution and asset accumulation in the areas where such investments are allocated.
Chapter 3 in this study gives us a first look to rural poverty in Peru from an asset based
point perspective. We have decided to look at poverty not just as a income or expenditure
gauge  but relate it to a more comprehensive definition based on  assets accessing and the
ability of rural household to accumulate or have more and better access to them. This chapter
shows the short run dynamics of asset accumulation and shows how key infrastructure
investments may affect the rate of return of those private and public assets that are already in
the hand of the poor.
Next, in Chapter 4 we add a critical element to the analysis: which is that of geography.
We have already mentioned the importance of geography in Peru. This chapter address whether
geography is the main determinant of market development and rural livelihoods in Peru or,
alternative if infrastructure may help to overcome the potential negative effects of an adverse
geography. We believe that in the analysis of the interaction between infrastructure investments
and geography, lies some of the most important contributions of this study.
By constructing a specific and novel measure for transaction costs, Chapter 5 studies
what is the role of infrastructure in shaping those transaction costs and affecting the relative
prices the household face in input and output markets. Chapter 6 follows a related path, looking
Chapter 1
22
F
ig
u
re
 1
.1
   
S
tu
dy
 f
ra
m
ew
or
k
Introduction
23
at arbitrage costs and spatial market integration. By connecting infrastructure investments to
the speed of adjustments of agricultural markets to external shocks, the chapter paves the way
to discuss spatial market efficiency and the role of infrastructure in improving market
performance. To our knowledge this is the first time that infrastructure investment has been
connected to multivariate measures of spatial market integration.
The study of labor allocations in different infrastructure settings is pursued in Chapter
7. As we will claim in Chapter 2 through an extensive literature review, we believe that together
with changing access to key public services, rural labor outcomes are the first one we should
see once an infrastructure investment settles. This happens because, in the context of thin
labor markets and very low opportunity costs, rural infrastructure opens new wage and non
waged sources of income, which the rural household starts exploring in a way to diversify its
income portfolio. This diversification strategy may be a way to cope with their vulnerability
(for example for those with little land assets) but may also be related to the exploration of new
and more profitable labor opportunities for those that have the complementary assets to take
advantage of the full potential of a new infrastructure investment.
Chapter 8 follows the path initiated in the previous chapter, looking at the income,
expenditure and savings effects that a new infrastructure may bring about. This is done adapting
relatively new impact assessment methodologies to the particularities of infrastructure
investments. Again, here we can see that labor markets are the first to react to these new
market opportunities. However, we also show that the possibility of turning this livelihood
improvement in a sustain one, institutional settings need to accompany the process so as to
connect this new income generating  opportunities to more permanent behavioral changes that
may render even more benefits if they are sustained in time.
Finally, Chapter 9, pulls together all our research results, and presents them in such a way
it addresses our four research questions. While doing that, the chapter goes into the main theoretical
and content contributions as well as the main methodological ones that we believe we have put
forward. The policy implications of those contributions are the final destination point in this
ambitious research road connecting rural infrastructure investment and rural market development.
If correct, we may be in the right path to make the markets really work for the poor.
Chapter 1
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Chapter 2
Infrastructure and Rural Development:
a review of the literature
2.1. Introduction
The 1994 World Development Report defines infrastructure in a narrowly way as "long lived
engineered structures, equipment and facilities, and the services they provide that are used in
economic production and by households"  World Bank (1994). Ahmed and Donovan (1992)
however, took issue on the definition of "infrastructure" showing how the concept has evolved
since the work of Arthur Lewis and that of Albert Hirschman. Ahmed and Donovan (1992)
recognize that with the increasing importance of the role of agriculture in economic
development, the literature started including agricultural research, extension services, financial
institutions or/and  irrigation as part of a much broader concept of infrastructure.
At the more conceptual level, the conventional theories on public goods, starting from
the seminal article written by Samuelson (1954) recognize that public infrastructure are goods
that are typically technical indivisible, have low excludability, long life and are rarely traded.
These characteristics have made them the kind of goods that are typically provided by the
public sector.
Fosu et al. (1995) building in the definition laid out by Wharton (1967) distinguished
the following 11 components of agricultural infrastructure: (1) irrigation and public water
facilities; (2) transport facilities; (3) storage facilities; (4) marketing and export facilities; (5)
processing facilities; (6) utilities; (7) agricultural research and extension services; (8)
communication and information services; (9) soil conservation services; (10) credit and financial
institutions; and , (11) education and health facilities.
Although we may agree with the above list, we think that it should be listed under the
name of rural instead of agriculture infrastructure, because as Fosu et al. (1995) recognize, it
includes items that facilitate not only agricultural but also non-agricultural (waged or
independent) income generating activities. Our study looks at rural infrastructure using as a
starting point this broad definition as it encompasses a range of public goods and services that
have low excludability, have long life and are rarely traded. Although from chapter to chapter
the specific focus of analysis narrows down to a specific infrastructure service or a combination
of them, we believe that all analytical and methodological conclusions are applicable to most
if no all infrastructure services listed above.
The aggregate linkages between poverty and rural infrastructure have been extensively
discussed in the literature.  See, for example World Bank (1994), Lipton and Ravallion (1995),
Jimenez (1995), Van De Walle (1996), among many others. For sector specific discussions
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(like the role of rural roads or electricity in poverty reduction) see for example Howe and
Richards (1984), Binswanger, et al. (1993), Jacoby (1998) or Lebo and Schelling (2001).
Most of these studies recognize that infrastructure investment has indeed, a powerful impact
in rural income. The specific linkages and the causal chain that brings about this outcome,
however, are usually not studied. The problem with this lack of understanding of the causal
relationship between public infrastructure investment and income generating opportunities
and welfare improvement is that there is little room for policy recommendation other than
suggesting an overall increase in public infrastructure investment.  The possibility of easing
key bottlenecks that affect this causal chain is undermined.
In a world with scarcity of financial resources, like the one that prevails in most
developing countries, knowing the relative profitability of each type of public infrastructure is
critical; that is, knowing where and in what type of infrastructure investment should each
additional dollar be spent. In addition, as critical as knowing which type of infrastructure will
render the higher return in terms of growth poverty or income distribution, it is also critical to
understand the causal pathways through which these impacts occur. This is especially important
if we are interested in devising policy recommendations that may maximize the welfare impact
of rural infrastructure development. In this context, some of the challenges in this area are:
! Identifying investment opportunities that generate a multiplier effect by attracting
additional public and private investments to rural economies
! Understanding the complementarities between different types of public infrastructure
and between public infrastructure and private asset endowments (human capital physical
and financial capital or social capital) that are already in the hands of rural dwellers so
as to maximize the impact of public infrastructure development
! Understanding what bottlenecks (physical or institutional) undermine the full potential
of public infrastructure investment.
To meet these challenges we need to understand fully the causal links between public
infrastructure investments, rural market development and changes in rural household behavior.
In order to attain this, our conceptual framework is rooted in the recent literature on livelihood
strategies1. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the livelihood base may include the infrastructure
services a rural household has access to. If there is a positive shock to this livelihood base, for
example through some kind of infrastructure investment (i.e. a new or improved road, access
to electricity, rural telecommunication, water or sanitation facilities), this will affect household
livelihood strategies. How livelihood strategies change because of this policy shock will depend
on the context where such investment takes place, which may include not only the characteristics
of the physical environment where this household is located (something that we refer as
1 See for example Carney (1998)or Ellis (2000)
Infrastructure and Rural Development: a review of the literature
27
Chapter 2
F
ig
u
re
 2
.1
28
Infrastructure and Rural Development: a review of the literature
"geography"), but also the social and institutional setting, the macro policy and the international
trends and finally, any other shock that the household may be subject to.
As an infrastructure investment changes the livelihood base, its impact will be reflected
in an improved access to services, in changes in the utilization of labor and other factor markets,
in changes in marketing decisions and ultimately in changes in livelihood diversification strategies.
In turn, these diversification strategies, depending on the asset base, will help cope with or
reduce vulnerabilities or will be used as a search mechanism for new market opportunities that
would enhance the asset base and allow these rural households to escape from poverty.
Following this conceptual framework, this study looks at the different paths through
which infrastructure investment may affect rural market development and, ultimately, the
livelihood of the rural poor. As we have seen in Chapter 1, in particular in Figure 1.1, we
envisage that infrastructure investments may have macroeconomic and microeconomic impacts.
At the macroeconomic level, improved access to new infrastructure services may change the
marginal rate of return of the main infrastructure we may be evaluating, but it may also affect
the marginal rate of return of other public infrastructure as well as the returns to those private
assets that are already in the hand of the poor. Thus from changes in infrastructure endowments
and the rate of returns of public and private assets we may trace the impact of infrastructure
investments on rural income growth.
On the other hand, microeconomic effects can be traced through changes in market
specific relationships or household specific behavioral changes. In the first case, market specific
impacts can be related to the reduction of transaction costs or the improvement of market
integration, affecting in this way market efficiency and the structure of relative price a rural
household will face. Microeconomic effects can also be traced at the household specific level,
as infrastructure investments changes factor markets, affecting input choice and mix, as well
as labor allocation. All these impacts can be summarized, as we show in Figure 1.1, in changes
in wealth indicators (income and assets) enhancing livelihood security of the rural poor.
In order to put in perspective our research questions and the conceptual and methodological
contributions of this study, in the remaining sections of this chapter we go through what the
literature has said about the different pathways through which infrastructure development
affects market development, and through it, rural livelihood security.
2.2 Macroeconomic impacts: poverty and growth
We can trace the connection between infrastructure and growth as far back as the writings of
economist Adolf Wagner and Geographer Johann Heinrich von Thunen which acknowledged
the importance of public infrastructure in development2.  Most of the theoretical developments
2 Wagner’s work on the role of public expenditures written in 1890 can be found in Musgrave and Peacock (1994).
Von Thunen work is discussed in detail in Samuelson (1983).
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in this area, including the standard neoclassical theory, have typically assumed that capital
accumulations (in particular infrastructure investments) are subject to diminishing returns. If
this is the case, the potential benefits of infrastructure investments may be restricted by a
range of limiting factors, including the lack of complementary investments or the presence of
institutional bottlenecks. However, endogenous growth theory [Romer (1986), Lucas (1988)]
has shown, at least at the theoretical level, that diminishing returns effect can be postponed or
eliminated so that the growth rates in the economy can be positively affected by investments
in infrastructure in the long run.  In addition, the literature coming from the "new economic
geography" Krugman (1991) has pointed out that infrastructure investments may induce total
factor productivity growth through economies scale brought from market expansion,
agglomeration economies in spatial clusters, or  innovation-induced effects. Thus, whether
infrastructure investments can have a sustained growth effect on rural incomes or not is an
empirical matter that will depend not only on the size and type of that public investment but
on a range of other factors that may boost or hinder its effects.
Although extensively reviewed for developed countries, the literature between
infrastructure and economic development and growth is relatively scarce in developing
countries. Most work is concentrated in the developed countries and as Creightney (1993)
recognizes, it is mostly restricted to evaluate the impact of public investment on aggregate
demand and output.
The works of Fan and Hazell (1999), Zhang and Fan (2000), Fan et al. (2000a), Fan et
al. (2000b), and Fan et al. (2002) in India and China are the first and most comprehensive
attempts to link infrastructure investments to rural growth and poverty alleviation. This research
effort shows that investment in infrastructure, especially irrigation, roads, electricity, and
telecommunications contributed not only to agricultural production growth, but also to the
reduction of rural poverty and regional inequality in these countries. They show that the marginal
returns of public investments to production and poverty reduction differs according to
geographic settings, and tends to be higher in the poorest regions (three times larger than
national average for roads, telecommunication and electricity) . Thus, infrastructure investments
may be not only poverty reducing, buy may well be equality enhancing.  This line of research
has been successful in ranking the marginal effects of public investments on growth, inequality,
and poverty, providing a powerful methodological framework that, provided the access to
sufficient data, can be very useful for analyzing other countries.
The results obtained by Fan, Zhang, Hazel and their colleagues for India and China
obviously depend critically on the distribution of private assets between regions and the degree
of complementarities that are present between public infrastructure and private assets. In case
where private asset may be highly concentrated in a region, marginal returns - due to strong
complementarities - may be higher in that region affecting negatively income distribution.
This is of course an empirical question that needs to be tested in each context.
Chapter 2
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Taking into account the research questions we are addressing in this study, two areas of
enquire are of particular importance when we look at the connection between infrastructure,
rural poverty and growth: a) the nature of the causal link between these variables; and, b) the
existence of complementary interventions that may postponed or eliminated the diminishing
returns effect of infrastructure investments. Next, we will review the literature contribution on
each of these two areas.
Causality links
The causality issue is one that has received some attention in the literature. Does infrastructure
investment lead to growth or does infrastructure develop as a derived demand related with a
higher growth pace?  Most studies have not been able to solve this issue. In a seminal article on
this topic Binswanger, et al. (1993) identifies several links between infrastructure development
and growth, which may occur simultaneously. For example, better endowed regions are more
likely to press for additional public infrastructure generating a self-enforcing pattern. At the
same time, we can see geographic poverty traps, like those mentioned by Jalan and Ravallion
(2002) where less endowed areas are left out from public infrastructure allocations.
Working with road infrastructure, Queiroz and Gautam (1992) contends that there are
several indications that roads should precede development. They argue, as Binswanger, et al.
(1993) did, that the lack of roads is a significant constraint on the supply response of agriculture.
Furthermore, they report in a study on India by the Central Road Research Institute showing
that literacy, agricultural yield and health care increase with road density. On the other hand,
Aschauer (1997) has shown that productivity (i.e., output per unit of private capital and labor)
is positively related to government spending on infrastructure, which may be an indicator of
growth affecting the rate of accumulation of infrastructure investment.
Datt and Ravallion (1996) looking at Indian data, have shown that initial conditions
matter when it comes to infrastructure. Those who started the period with better infrastructure
and human resources - with more intense irrigation, greater literacy, and lower infant mortality
rates - had significantly greater long-term rates of consumption growth and poverty reduction.
Lächler and Aschauer (1998) have shown that there have been a systematic co-movement
of infrastructure expenditures and economic growth in Mexico but they found no evidence to
establish any causal relationship between public infrastructure investment and growth. One
reason for this is the public investment’s crowding out effect on private investment. Another
explanation may be related to how the public investment may have been financed, as it may
have affected other key complementary investments done by the public sector.
Geography may also play a critical role explaining the causal link between infrastructure
investments and rural income growth or poverty reduction.3 Venables and Limão (1999), for
3 An important point to be highlighted here is that geography related variables are one of the few that may be
considered truly exogenous when analyzing the causality between infrastructure investment and market development
or rural income growth.
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example, found that infrastructure and geography interact between each other and determine the
direction and relative size of trade flows. These authors define transport intensity and show how
location and transport intensity should be combined with factor abundance and factor intensity
in determining trade patterns. Even more, they state that a theory based on only one set of those
variables, such as factor abundance, will systematically make incorrect predictions.
However, geography may also be a barrier to growth and poverty reduction. Carnemark,
et al. (1976) looking at the connection between rural roads and economic outcomes state that
most of the studies that report in the benefits of this type of infrastructure have focused in the
quantification of road user savings not paying much attention to the evaluation of projects where
this public investment generated new traffic.  The studies often neglected the existence of
geographic constraints in the area of influence of the road which limit its developmental impact.
Ravallion (2003) using information from China tackles this issue and shows that there are indeed
geographic externalities that may arise from the interaction between the level and composition
of local economic activity and the marginal return to private and public asset. For this author,
this interaction is a clear sign that the lack of development in rural areas comes from an inadequate
provision of infrastructure and human capital, so to take advantage of these externalities.
As Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) maintain, the empirical assessment of the relationship
between improved access to infrastructure services and rural income or other relevant outcome
variable has been subject to numerous criticisms, most of them associated to problems of
endogeneity and direction of causality. Although the access to infrastructure affects productivity
and income, economic growth and income expansion also affect the demand and the supply of
infrastructure. Disregarding this simultaneous relationship may bias considerably any empirical
assessment of the impact of rural infrastructure investment.
Until recently, the possibility of identifying causal relations between access to
infrastructure services and agricultural productivity or rural income, was limited to
macroeconomic studies based on time series data where it was identified if the infrastructure
investment preceded or not the effects that supposedly were attributed to this investment. In
econometric terms this is called Granger causality.  In recent years, however, thanks to the
development of evaluation methodologies (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) or Heckman, et al.
(1998)) the literature has advanced in establishing causal links from microeconomic evidence,
comparing the trajectory of individuals subject to some intervention, in comparison with the
trajectory of other comparable individuals that have not been subject to the same intervention.
Complementary interventions and the returns to rural infrastructure investments
Despite it is an obvious and critical area for research, there is very little conceptual or practical
analysis that discusses the potential complementarities that may arise by combining more
than two type of public infrastructure or the interaction that may generate combining public
infrastructure and private assets.
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At the conceptual level Ferreira (1995) proposes a model of wealth distribution dynamics
with a capital market imperfections and a production function where public capital is
complementary to private capital. He shows that increases in non-targeted public investment
over some range leads to unambiguously less inequality of opportunity, as well as to greater
output. If that were the case, the rationale for an active role for the government in infrastructure,
provision will be clearly granted.
On the empirical side, one of the few studies that explicitly take into account the
complementarity nature of public infrastructure is that of Van De Walle (2000). He shows that
the marginal gains from investment in physical capital depend positively on knowledge, so if
a household cannot hire skilled labor to compensate for his low skills, then even if it has
access to credit the household will achieve lower returns than an educated household.
Canning and Bennathan (2000) study public investment in electricity-generating capacity
and paved roads, and show that both investments where complementary with other physical
capital and human capital, but have rapidly diminishing returns road-if increased in isolation.
The complementarities on the one hand, and diminishing returns on the other, point to the
existence of an optimal mix of capital inputs, making it very easy for a country to have too
much - or too little - infrastructure.
Ravallion (2003) using data from China shows that rural underdevelopment arises
from underinvestment in externality-generating activities, especially those related to agricultural
development. He shows that there are important externalities as the farmers can benefit from
the infrastructure already in place locally. In particular, this author shows that higher levels of
literacy and locally and higher road density promote higher consumption growth at household
level. Finally, Blum (1998) looking at transport infrastructure states that investment in roads
can reduce preexisting negative externalities.
Another important issue at the macro level that is related to complementarity of
infrastructure investments is that of crowding in or crowding out of public investment. On this
issue, several studies like those of Blejer and Khan (1984), Creightney (1993) or Jalan and
Ravallion (2002) have shown that in rural areas is very unlikely that crowding out could
occur.  On the other hand, crowding in may occur through a variety of channels like the
creation of new demand for private produced intermediate products or by lowering the
transaction costs for the production and marketing of  unrelated good and services.
2.3 Microeconomic impacts:  market and household specific impacts
Wharton (1967) was one of the first researchers that raised the importance of the relationship
between infrastructure and external economies, and how these investments shape market and
producer behavior. He recognized that agricultural development was not exclusively determined
by the "economizing behavior of farmers" but was also determined by the "economizing
setting", which, according to him, was made of physical-climatic, socio-cultural and institutional
components, that formed the so called "agricultural infrastructure". Wharton (1967) divided
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Agricultural Infrastructure in three types: capital intensive (like roads, bridges or dams); capita-
extensive (mainly services like extension or agencies for plant and animal health); and
institutional infrastructure (comprised of formal and informal institutions). A key point here is
that the development of infrastructure accompanies the development of markets, the movements
toward specialization, division of labor, monetization of production and purchase of inputs
Wharton (1967).
Fosu, et al. (1995) established that to analyze the microeconomic channels, through which
public infrastructure affects rural development and rural poverty, we need distinguish between
direct effects and indirect effects. The first one come about when public infrastructure increase
output by shifting the production frontier and marginal cost curve, and by increasing the rate of
return of private investment in rural activities. Other public investments change the relative
price structure of inputs and outputs, reducing their transaction costs, and generating a completely
different set of price signals that reshape the connection of producers with the market.  These
connections may occur at the market level, through lower transaction costs, higher spatial market
integration and changes in relative prices. These connections may also occur at the household or
individual level, as a response to these market changes. In this later case, household specific
impacts may be related to changes in factor allocation (labor allocation, land usage, crop choice
or input mix) or changes in marketing patterns (sale mix or marketing channels).
Although many authors have recognized that infrastructure related externalities play a
role in rural development, there is very little empirical work that backs this proposition at the
microeconomic level. If these externalities are related to livelihood strategies, empirical work
that evaluates how rural household with different asset compositions generate differentiated
livelihood strategies may allow us to evaluate the presence and importance of such effects.
2.3.1 Market specific impacts: the role of transaction costs
Institutional Economics has championed the idea that market transactions are not costless.
Aside from the transport costs, buyers and sellers have to communicate to establish contact
and then to bargain, agree and execute a particular transaction, while developing mechanisms
to check and enforce the delivery and payment of goods and services to be exchanged.
Williamson (1979), North (1990), among others, have shown that transaction costs are
influenced by context in which the transaction are performed. Although the institutional
environment (the rules of the game) and institutional arrangements (the specific arrangement
that people set up for a particular transactions) are the two major influences on transaction
costs and on the risks of transaction failure, infrastructure also plays a key role facilitating or
obstructing a market exchange. In an extreme situation the lack of a particular infrastructure
service (i.e. a road in good condition or a telephone) may increase transaction costs to a point
that it makes prohibitively costly to perform a particular transaction.
Infrastructure services affect transaction costs and through them, affect market
development. De Janvry, et al. (1995) shows for México maize producers that insufficient
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infrastructure among other key factors will increase transaction costs and determine that a
majority of these producers may not be producing for the market and consequently may not be
directly affected as producers by policies that affect the price of maize. Holloway, et al. (2000)
shows how the provision of infrastructure (measured by time to transport milk to market)
hinders participation. Bayes (2001), for example, shows how telephones can be turned into
production goods, lowering transaction costs and boosting market development in Bangladesh.
Other works that convincingly report how transaction costs affect market development are
those of Omamo (1998), Key and Runsten (1999) and Crawford, et al. (2003).
Rural infrastructure also plays a major role shaping markets trough the reduction of
transport and transactions costs by improving spatial market integration. If transportation and
transaction costs are low, marketing integration is possible. If not, autarchy will prevail. Badiane
and Shively (1998), Kuiper, et al. (1999), Abdulai (2000), among others, have used multivariate
cointegration techniques to estimate the degree of spatial market integration. These studies
have shown that some markets may respond faster than others when they are affected by some
exogenous shock. However, what factors are behind these results is still something that has
not been sufficiently researched.
Although the theoretical literature on transaction costs is very extensive the literature
associated to measurement of transaction costs is scarce [Boerner and Macher (2002), Wang
(2003)]. Recently Renkow, et al. (2004) have estimated fix transaction costs (that is those
costs that do not depend on the volume traded) that may prevent access to market to certain
producers.  Using information of subsistence farmers in Kenya, these authors consider that
these transaction costs represent an ad-valorem tax equivalent to 15%. It is somewhat strange
however, that the fixed transaction costs are not substantially higher in those zones where
access the relevant markets using trucks with respect to those zones where do so using non-
motorized transport (like bicycles or mules). The fixed transaction costs associated with these
two groups are equivalent to 15% and 11%, respectively; although this difference is not
statistically significant. This would have happened, in our opinion, because the sample design
did not put care in segmenting producers according to the type of road access.
2.3.2 Household and farm specific impacts
A suitable access to public infrastructure would also have an effect on farm and individual
behavior, affecting productivity through technology adoption, input use, crop choice or labor
intensity both within agriculture as well as in non-agriculture related activities. During the last
few years there has been a wealth of papers looking at how infrastructure investments affect
productivity through these channels.4 Besides the seminal work of Binswanger, et al. (1993),
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which we already mention (which shows how infrastructure investments shape input usage,
credit demand and technology choice) many other authors have looked recently at the effect
of infrastructure investments on productivity through these channels. For example, regarding
technology choice,  Dalton, et al. (1997) shows the importance of rural infrastructure in
determining production costs and shaping the substitutability between labor, biochemical inputs
and capital. In the same area, Ann Hollifield, et al. (2000) show how infrastructure investment
in rural telecommunication affects local adoption of new technologies. More recently,
Gockowski and Ndoumbe (2004) shows that unit transportation costs significantly decrease
the probability of adoption of intensive monocrop technologies and Spencer (1994) shows
that the appropriate set of agriculture technology, that is, input efficient, needs to take into
account the scarcity of infrastructure, especially rural roads and irrigation systems. Regarding
the effect of infrastructure on input mix we should also mention the work of Obare, et al.
(2003). Their work establishes that farmers facing high farm-to-market access costs commit
less land, fertilizer and machinery resources to production, but more labor.
Several papers can be reported that have studied how infrastructure investment increases
agricultural productivity. Recent studies like that of Mamatzakis (2003), for Greece, show
that the public infrastructure operates as complement to private assets and to key inputs but
that it may substitute farm labor. This finding is interesting because it shows that the access to
infrastructure services may favor intensification processes that are capital and input intensive,
reducing agriculture labor demand, which will be repositioned into the labor market as non-
agriculture related activities expand as rural markets behave more dynamically thanks to
infrastructure development.
On the output side, Pingali and Rosegrant (1995) provides evidence regarding how
agricultural commercialization and diversification  processes are affected by rural infrastructure
availability, while Omamo (1998) shows how better infrastructure endowments affects
transaction costs and promotes specialization.
Given that most rural households are engaged in multiple economic activities, either
related to agriculture or non agricultural activities (associated to waged-employment or self-
employment sources), it is no wonder the access to public infrastructure also affects the labor
allocation within the household (diversifying livelihoods). This diversification can be the result
of the need to cope with unanticipated risks in a context where the credit and insurance markets
are either underdeveloped or even nonexistent [Zimmerman and Carter (2003) or Ellis, et al.
(2003)] or, alternatively, it can be due to the existence of entrance barriers to more profitable
labor markets product because of insufficient private or public assets [Reardon, et al. (2001)].
In either case, the access to public infrastructure can have both a direct and indirect role in
enhancing the opportunities for income generation of the rural poor.
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2.4 Distributional issues
As described in our conceptual framework (depicted in Figure 1.1), changes in the infrastructure
base can change livelihood strategies in different ways depending on the context and on the
asset base that the rural household possess or has access to. There is consensus in the literature
that the process of income and asset accumulation that infrastructure investment will trigger
has clear poverty reduction effects. However, what impact may have in income and asset
distribution is a matter of debate.
For many, the Government role of investing in public infrastructure can improve both
equity and efficiency. Esfahani (1987), Bayes (2001) or Fan, et al. (2002), for example, show
evidence on this regard. However, for others like Prahladachar (1983), Bigsten, et al. (2003),
Krongkaew and Kakwani (2003) or Benavides (2003)  infrastructure investments, if not
adequately combined with other public interventions, may affect negatively income distribution,
as the less poor in rural areas may grab more benefits from this investments than the poorest
segments thanks to their higher private endowments.
The rural poor almost always suffer the most from lack of appropriate infrastructure
and public services. However, while poverty alleviation is consistently a key objective of
rural infrastructure investments, the question of how to ensure that the richer members of the
rural population do not capture most of the benefits is far from clear. The non-excludable
nature of most rural infrastructure means that although programs may target the poorest, the
better off may benefit more than the poorest at whom the project is aimed. This is because
initial conditions do matter.
The institutional setting and the availability of social capital may also be an important
ingredient that can enhance or hinder the distributional impacts of public infrastructure
investments. For example, Ruttan as cited by Lebo and Schelling (2001) mentions that the
failure to reform a community power structure may led to local elite capturing a disproportionate
share of both the economic and political gains generated by infrastructure investments. On the
other hand, social capital, as a mediator for collective action can help people, for example,
build common property resources or maintain public provided infrastructure Orstrom (1990).
The access to infrastructure can affect the rate of return of the assets that are already
the poor own or have access to.  On this regard, Van De Walle (2000), for example, evaluates
if the returns to infrastructure investment are lower or higher for poor. We believe it is critical
to evaluate this empirically because it could be the case that the benefits of the infrastructure
investment may be captured by those richer, thanks to a greater access to key private assets
like, for example a larger endowment of human capital.
Chong and Calderón (2001) provide evidence at the aggregate level, in a context of a
dynamic panel of countries, that both quantity of infrastructure and quality of infrastructure
may be negatively linked with income inequality. However, this empirical regularity, like
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many of the others one reported here, are not framed in any conceptual model that may allow
us to understand what may be the main driving forces behind these results.
2.5 Conclusions
From our brief literature review we can conclude that although evidence does exist for improved
household welfare coming from rural infrastructure investments, relatively little evidence can
be found of studies that provided concrete linkages between specific investments in rural
infrastructure and increased welfare of the rural poor. Although it is important to know the
magnitude of the benefits that access to new or improved infrastructure services bring about,
it is also critically important to understand through which causal paths these benefits are
obtained. Better knowledge of these linkages will help us to understand why specific
interventions do not trigger certain behavioral responses and will help us to design
complementary interventions that will allow us to make the markets really work for the rural
poor.  New methodologies like those related to propensity score matching may provide us
with ways to address this type of analysis. However, as we will develop further in this study,
there is a need for adapting this kind of methodologies to the particularities of infrastructure
development. Until now, this methodologies have focused on individual based interventions
(i.e. a training program) however infrastructure investments are interventions that affect not
one individual but a group of heterogeneous individuals within a community.
We have also looked at how the literature has discussed the way geography may interact
with rural infrastructure. We have seen that for some authors geography may hinder the positive
effects of increased access to infrastructure services. For others it may provide the natural
capital needed to improved rural incomes. We believe that pursuing this interaction further, as
we will do along this study, is critical given the particular geographic diversity that a country
like Peru has.
Many studies reviewed in this chapter have shown that household and market specific
effects brought from infrastructure investment can be critical to reduce transaction costs and
improve market integration. By doing so, these authors have shown that we may achieve
greater market efficiency which in turn may have an important impact in rural income growth.
We will also pursue further this line of research in this study, by measuring first transaction
costs in rural Peru and then by connecting the reduction in transactions costs to rural market
development; specifically to improved market efficiency.
Very few papers in our literature review have discussed the effect of complementary
interventions so as to avoid the well known problem of diminishing marginal return to
infrastructure investments. We believe that this is a crucial and promising area of research.
This study look at this issue, showing at the microeconomic level that it is perfectly possible
to raise the marginal rate of return to rural infrastructure investment by investing simultaneously
in more than one infrastructure service or combine public infrastructure with private assets.
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Finally, the literature that we have reviewed shows conflicting results when addressing
the distributional impact of infrastructure investments.  For some it is perfectly possible to
have a "win-win" situation, where infrastructure investments are beneficial to rural household
both on efficiency and equity grounds. For others, it matters the asset endowment and
institutional base that both the rural poor and non-poor have to answer whether or not those
better off will obtain or not larger benefits from infrastructure investments. We believe whether
there is a trade off or not between efficiency and equity on the provision of rural infrastructure
is an empirical question; one that this study will also try to address.
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Chapter 3
The assets of the poor in Peru**
3.1 Introduction
Both income distribution and poverty levels have experienced important modifications during
the last four decades in Peru. Setting aside the problems of compatibility between surveys and
methodological differences associated with the calculation of these indicators, the evidence
suggests that over the last 40 years the dispersion of income distribution has decreased.
Additionally a significant reduction in poverty levels took place especially in the 1970s. In the
1980s and 1990s the dispersion in income distribution continued to fall, although at lower
rates with important fluctuations in poverty levels associated with abrupt changes in the
macroeconomic context. Although the most important changes in poverty, distribution of income
and spending occurred between 1960 and 1980, important modifications in patterns of poverty
have taken place since the mid-1980s. The availability of a database formed by five Household
Surveys (1985-1986, 1991, 1994,  1997, 2000) as well as a panel of households from 1991 to
1994 opens the way for an exploration of the changes in the possession of assets by the poor
population and their impact on poverty and income distribution.
The approach adopted by this chapter is to analyze the problems of possession and
access to assets and public infrastructure by the poor. Private, public and organizational assets
are the principal determinants of household spending and income flows, and are thus, crucial
in determining whether a family is successful in leaving poverty. In this respect, public policies
need to be carefully designed to resolve unequal access to certain assets (like public
infrastructure) that are suitable for state intervention and which facilitate access, accumulation,
and higher returns on household assets. For this reason, the document evaluates first the nature,
characteristics and recent trends in poverty in Peru, as well as trends in the distribution of
income/spending and assets. Next, a taxonomy of the assets of the population is made,
illustrating the existing dispersion and the differences in possession and access to assets by
the poorest sector. Using these tools, relationships are established between the different types
of assets and the status of poverty, as well as the mobility of households on income/expenditure
scale. Additionally, the effect of changing the access to key public infrastructure services on
the return from private assets is assessed.
The chapter is divided into seven major sections including this introduction. The second
section presents Peruvian historical trends regarding poverty and income distribution as well
** Sections 3.2 and 3.5 of this paper are based on "Los Activos de los Pobres en el Peru" by Javier Escobal, Jaime
Saavedra and Máximo Torero. Trimestre Económico  Vol LXVI(3) Número 263. pp. 619 - 659. July -September
1999. also in:  "Portrait of the Poor. An assets-based approach". Orazio Attanasio and Miguel Székely (editors).
Latin American Research Network. IADB. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Washington, 2001. pp.209-240.
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as its short term dynamics, with particular emphasis in rural Peru. Section 3.3 describes asset
ownership and access to key infrastructure services.  Then, Section 3.4 presents the conceptual
and analytical framework that we use to connect asset ownership to poverty status. Next, in
Section 3.5 we present our main results, showing how asset ownership and access to key
infrastructure services are crucial factors determining the distribution of income and spending
in rural Peru. In addition, this section assesses the impact of complementarities in infrastructure
provision. In section six we go one step further and discuss poverty dynamics and how its
short term dynamics is affected by changes in asset endowments. Finally, Section 3.7
summarizes the results and discusses how investments in rural infrastructure can be an effective
mechanism to strengthen the return of private assets facilitating the reduction of rural poverty.
3.2 Poverty in Peru
3.2.1 Historical trends
In the 1960s and 1970s, the empirical literature that analyzed income and spending focused
on the analysis of income distribution, neglecting estimates of the magnitude of poverty. In
general, the trend in income distribution and poverty were implicitly treated as biunivocally
interrelated concepts (i.e. an increase in income concentration would necessarily result in an
increase in poverty). It was enough establishing that a high percentage of low-income families
would receive a decreasing proportion of total income or spending to affirm that poverty was
increasing. Implicitly, the existence of a national poverty line was presumed without taking
into account the disparity of regional baskets and relative regional price structures, which
mean that the same level of spending can be associated in one region with a poor family, and
with a non-poor family in another region. Moreover, there was no discussion of more complex
relationships such as the possibility of distributive improvements in contexts of increases in
poverty or of more unequal distributions in contexts of reductions in poverty.
The National Food Consumption Survey (ENCA) of 1971-1972 was used to estimate
the long-term changes in poverty rate, applying the regional poverty lines calculated by Amat
Y León and León (1981)  and Amat Y León and Curonisy (1987). To compare the poverty
rates derived from this survey with poverty rates calculated from the National Surveys of
Standard of Living (ENNIV) for recent years, the lines were adjusted to make them
methodologically comparable with the lines associated with the ENNIV1. Note that both surveys
are reasonably comparable: both use family spending and the coverage of spending is similar.
Poverty in Peru has changed dramatically over the last three decades (see Table 3.1),
experiencing not only an important reduction but also compositional changes. While in the
1 Two adjustments were made to the data from Amat and León: homogenization of calorific consumption of both
surveys to construct a basic spending on food; and, use of the same method to extrapolate the global spending
required (i.e. the line) from the basic food spending.
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early 1970s poverty was largely rural - two-thirds of the poor were rural dwellers employed in
agriculture — the picture reversed in the mid-1990s, at which point two-thirds of the poor
were reported to be urban dwellers. Hence, while urban poverty rates have risen ten points
over the last 28 years, in the rural sector poverty has fallen 18 points.  In this sense, it is
possible that the entire long-term reduction in poverty could be a rural phenomenon arising
out of a major migratory process2.
2 The 1991 survey does not include tropical forest areas and the rural coast, while the other surveys are representative
at the national level.
3 Unlike the calculations presented in the rest of the document, the indicators presented here are based on published
aggregate figures from which the Gini coefficients were calculated, as well as the indicators of the incidence, gap
and severity of poverty. A quadratic functional form was estimated in each case for the Lorenz curve. For the
specific method used see Datt (1992).
4 For example, in 1985-86, the Gini based on family income is 0.48 while that based on income per capita is 0.495.
Webb and Figueroa (1975) and Figueroa (1982) have suggested that income distribution
in the 1960s was very unequal and that this inequality deepened in subsequent decades. The
works of Amat y León (1981a and 1981b), based on the National Food Survey of 1971-1972,
allowed us to calculate indicators of the distribution of family income and spending based on
published tabulations 3 which can be compared with our own figures based on more recent
survey data coming from the ENNIV surveys.
When we look to income distribution, as in most Latin American countries, Peru shows
an improvement in the aggregated levels (see Figure 3.1). The Gini coefficient fell three
percentage points between 1961 and 1971. However, taking into account the fact that the Gini
coefficient for per capita income is higher than the coefficient obtained for family income, it is
not possible to state that there has been a reduction in income dispersion. Rather, it is most
likely that the concentration levels of 1961 are similar to those of 1971-19724. Since 1971, a
clear pattern of reduction in dispersion has been observed. As shown in Figure 3.1, the Gini
coefficient of family income fell from 0.55 to 0.40 between the early 1970s and the 1990s. The
percentage of total income received by the poorest half of the population rose from 10.7 percent
to 24.5 percent in 1996, while the share of richest half fell from 61 percent to 43 percent.
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The trend in income distribution from the 1970s can also be corroborated by the
estimation of concentration indicators based on family spending5. It is also interesting noting
that the reduction in the dispersion of family or per capita income or spending could have
taken place both in periods in which average income was falling (e.g. 1985-86 to 1991) and in
periods in which it was rising (1991 to 1994 or 1996). Bruno, et al. (1998) demonstrate that
the empirical support for Kuznets’ suggested that systematic relationship between growth and
inequality is very weak. The Peruvian case also shows that there is no evident association
between the economic cycle and inequality6.
The connection between asset endowments and poverty alleviation is well understood in
the economic literature. For example, Birdsall and Londoño (1998) suggest that one of the
fundamental causes of poverty and income inequality is unequal access to and possession of
assets. In this respect, it should be possible to find modifications in the distribution of key assets
that underlie these long-term changes in income distribution.  Although no detailed information
(by household) is available on possession of assets before the 1980s for making a systematic
evaluation of their relationship, the evidence presented below suggests that the improvement in
the distribution of two key assets, land and human capital, played an important role in reducing
the concentration of income/spending and in poverty reduction, as will be seen later.
Thus, along with the reduction in income dispersion and poverty from the 1960s to the
1980s, an increase occurred in the average endowment of land and education, simultaneously
5 These results are shown in a more complete version of this document (see Escobal, et al. 1998).
6 More evidence on the time trend of inequality of income and spending using different databases is found in Saavedra
and Díaz (1998).
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with a reduction in the dispersion of these assets. For example, between 1961 and 1971 the
Gini coefficient of land distribution fell from 0.94 to 0.81, and then to 0.61 in 19947. At the
same time, between 1971 and 1994, the average endowment per farmer rose from one to two
hectares (standardized in equivalent units of irrigated coastal land). This occurred as a result
of a substantial expansion of the agricultural frontier (irrigation in the desert coastal strip and
expansion of the agricultural frontier in forest areas) and an increase in farming hectares
under irrigation.
At the end of the 1960s in Peru, the military government began an agrarian reform
process. However, before redistributing the land expropriated from large landowners, the
government collectivized agriculture, creating large cooperatives on the Costa and in the Sierra.
The failure of this reform, which became evident in the late 1970s, led to the splitting up of the
cooperatives. In 1980, the Belaúnde administration formalized this process, which continued
during the 1980s. In 1994, according to the III National Agricultural Census, Peruvian
agriculture consisted predominantly of highly atomized small holdings, excluding the peasant
communities of the Sierra which retained large areas of relatively infertile land. On the Costa,
approximately 50 percent of agricultural holdings were below three hectares and 62 percent in
the Sierra. Further, each producer had an average of three non-contiguous plots of land, with
is characteristic of the Sierra, where almost one-third of producers have five or more plots
averaging less than one hectare.
The other important change in average ownership and asset distribution was in education.
School enrolment increased massively since the 1950s. The proportion of school age children
who attended educational institutions rose dramatically. In 1940 30 percent of children aged
six to fourteen attended school, by 1993 this figure had risen to 86 percent. Starting in the
early 1970s this expansion extended to post-secondary education. These changes in enrolment
had an impact on the education level of population and labor force. While almost 60 percent
of population aged over 50 had no education in 1948, in 1996 the rate had dropped to 15
percent. In 1940 less than 5 percent had completed secondary level, by 1996 one third were
achieving this level of education. Average years of schooling rose consistently from two in
1940 to six in 1981 and eight in 1996.
It is clear that the educational expansion and redistribution of land resulted in a change
in the pattern of asset ownership among the poor population. As the return on these assets has
not fallen over time, it can be expected that these structural transformations raise, at least
partially, the average income of the poorest sector and improve income distribution. In the
case of land there is some evidence of a reduction in returns associated with the restrictions
that the agrarian reform imposed on trading this asset. This could have affected farmers’
7 The 1961 figure comes from Webb and Figueroa (1975), those for 1970 to 1994 are the authors’ own calculations
based on information from the Agricultural Census.
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opportunities for using land as a means of raising their income and reducing poverty. In contrast,
for education the evidence provided by Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985) for return rates
in the 1970s and early 1980s, as well as Saavedra (1997) in the mid-1980s and early 1990s,
shows little probability of a fall in the private return on education in the last three decades. The
notable increase in urban and rural educational levels and the reduction in the dispersion of
these assets indicate that the educational transformation over the last few decades is one of the
variables that may be explaining the changes identified in poverty and income distribution.
3.2.2 Recent trends in rural poverty
According to the National Survey of Households (ENAHO) in 2002, 76.4 percent, of those
living in rural areas can be considered poor8. This figure is far higher that urban poverty (41.5
percent). Despite the fact that only slightly more than one third of national population in Peru
is rural, half of the 14.5 million poor belong to the rural sector. Furthermore, the extreme
poverty rate (the ratio of households whose expenditures are below the requirements needed
for attaining a minimum caloric norm9) is 49.7 percent. This means that nearly three out of
four extreme poor live in rural area.
Even if these figures are high by international standards, there are important differences
in poverty and extreme poverty rates within the rural sector. While in rural Costa, typically
better integrated to factor and goods markets, 62.2 percent of rural population is poor, in the
Sierra and in the Sierra regions, where it is more difficult to access markets and large fraction
of the population is indigenous, poverty rates are significantly higher, reaching between 70
percent and 80 percent.  Also, these differences can be observed between political regions
where rural poverty rates range from 30 percent to 90 percent.
How has rural poverty evolved in recent years?  To answer this question, first of all, we
need a long and consistent poverty time series. However, there is a problem of comparability
across the different available surveys. Nevertheless, Herrera (2002) has done an important
effort trying to make comparable estimations of poverty using ENAHO data. Following the
criterion established by Herrera (2002), we present in Table 3.3 the poverty evolution for the
period 1987-2002. Also, we have included estimations from ENNIV, which are not strictly
comparable with those from ENAHO, although they are consistent across years within their
own survey.
Recent figures reported by INEI, show that in 2003 rural poverty reached a slightly
lower rate (1 percentage point) than the 2002 poverty rate. However, due to the reduced sample
size from which these new rates were calculated, the one percentage point difference is not
8 ENAHO is the national survey generated  by l INEI in a comparable basis since 1997.
9 2,232 calories per capita per day for Lima city, 2,133 calories for rural Sierra and Selva and 2,194 calories for all
other regions.
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Table 3.3 Poverty rates by geographic zones
(% poor)
Table 3.2  Poverty by geographic zone 2002
(Number and % poor people)
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statistically significant.10 In general, the profile for 2003 looks about the same as the one
reported here for 2002.11
Although it is necessary to be cautious in interpreting these figures, there are some
clear tendencies that can be seen in previous tables (and in Figure 3.2) which are worth
mentioning. First, we can see that poverty rates in rural Costa declined during the period of
fast growth that experience the Peruvian economy in 1991 and it started rising again as the
economy slowed down. On the contrary, poverty in the rural Sierra has been growing across
the period of analysis, except for a marginal reduction which took place between 1991 and
1994 (most certainly not statistically significant). The figures obtain for rural Sierra although
reflecting lower poverty rates than the Sierra, show a similar pattern.
If anyone looks at the ENNIV sample there is striking issue differences in the evolution
of poverty rates along regions during the period 1994-1997, a period with the greatest economic
dynamism during the last ten years, with a substantial increase in public and private investment.
While poverty rates in rural Costa and Sierra show important reductions (10.6 and 5.2 points
respectively), in highland they increase in 3.4 points. This could be a sign of the low responsiveness
to positive changes in macroeconomic environment that rural highland have shown.
10 Again, in 2003 there was another change in the methodology. Instead of doing the survey in the forth quarter, the
sample has been split and will be captured month by month. Since each month the sample maintains statistical
representativeness at the urban/rural and regional levels, INEI is aiming to have a monthly "moving average"
poverty rate that will allow them to do short term monitoring of poverty and targeting indicators.
11 The only difference is a significant reduction of poverty and extreme poverty rates in rural Selva area.
Figure 3.2 Evolution of rural poverty rates
(Trends)
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One way of looking at how responsive is rural Peru to growth is to calculate poverty-
growth elasticity estimates. Table 3.4 shows poverty-growth elasticity estimates based on
Duclos, et al. (2004) formulae. These figures indicate in what percentage poverty will drop
per additional percentage point in growth. It is important to note that these figures do not
reflect poverty percentage points. For example a value of -0.941 for rural Costa is equivalent
to a 0.57 percentage point reduction in this area due to growth (-0.941*0.605=0.57). The
results obtained here are in line with those obtained by Bourguignon (2003) and Bhalla (2004).
These elasticity calculations could confirm our hypothesis: rural Costa is much more
responsive to growth than the Sierra and Sierra regions.
3.3 Distribution of assets
The dispersion of spending or income, as well as the probabilities of individuals and families
being poor or non-poor, depends on their stock of assets and its return or market price. Assuming
that, aside from possible interactions between different assets, the return on possession of a
unit of an asset of physical, human, financial, public or organizational capital does not depend
on its level, the distribution of the assets plays an important role in the determination of the
distribution of income and spending.
Table 3.5 shows the average level of possession or access to different key assets in
Peruvian urban and rural sectors. Obviously, assets are not totally exogenous variables. Assets
possession depends on the possession of other assets, on changes in acquisition prices and on
the expected return on the assets. However, compared to previous years (see Escobal, et al.
(1998), patterns of possession and access to assets by quintiles are relatively similar, although
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the average in some cases had changed. For example, access to water increased, while access
to electricity had increased substantially, with the exception of the poorest quintile. Access to
telephones, average level of education, average years of experience and the age of the head of
household also rose, although the distribution did not vary substantially12.
In order to capture the level and the changes in the disparities in assets possession, Gini
coefficients were calculated for some of the assets from urban and rural areas (see Figure 3.3).
Possession of durable goods and head household’s labor experience are the assets with the
highest degree of dispersion in the urban area. Education variables reveal relatively low
dispersion, observing that the process of expansion of the educational system, which began in
the 1970s, is still continuing. On the other hand, when we look to the rural areas, the highest
12 Access to public services was expected to increase significantly by 1997 under commitments made by the companies
that acquired the privatized companies.
Figure 3.3 Gini coefficients of access to assets
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inequality indexes are on value of land (basically due to differences in quality), on the value of
durable goods and on the proportion of members with migration experience.  Meanwhile, as
in the urban areas, dispersion in education has been also reduced substantially, as a consequence
of the expansion process of the educational system. It is important to note that if these
calculations were at national level, the inequality of many of these assets would be much
greater because of the large gap in access to education and in infrastructure between urban and
rural sectors.
3.4 Relationship between assets and poverty: a conceptual framework
Depending on the conceptual framework, the relationship between possession of or access to
certain assets and poverty condition can be viewed either as a poverty profile or as an attempt
to understand its determinants. Based on a static optimization model of household production
and consumption, it is possible to derive a relationship between household spending and asset
levels which is open to empirical evaluation.
In fact, assuming that households as producers maximize benefits subject to the usual
technological restrictions (i.e. production function) and as consumers maximize their welfare
by optimizing consumption and work decisions given the level of utility obtained, it is possible,
as we will show below that we can establish a direct connection between possession and
access to assets and household spending levels.
Following Sadoulet and De Janvry (1995) and Singh et al. (1986), we assume that
household behaves as if production and consumption/work decisions were made sequentially
and therefore, we can solve the optimization problem recursively in two steps. In the first step,
the production problem is solved and in the second step the consumption problem is solved.
Therefore, the problem of optimization of the household as a producer will be:
Max 
(qa,x,l)
 π= p
a
 q
a
 - p
x 
x – wl              (1)
s.t.: g(q
a
,x,l,Aq)=0,
where q
a
 is the quantity produced at a price p
a
, x are the variable factors used in the
production process and l is the amount of hours of work used with a price w. g(•) represents
the production function and the assets affecting the production decision (e.g. fixed capital,
and size of the plot) are captured in Aq.
The reduced form of the model is therefore,
Supply function: q
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 , w ; Aq )
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In the second stage, the consumption/work problem is solved given the level of profit
π* achieved in production:
Max 
( c , cl ) 
 u(c,c
l 
;Ah),
s.t:  p
c 
c + wc
l
 = π* + wE,  (3)
c
l
 + ls = E,
where c represents the set of goods consumed by the household at prices p
c.
 c
1
 and ls are the
time the household assigns to work in the house and hours of work out of the household
respectively with a total time constraint of E. Finally, Ah represents assets affecting the
consumption decision.
The reduced form of the sequential model can then be expressed in terms of the demand
function for goods:
c = c ( p
a  
, p
x  
, w , y* ; A
h 
) (4)
where y* = p
a 
q
a
 - p
x 
x - wl + wE. From this demand function we can then obtain an expenditure
function for the household:
G = c . p
c
 = G(p;A), (5)
where p is the price vector and A is the vector of assets owned by the household that includes
also, all the assets the household can access. Even more, these assets can be subdivided
according to the degree of transferability into private assets (A
priv
), public assets (A
pub
) and
organizational assets (A
org
).  Therefore our equation of expenditures can be expressed as:
G = G(p;A
priv
,A
pub
,A
org
)                                                               (6)
To evaluate the relative importance of each type of assets we run a set of models
including separately each of the following groups of explanatory variables: neighboring public
assets, private assets and individual characteristics. Then, we identify the direct externality
effects from the presence of each of them.
Finally, we try to identify the critical amount and combination of public and private
assets needed to overcome possible poverty traps by correctly targeting investment in public
infrastructure in poorer districts. We model at least three types of public goods and services: a)
"traditional infrastructure" such as transportation, sewer systems, water, electricity which does
not generate positive network externalities; b) "human-capital-generating public services"
that are capable of creating mobile private assets, such as schooling and health services and c)
"information and communication technologies", such as telephone or Internet, all of which
generate network externalities. For example, an information highway is intrinsically different
from a transportation highway.
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To test the growth impact of the public assets that generates network externalities we
will use the fact that the impact of these types of assets on the income of the households will
not be linear (e.g. telecommunications), as the income impact might be larger whenever a
significant network size is achieved. This would imply that positive growth effects in income
might be subject to having achieved a critical mass in a given infrastructure.
In order to test whether such non-linearities exist and if so what the critical mass is, we
will include in equation (6) the quadratic terms of the stock of those assets in the specific
districts of the household. If the coefficient of the stock of this asset is negative and the coefficient
of its squared term positive, then we will have evidence in support of a "critical mass" theory,
in which the impact might be insignificant in low intensities of such asset.
Assuming, for example, a quadratic function on the assets, the effect of an increase in
one of them on household expenditure can be expressed as:
(7)
which implies that the asset elasticity will be equal to:
(8)
and the cross elasticity will be:
                                                                      (9)
Therefore, we can estimate the own and complementary elasticities –given that controls
for all other public and private assets will be included- effects of the different types of assets.
The analysis of these elasticities, as well as some simulations that are carried on should shed
light in the complementary nature of public investments and their pattern across the income
(expenditure) distribution, should make evident the presence of important non-linearities in
public investments.
3.5 Relationship between assets and poverty in rural Peru
3.5.1 Empirical results
Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 show the distribution patterns for the different assets under study
between poor and non poor rural dwellers. Here, it is obvious that those households with more
education also have in average a higher level of expenditure. On the other hand, this relationship
is not so clear in the case of access to a health center in the village. Even more, when analyzing
the number of poor and non poor households with access to a health center, in both cases
approximately 30 percent of the households had access. A possible explanation could be the
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significant expansion plan of number of health centers along rural Peru in the last years was
targeted to poorer households making the distribution of this asset more equitative.
When we look to what we called traditional infrastructure, as access to drinkable water,
sewerage and electricity, we can find a positive relationship between them and the level of
expenditure of the households, as a proxy of income. Likewise, the time to a paved road is
positively correlated to the level of expenditure of the households. There are several benefits
that a faster access to paved roads can bring to the poor rural households, for example they can
reduce the transportation access to social and government services, such as health, education,
justice, policing, and public registries; articulate households with markets; and increase
opportunities to develop income-earning activities.
Finally, Figure 3.6 looks to the Kernel distribution of access to one of the most important
assets within it is called Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). ICT’s include
Chapter 3
Figure 3.4 Access to assets and rural poverty: human capital assets
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Figure 3.5 Access to assets and rural poverty: traditional infrastructure assets
a wide range of services, but telephone is the precondition for most of the other ICTs13 and as
shown in the figure, it also had a positive correlation with the level of income (expenditure) of
the households. The current literature had identified several potential impacts of accessing
ICTs. For example, the fact that access to telephone may permit a reduction in distance related
constraints which have limited the potential for economic development in rural and remote
regions. Even more, accessing ICTs increases efficiency and reduces transaction costs, including
transport costs; provides improved access to information; and it strengthens household members’
economical capabilities as they obtain more product information and improves the speed of
the responses to market signals.
The distribution of assets depicted in the above graphics reveals that although poor households
have in general fewer assets that non poor, this pattern is not necessarily true for all assets.
13 It is important to note that due to the adverse geographic conditions that prevail in rural Peru most of the telephone
services could only be provided by wireless technologies.
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Figure 3.6 Access to assets and rural poverty: information and communication technologies
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show the results of our econometric methodology. In Table 3.6 we
just run a weighted regression14 in levels and also the fully interactive model. In Table 3.7 we
include in addition, the sampling framework of the LSMS of 200015. As mentioned by Deaton
(1997), if the cluster design of the data is ignored, standard formulas for variances of estimated
means are too small, a result which applies essentially, the same way to the formulas for the
variance-covariance matrices of regression parameters estimated by OLS. Therefore to solve
this problem we use the procedure developed by STATA for correcting the estimated standard
errors of the least squares regression.
Our results, once we corrected for the sampling framework, show that access to human
capital assets are of great importance in explaining the level of per capita expenditure. Education
for example shows a significant and positive effect both of the household head and of the
other members bigger than fourteen years16. Similarly, the variable measuring the migratory
experience of the household is significant and positive. Both of these variables are important
14 With respect to the use of sampling weights there is an important controversy both at the theoretical and practical
level. The discussion basically consists in two issues: (i) include or not the sampling weights and the sample design
in the estimation of the coefficients (ii) to correct or not to correct the standard errors associated to those coefficients
(Deaton, 1997; Pfeffermann,1993). A weighted regression provides a consistent estimate of the population regression
function, provided of course the assumption about functional form is correct. This is especially relevant in our case
in which we are looking at the mean of one variable conditional on others.
15 In surveys of rural areas such as the LSMS, clusters are often villages, so the households in a single cluster live near
one another, and are interviewed at much the same time during the period that the survey team is in the village. As
a result, the observations from the same cluster are much more like one another than are observations from different
clusters. At the simplest they may be neighborhood effects, so that local eccentricities are copied by those who live
near one another and become more or less uniform within a village (Deaton 1997).
16 Even more, when including the square term, the sign is also positive and significant in both the household head and
the average years of education of the household members; it means that the returns to education increase as the
number of years of education does. Finally we exclude the square terms from the regression because there was
colinearity with the interactions.
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in rural areas because they become part of a mobile asset for the household members. The
analysis also confirms that access to credit and ownership of assets that can be used as collateral
has a positive effect on spending and therefore on the probability of not being poor.
In addition, reductions in family size have a significant positive impact on the return on
the above-mentioned assets. The concept that an increase in family size implies an increase in
the productive resources of the family and therefore, an increase in family well-being is not
empirically sustained. This could justify public intervention in the area of family planning, but
since the variable is endogenous to other decisions and restrictions that affect the household, it is
not possible to validate such a policy recommendation without first understanding the mechanism
of the determination of family size. As specified in these calculations, the variable could in fact
be capturing the effect of human capital-related variables that are not easily observable.
When analysing the impact of rural infrastructure, as expected, we find a significant
and positive impact over expenditure per capita of access to electricity and access to
infrastructure for drinkable water17. In the specific case of time to paved roads and access to
primary or secondary schools, both of these variables become significant and with the expected
signs when taking in to account their complementarities with other assets. Specifically, in the
case of roads and as mentioned previously, an improvement in the transport system could
considerably reduce what is a significant constraint on agricultural efforts in rural areas. The
lack of a reliable transportation, reflected in high transport and transaction costs, hampers the
capacity of rural households to articulate with markets and forces them to continue in subsistence
agriculture. Proximity to markets reduces effective prices of agriculture inputs and outputs.
Purchases of modern inputs and sales of outputs decline with distance from market,
and transport costs influence farm profits through input use and crop marketing decisions.
Even more, we find that there is a strong complementarity between a closer access to roads
and telephones, something consistent with the idea of a reduction of transaction costs and an
increase to proximity of markets.
Among the additional most important interactions that are shown to be significant we
should mention some obvious like the complementarity’s between access to road infrastructure
and the fact that the house has better roofs, which could be a result of a major market value of
the house once there is a close paved road. At the same, time several interactions point to
complementarity’s nature on public and private assets, like the one established between access
to education infrastructure and access to electricity. Finally, statistical evidence was found
that variables of public and organizational capital such as being director of the local
organizations have a similar positive impact.
The assets of the poor in Peru
17 In this specific case the variable which is positive and significant at 5 percent level of confidence is the number of
households with infrastructure for drinkable water. Additionally, these variables could be measuring the need to
have a critical mass of households connected to the drinkable water system to be able to cover the significant fix
cost needed to incur.
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Table 3.6  Regression analysis of  per capita expenditure
(using variables without interactions)
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Table 3.7 Regression analysis of per capita expenditure in the household
(using variable interactions)
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In the next section, using the parameters estimated from the spending equations, we
calculated the impact of changes in ownership and access to complementary assets on
expenditure level.
3.5.2 Assessing the effect of complementarities
Using the expenditure function estimated in the previous section, we have run some simulations
to show not only the importance of key assets in explaining per-capita expenditure, but also
the importance of complementarity in the allocation of public infrastructure.
Table 3.8 shows how much will per capita expenditure increase if we provide some
additional infrastructure to rural dwellers. Here, we evaluate the impact of public phones,
education, sewerage systems and road infrastructure in each of the 5 quintiles of the rural
expenditure distribution. For example, accessing public phones will increase per-capita
expenditure by less than 2 percent in the poorest quintile of the distribution and will increase
it by 12 percent for the richest quintile of the distribution. A similar pattern can be observed
with respect to access to other key assets that we evaluate here.
Table 3.9 shows the results of these simulations contrasting the effects of provision of
public infrastructure between poor and non-poor rural dwellers. As expected, although all
rural inhabitants benefit with the provision of additional public infrastructure, non-poor rural
dweller tend to benefit more. This is obviously, the effect of the additional private (and public)
asset endowment that non-poor have in comparison with the rural poor. A better educated
rural dweller typically positioned in the richest quintile, may use the same public infrastructure
in more profitable way than a less educated rural dweller positioned in the poorest quintile.
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show the combined effect of delivering public infrastructure to
rural inhabitants of Peru. Two very interesting conclusions emerge from analyzing these
simulations. First, the results show a positive effect of being able to access to more than one
asset at the same time. The combination of one or more assets sometimes increases the impact
over the welfare of the households in more than the sum of its individual impacts, and in some
Table 3.8 Increase in household expenditure through access to selected assets
(By quintiles – percentage)
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Table 3.9 Increase in household expenditure through access to selected assets
(Percentage)
Table 3.10 Increase in household expenditure through simultaneous access to selected assets
(By quintiles - percentage)
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case the effect is multiplicative. Second, complementarity investments tend to close the gap
between poor and non-poor rural dwellers. For example while investing in public phones
increases per capita expenditures in the richest and poorest quintile in 12 percent and less than
2 percent, respectively, adding an additional investment, like improved roads increases per
capita expenditures in the richest and poorest quintile in 18 percent and about 7 percent,
respectively. Adding a third asset, like sewerage, increases per capita expenditures in the
richest and poorest quintile in 52 percent and 42 percent, respectively. This is consistent with
the idea that the simultaneous provision of public assets is an effective way of equalizing
opportunities between the poor and non poor.
3.6 Assets, access to infrastructure and transition between states of poverty
Possession or access to assets of human, physical, financial, public and organizational capital
would not only raise the return on private assets but have an effect on the process of asset
accumulation. Thus, the original possession of assets, their process of accumulation and the
existence of external shocks would be the determinants of the transition of households along
Table 3.11 Increase in Household Expenditure through access to selected assets
(Percentage)
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Table 3.12 Distribution of household panel between 1991 and 1994
(Percentages)
The estimate of equation (10) requires the use of a discrete variable indicating changes
between the different states, and the use of a multinomial logit to estimate the effect of the
possession of different types of asset on the probability that for example a household remains
in poverty or makes a successful transition. Estimating the transition matrix from the
The assets of the poor in Peru
the scale of income or spending. Under this criterion, it is possible to derive an equation that
represents the transition of a household:
from one level of spending to another, or alternatively from states of poverty or non-poverty,
where all the variables have been defined, except h which represents a vector of short-term
shocks that affect current income/spending. In our case, we introduced two variables to capture
short-term shocks: the spending of the Compensation and Social Development Fund
(FONCODES) between 1991 and 1994 and the change in the labor status between both years
(the difference between the household occupation rate measured as the number of household
working members compared with the number of members aged over 14). Both variables attempt
to capture short-term modifications in the macro-environment which have not yet resulted in
changes in the possession of assets.
To evaluate the transition between states of poverty, a panel of 1,316 households
surveyed in 1991 and 1994 was used. To see how representative the panel is with respect to
the 1991 sample, the panel information for the principal variables under study was compared
with data that was not part of the panel because the households were not present in the 1994
survey. The coverage of the panel represents 71.5 percent of the 1991 sample. The results,
based on the principal variables under study, show that information at panel level does not
contain significant differences in relation to the global sample of 1991. However, the panel
assigns greater weight to the urban north Costa and lesser weight to Lima city. In relation to
poverty rate, the panel captures the distribution of the total sample, although with a slight bias
since it captures 74 percent of the poor and only 71 percent of the non-poor.  Table 3.12 shows
the distribution of households included in the panel.
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multinomial logit is asymptotically equivalent to directly estimate it by maximum verisimilitude.
The advantage of the option used here is that it explicitly identifies the effects of the possession
of different assets on the transition process.
Since certain changes in assets possession can be considered endogenous to the process
of household decision-making, these changes have to be instrumentalized, especially for
changes in key assets such as education, financial saving, land or livestock. Changes in public
assets are considered exogenous to the process of household decision-making and they are
not, therefore, instrumentalized. For the instrumentalization, the endowment of initial assets
is used both, those that appear in the estimate and others not considered in the estimated
model (e.g. education of the rest of the household).
Since the set of explanatory variables shows an important degree of collinearity, certain
restrictions were imposed. In particular, the estimated model assumes that changes in possession
of assets help explain the transitions but do not affect households remained in the same state
between 1991 and 1994. It is also assumed that the asset levels help explain why certain
households remain poor or non-poor but are less important in explaining the transition.18
Additionally, because of the small number of panel observations for the rural sector, the model
was estimated for the entire sample.
Table 3.13 Model´s prediction rate
Table 3.14 shows the results obtained from the proposed multi-nominal logit model. The
model maintained 15 explanatory variables previously analyzed which are indicators of the
assets of human capital (education of head of household, potential labor experience, gender
differences, migratory ability, illnesses in the household and family size), assets of physical and
financial capital (financial saving, durable goods, land, livestock), and of public and organizational
capital (access to water, electricity, sewerage, telephone and membership of social organizations).
The prediction rate of the model (see Table 3.13) is reasonably high for households that remain
in their initial state (poor or non-poor). In contrast, the prediction rate for households that make
18 These assumptions appear reasonable in the light of the results of the unrestricted logit model, with the sole
exception of the educational variable in the equations that explain the transitions (variable that was introduced in
the model). It should be noted that due to the high collinearity verified between the changes in the assets and their
levels, these restrictions were imposed ex ante.
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Table 3.14 Multinomial analysis of changes in states of poverty
(Marginal effects)
Poor to non-poor Non poor to poor
Coefficients z Coefficients z
I:   In transition
Education of head of household -0.002 -0.519 -0.006 -2.5
Gender 0.018 0.433 0.006 0.241
∆(Education of head of household) (1) 0.007 1.489 -0.012 -4.098
∆(Potential labor experience) -0.002 -1.623 -0.002 -2.127
∆(Migration) 0.146 2.486 -0.078 -2.053
∆(Land) (1) 0.021 1.552 -0.003 -1.384
∆(Access to potable water) 0.017 0.31 0.063 2.218
∆(Access to sewerage) 0.021 0.29 0 -0.007
∆(Access to electricity) 0.029 0.324 -0.063 -0.938
∆(Access to telephone) 0.051 0.67 -0.1 -1.174
∆(Family size) -0.034 -5.124 0.028 6.842
∆(Financial savings) 1/ -0.014 -0.068 0.045 0.345
∆(Livestock)1/ -0.001 -0.882 -0.001 -1.796
∆(Community capital) -0.062 -0.799 -0.003 -0.075
∆(Labor status) 0.052 1.806 -0.057 -3.184
FONCODES 0 0.304 0 -0.864
Constant -0.058 -0.922 -0.063 -1.87
II: Constant
Education of head of household -0.032 -7.047 0.049 8.713
Potential labor experience -0.005 -4.193 0.008 5.416
Gender 0.031 0.883 -0.086 -1.668
Migration -0.202 -3.569 0.137 1.992
Illness -0.002 -0.147 -0.003 -0.232
Family size 0.062 8.357 -0.092 -10.011
Financial savings -0.466 -2.842 0.315 3.45
Durable goods 0 1.186 0 -0.682
Land 0 0.008 0.001 0.347
Access to potable water -0.018 -0.52 -0.056 -0.988
Access to sewerage -0.003 -0.104 0.077 1.607
Access to electricity -0.049 -0.906 0.101 1.148
Access to telephone -0.446 -4.417 0.418 6.016
Community capital 0.448 1.845 0.063 0.179
Livestock 0.002 2.234 -0.004 -2.333
Labor status 0.077 3.397 -0.102 -2.918
FONCODES 0 -0.003 0 -0.085
Constant 0.181 2.162 -0.156 -1.239
Pseudo R2 0.195
1/These variables were instrumentalized to correct possible bias due to endogenous effects.
Source: Own estimates
the transition from states of poverty is low, reflecting inability to capture adequately all the short-
term shocks that affect the transitory income or spending of the households.
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The multivariate logit-type models have the independence of irrelevant alternatives
property (IIA), that is, to add or reduce alternatives or states; it does not affect the relative
probabilities of the state maintained in the model. This property could be undesirable in a
model such as that proposed here because the states are conditional on the initial position of
each household. To verify that this property does not generate important biases in the results
obtained, the statistical test developed by Hausman and Mcfadden (1984) was used. As shown
in Table 3.15, in our case the tests show that the estimates of the proposed model were not
affected by this assumption.
Table 3.15 Hausman test for IIA
Excluding alternative poor-poor 13.7563
Excluding alternative poor/non-poor 10.9349
Excluding alternative non-poor/poor 11.1669
Excluding alternative non-poor/non-poor 62.6985
Note: The critical value is 75.35 at the level of 1 percent.
Source: Own estimates
The probabilities of transition are presented in Table 3.16 where the effective probability
is equivalent to the transitions effectively observed and reported in 3.12
Table 3.16 Probability of transition
States Efective Estimate
Poor to poor 29.3% 35.7%
Poor to non-poor 21.0% 10.5%
Non-poor to poor 10.0% 3.0%
Non-poor to non-poor 39.7% 50.8%
Total 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Own estimates
The results reveal that the assets of human capital assets (years of education of head of
household, potential experience of head, migratory experience and family size), financial capital
(financial savings), physical capital (livestock) and public and organizational capital (access
to telephone and membership of associations) are crucial in explaining why certain households
remain in a state of poverty or non-poverty. Changes in some human capital assets (migratory
experience and family size) as well as the positive shocks associated with change in the labor
status are the variables that better explain the transition from poverty. Conversely, the variables
that better explain why certain households that were not poor in 1991 had become poor by
1994 are the level and change in educational level of the head of household, changes in labor
and migratory experience, together with lack of access to public goods and the adverse shock
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associated with the change in labor status. Gender differences are not important in any of the
four states analyzed. Additionally, of the short-term shocks identified (FONCODES spending
and change in labor status) only the second has explanatory power for understanding the
reasons why a household moves into or out of poverty. Lastly as expected, family size reduces
the probability of improving status and is determinant in explaining why some households
remain in poverty.
3.7 Conclusions
This study has empirically verified the key assets that characterize the poor population of
Peru. It has attempted to better understand the connection between assets and poverty, analyzing
changes in the distribution of assets, the link between access to or possession of these assets
and poverty, and the connection between their returns and poverty. Given that many of these
assets are reasonably exogenous, at least in the short term, an understanding of these
relationships enriches the debate about which public policies could have the greatest effect on
poverty reduction.
In the Peruvian case, this chapter shows the importance of variables such as education
and family size for typifying the state of poverty of individuals, through the analysis of probit
models and spending regressions. The analysis also confirms that access to credit and ownership
of assets that can be used as collateral has a positive effect on spending and on the probability
of not being poor. Finally, statistical evidence was found that variables of public and
organizational capital such as membership of organizations, and access to basic public services
such as water, sewerage, electricity and telephone have a similar impact. In this respect, the
empirical analysis is consistent with the view that the lack of access to certain key assets,
which generate sufficient income for loans for a part of the population, underlies the problem
of poverty.
Levels and changes in the assets returns are as important as the possession of them in
determining poverty status. These returns can also be modified by accessing complementary
key assets. Utilizing the parameters estimated from the spending equations, the impact was
calculated of changes in the ownership and access to complementary assets on the return on
education and land. The results show a positive effect of public assets on these returns, which
is evidence that private and public assets are complementary. This shows the role of public
policy in terms of provision of services and infrastructure as a mechanism to strengthen the
return from private assets and thus facilitate reduction of poverty.
Further, reductions in family size have a significant positive impact on the return of the
assets mentioned. The concept that the larger the family implies an increase in the productive
resources of the family and therefore an increase in wellbeing is not empirically sustained.
The finding is very significant even if the existence of economies of scale is accepted in
family consumption. This could justify public intervention in the area of family planning, but
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since the variable is endogenous to other decisions and restrictions that affect the household,
it is not possible to validate such a policy recommendation without first understanding the
mechanism of the determination of family size. The variable as included in these calculations
could in fact be capturing the effect of variables of human capital that are not easily observable.
When looking to the complementarities of the assets the results show a positive effect
of being able to access to more than one asset at the same time. In this sense the combination
of one or more assets sometimes increase the impact over the welfare of the households in
more than the sum of its individual impacts, and in some case the effect is multiplicative. For
example, a poor household has access to telephone only its expenditure will increase in 4
percent, if it has only access to a road one hour less than previously its expenditure will
increase in 1 percent, meanwhile if both assets are given to the household simultaneously its
expenditure will increase in 7 percent. Even more, if in addition this household has access to
primary and secondary schools in its village then its expenditure will increase in more than 11
percent, while the arithmetic sum of the increase in expenditure of having each asset alone
was only 7 percent. This result clearly shows the role of public policy in terms of provision of
services and infrastructure as a mechanism to strengthen the return from private assets and
thus facilitates reduction of poverty. The results also show that the additional provision of
public goods serves as an equalizing force between the rural poor and the non poor.
A dynamic analysis was also done of the ownership of assets on mobility between the
states of poverty and non-poverty. It was found that the initial levels of the assets are not enough
to explain transitions into and out of poverty, although they are crucial in explaining permanence
in poverty or non-poverty. This is to be expected since the sample of household in panel form
was for a relatively short period (1991-1994). Education, labor experience and family size, as
well as financial saving, access to telephone and ownership of livestock are the most important
variables in explaining whether a household will remain in its original state of poverty.
In contrast, to explain transitions into and out of poverty, in addition to initial levels
and changes in assets, shocks linked to short term changes have to be considered. These
shocks were partially approximated by short-term changes in the social spending of
FONCODES in each household’s district and by short-term changes in the labor status of
household members. Thus, to leave poverty, the crucial factors are an increase in migratory
experience, an increase in the number of employed persons in relation to total members of
working age, and a reduction in family size. On the other hand, the level of education and its
increase, labor experience, reduction in family size, improvements in access to potable water,
and increases in livestock reduce the probability that a household move into a state of poverty.
In this analysis of transition, the variable of FONCODES district spending was not significant.
The analysis suggests the possible existence of a relationship between poverty and the
distribution of assets and income. The reduction in poverty and spending dispersion could be
related to long-term structural changes in the average ownership and dispersion of education
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and land ownership. The decrease in the dispersion of land ownership is evidence, together
with the increase in the stock of available land, of consistency with increased ownership of
this asset by the poor. Yet, the absence of an institutional framework to facilitate the transfer of
land lowered its value market value and its productivity. Additionally, the lack of other
complementary assets, such as public goods and education, keeps poverty rates very high
despite possible improvement of distribution within the rural sector.
69
Chapter 4
Public Infrastructure under Geographic Constraints*
4.1 Introduction
In "The Wealth and Poverty of Nations" David S. Landes argues that Europe’s temperate
climate encouraged hard work and capitalist development, while the heat of the tropics brought
reliance on slaves [Eichengreen (1998), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997)], trying to explain
why the United States and Canada have been so much more successful over time than other
New World economies, suggest that the roots of these disparities on the extent of inequality
lay on differences in the initial factor endowments of the respective colonies. Why do we see
areas with persistently low living standards, even in growing economies? Will the legacy of
these differences persist?
One view is that differences arise from persistent spatial concentrations of individuals
with personal attributes inhibiting growth in their living standards. This view does not ascribe
a causal role to geography per se; in other words, identical individuals will, by this view, have
the same growth prospects regardless of where they live. Alternatively, one might argue that
geography has a causal role in determining how household welfare evolves over time. By this
view, geographic externalities arising from natural geographic characteristics, local public
assets, or local endowments of private assets, entail that living in a well endowed area means
that a poor household can eventually escape poverty. Yet an otherwise identical household
living in a poor area experiences stagnation or decline. If this is so, then it is important for
policy makers to understand how geographic factors do matter to growth prospects at the
micro level [Jalan and Ravallion (1998), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997)]
Peru has an astonishing variety of ecological areas. Only a few countries offer so many
climate zones and landscapes, with rainforests, high mountain ranges and dry deserts. Peru
contains a total of 84 of the world’s 104 known living ecological regions and 28 different
climates. This geographic diversity, its link to development and the important differences in
the welfare of the different regions makes Peru a good case study in attempting to ascertain
what role geographic variables -both natural and manmade- play in explaining per capita
expenditure differentials across regions within Peru.
As shown in Table 4.1, when comparing within countries variability of income per
capita across Latin America, it is clear that Peru has one of the highest degrees of inequality
between regions in Latin America. According to the World Bank (1999) and our own estimates
based on the Peruvian LSMS of 1997, Peru has a larger dispersion of per capita income by
* Chapter based on "Adverse Geography and Differences in Welfare in Peru" by Javier Escobal and Máximo Torero.
In: Spatial Inequality and Development.  Ravi Kanbur and Tony Venables (Eds.) WIDER and Oxford University
Press  2004 (forthcoming)
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region than Colombia, Brazil, Chile or Mexico. Only Argentina is reported as having larger
regional income disparities. Furthermore, this dispersion is also very large within the different
geographical regions of Peru.
This chapter attempts to show whether geographic externalities arising from natural
geographic characteristics have a causal role in determining how household welfare evolves.
The chapter is divided into six major sections. The second section gives a detailed description of
Peru’s geography and specifically the main areas in which geography might play a fundamental
role in economic development. It also makes a first attempt to analyze whether there is a correlation
between geographic variables and earning levels. Additionally, it analyzes whether the differences
observed across the different regions in Peru are also correlated to the changes in geography and
therefore to geographic externalities. In the third section we try to formally answer whether
geography is a determinant of the evolution of welfare across households over time. We developed
a model of consumption and consumption growth at household and province level respectively.
This model not only takes in the local effect of geographic variables but also includes spatial
econometric techniques to ascertain the presence of persistent spatial concentrations forced by
geography. In addition, we also analyze whether the presence of positive geographic externalities
arising from local public assets, or local endowments of private assets implies that the effect of
natural geographic characteristics can be overcome and therefore a poor household can eventually
escape poverty. To be able to analyze the partial effects of each of these types of assets (geographic,
private and public assets) we also develop a methodology to break down the partial effects of
each of these variables.
Fourth section details the main databases constructed for this chapter and the
methodological issues regarding the databases. We use the national census for 1972, 1981 and
1993, the Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys for 1991, 1994, 1996, and
1997, information from the district infrastructure census, geographical data-sets, and
information from the III National Agrarian Census of 1994. In Section 4.5 the results are
presented and, lastly, we detail the major conclusions of the study.
 
Table 4.1 Regional income per-capita dispersion in Latin American countries
(Selected years)
Year Dispersion
Colombia 1989 0.358
Brazil 1994 0.424
Chile 1994 0.470
Mexico 1993 0.502
Peru 1997 0.561
Argentina 1995 0.736
(1): Unweighted coefficient of Variation
Source: Falcon, P. (1998) and own estimates
Public Infrastructure under Geographic Constraints
71
Chapter 4
4. 2. Basic Characteristics of Peruvian Geography
Leading historians and economists have long recognized geography as having a crucial role in
economic development, even though geography has been neglected in most recent empirical
studies of comparative growth across countries and of comparative growth within the same
country.1
Specifically, in the case of Peru the enormous diversity of its geography makes it an
extremely interesting case study to analyze the importance of these variables to economic
growth within the country.2 Peru is located in the Tropical Zone of the globe, but because of
variations in relief and such factors as rain shadows, bodies of water (i.e. marine currents such
as "El Niño" and Humboldt) and wind patterns, it comprises a multitude of microclimates.
Although many geographic factors interact, it can be said that, throughout most of Peru, the
orography and the morphologic structure of the Andes has conditioned the local climate, the
type and use of the land, and the agricultural activities of the country.
The entire coastal area of Peru (around 11 percent of its territory but with 49 percent of
the total population)3 is one of the driest regions on the surface of the Earth. Cold waters off the
coast and the proximity of the high Andes, as well as wind patterns out of the South Pacific high
pressure system, contribute to the virtual lack of rainfall in this region. However, this cold humid
desert results in pleasant living conditions for those not bothered by the lack of rainfall.
Many separate ranges, surrounding several areas of high plateau, make up the Andes in
Peru, which account for 31 percent of Peruvian territory. Passes through these mountains are
usually high and difficult, especially in the southern Andes, which can be considered a barrier
to trade and transportation. Climatic conditions also make vast areas of the Peruvian Andes
relatively inhospitable.
A large part of Peruvian territory (about 58 percent) lies in the Amazon Basin. Most of
this area is covered by dense forest that has slowed the development of the region. In some of
these areas annual floods raise the water level more than 15 meters (50 feet) and inundate
thousands of square miles of land. These floods deposit alluvial silts that renew the soils of the
flooded areas.
The distribution patterns of vegetation and soils in Peru are closely related to the
distribution patterns of landforms and climate. That is, tropical-forest types of vegetation and
soils are found mainly in the Amazon Basin, while desert types are found mainly along the
coast of Peru. Soils in most tropical forests are poorly developed and low in fertility except in
areas subject to annual flooding.
1 There are few studies estimating the economic importance of geography within a region or a country, for example
Bloom and Sachs (1998) make a great contribution for the case of Africa and Engerman and Sokoloff (1998) for
Canada and the U.S.
2 There exist several papers [Hall and Jones (1998, 1997), Gallup et al (1998), Moreno and Trehan (1997), Davis
and Weinstein (1996)] that have tried to answer the question of the importance of geography in explaining the
levels of economic activity across countries.
3 In comparison, Selva represents 58 percent of the territory but holds only 7 percent of the population.
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Peru is also well known for its mineral reserves. It has the world’s second largest
proven reserves of silver, third largest of tin, fourth of lead, seventh of copper and eighth of
gold. A large proportion of Peru’s mineral surface composition is sedimentary rock where
petroleum deposits are usually found; and igneous and metamorphic rock where gold, silver,
and copper deposits are to be found.
Despite the fact that there have been many efforts to link Peruvian geographic diversity
to key issues as important as settlement location or construction of administrative or political
regions, very little has been done to analyze the links between this geographic diversity and
development, economic growth or poverty. The only exception is the construction of "poverty
maps" done by the Government to help target social programs. One of the most recent efforts
in this regard is the construction of poverty indexes at the provincial and district level by
FONCODES (the public agency in charge of poverty alleviation programs)4. Although these
maps are "geographic" in nature, no effort has been made to link them to geographic variables,
trying, for example, to find out whether there is any kind of poverty trap due to the negative
externalities of certain "geographic endowments". However, this map clearly shows that there
are huge welfare disparities across the country, and there is a heavy concentration of very poor
people in the most geographically adverse regions, as in the Sierra and Selva.
Table 4.2 also shows how there is a negative relation between the main geographic
variables (altitude, rainfall, and temperature) and household economic welfare. The higher
the altitude the larger is the number of poor households in the specific region (districts). As
expected, temperature shows a non linear relationship such that poverty increases in areas
with very low levels of temperature and with extremely high levels of temperature. The
precipitation variable however, does not display a clear relationship.
On the other hand, these welfare disparities can also be attributed, at least in part, to a
significant dispersion of asset ownership or access. As can be seen in Table 4.3, most of the
access to public assets and services is at least 2 or 3 times as high in urban areas as compared
to rural areas. In the case of access to sanitation, differences are even greater (see Table 4.3)5.
Even though access to public goods and services has increased dramatically in rural
areas during the last four years, new access continues to be biased in favor of urban areas. Two
thirds of the new electricity, sanitation and health services are placed in urban areas. Only in
education does the pattern of new public services placed in rural areas surpass that of urban
areas (see Table 4.4).
4 This index was constructed at the district level by weighting socioeconomic indicators reflecting: extreme poverty
(infant mortality, children with chronic malnutrition), indicators of education (illiteracy rate, school attendance
rate), labor market indicators (proportion of working children, percentage of illiterate adults), housing indicators
(percentage of households living in overcrowded housing, percentage of houses with precarious roofing), and
basic services indicators (access provided by public networks to water, sanitation and electricity).
5 Poverty maps provide a detailed description of the spatial distribution of poverty within the country and are a
crucial tool for research in trying to explain the relationship between poverty or inequality and indicators of
development. On the other hand, it is important to mention that they must be interpreted carefully given that their
quality is limited by the sparseness of the desegregated data. Some improvements on these methodologies can be
found in Hentschel et al. (2000).
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Table 4.2 Geography and economic welfare
(Percentage of poor households*)
1985 1994 1997
Altitude (m.o.s.l)
0-500 41.4 37.5 46.1
500-1000 43.5 38.2 48.6
1000-2300 51.9 37.0 53.8
2300-3500 57.7 43.7 59.7
3500- 52.1 62.5 63.3
Precipitation (mm per year)
0-100 35.3 33.2 40.7
100-200 54.0 33.4 42.8
200-400 46.0 65.3 58.7
400-600 59.4 69.8 61.9
600-1000 51.5 49.2 63.1
1000-1400 67.0 42.8 59.4
1400-2000 63.4 43.4 58.4
2000-2800 60.3 70.4 55.8
2800- 42.7 34.4 54.7
Temperature (Celsius degrees)
0-5 52.7 67.6 65.4
5-10 49.1 44.2 57.8
10-15 40.6 34.4 43.1
15-20 55.1 43.0 53.1
20- 61.7 46.8 55.9
Source: Own estimates
*Poverty line is obtained from Escobal, et.al. (1998)
Table 4.3 Regional differences in access to services and assets: Peru 1997
Urban Rural Ratio
Family Size 6.1 6.3 1.0
Years of Education (head) 8.6 4.5 1.9
Years of Education (adults) 8.1 5.0 1.6
Drop-Out Rates, Secondary School 12% 15% 0.8
Access to Electricity (%) 97% 30% 3.2
Access to Water, public network (%) 89% 43% 2.1
Access to Sanitation Connection (%) 84% 12% 7.3
Access to Credit (%) 37% 23% 1.6
Memo: Poverty rate 40% 65%
Source:Own estimates
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Tale 4.4 Distribution of new access to basic and social services
Peru: 1994 – 1997
Urban Rural Ratio
Water, Public Network 57% 43% 1.3
Electricity 72% 28% 2.6
Sanitation Connection 78% 22% 3.5
Ambulatory Health 74% 26% 2.8
Education Enrollment 33% 67% 0.5
Source: Own estimates
Given the above evidence, the major question this research will try to answer is: what
causal role do geographic variables -both natural and manmade- play in explaining per capita
expenditure differentials across regions within Peru? How have these influences changed
over time, how important will they be in the future, through what channels have those influences
been transmitted and does access to private and public assets play a crucial role in reducing
the negative effects of an adverse geography? The next section describes how we plan to
formally answer these questions.
4.3 Analytical framework to test the effects of geography
The main question this chapter tries to answer is whether geography has any effect on living
standards after controlling for observable non-geographic characteristics of the households
and whether access to public and private assets compensates for the effects of an adverse
geography. To address this question, we have divided the analysis into three stages.
The first stage analyzes the evidence of regional income differences and to what extent
these differences had been hampered (or facilitated) by local or neighboring, natural or
manmade, geographic endowments. We analyze the evolution of geographic patterns and the
importance of clustering in some areas by using spatial econometric techniques, such as the
Moran I statistic.6 We measure for the presence, over time, of spatial concentration of per
capita expenditure and geographic, private and public assets and test for their significance.
In the second stage, to formally answer whether geography has a causal role in
determining how household welfare evolves over time, we developed an estimable micro
model of consumption levels and growth. To model changes in consumption over time we use
three census databases at the provincial level (see Annex A4.1 for details on how consumption
is estimated for the census databases). This analysis also allows us to see what geographic
factors matter to growth prospects at the micro level [Jalan and Ravallion (1998), Engerman
and Sokoloff (1997)].
6 There are a large number of tests to detect the presence of spatial correlation (Anselin, 1988), but those that are most
used are the «Moran Statistic» (I) and the G-statistics (Getis and Ord, 1992).
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Our explanatory variables include a set of individual characteristics such as human
assets (x), a set of private assets (z), a set of public assets at the district level (r) and a set of
variables comprising specific geographic characteristics such as climate, soil characteristics
and altitude (g). Specifically the change in consumption equation is:
(1)
in which the subscript p refers to provincial level averages of the respective variables, and the
subscript zero refers to information of the initial period. We include each of the groups of
regressors incrementally, and lastly we estimate the full model. We run a set of models including,
one by one, each of the groups of explanatory variables: geography (g), neighboring public
assets (r), private assets (z), and individual characteristics (x) and identify the direct externality
effects of the presence of each of them. Additionally, according to the hypothesis of the presence
of spatial concentration we analyze the importance of the effects of neighboring provinces by
measuring the significance of spatial autocorrelation7 in each of our specifications and test
how it decreases as we include additional groups of regressors.
We model the spatial dependence as a nuisance (a nuisance since it only pertains to the
errors). Formally, this dependence is expressed by means of a spatial process for the error
terms, either of an autoregressive or a moving average form [see: Anselin (1988, 1990), and
Anselin et al. (1996)]. Such an autoregressive process can be expressed as:
(2)
with Wε8 as a spatially lagged error term, λ as the autoregressive coefficient and ξ as a well-
behaved (i.e. homoskedastic uncorrelated) error term.
As a consequence of the spatial dependence, the error term no longer has the usual
diagonal variance matrix but instead takes the following form [Anselin L. (1988, 1990)]:
(3)
7 Spatial autocorrelation, or more generally, spatial dependence, is the situation where the dependent variable or
error term at each location is correlated with observations on the dependent variable or values for the error term at
other locations.
8 For N districts observed, W
i
 is the ith row of an (N*N) matrix W that assigns neighboring districts to each district.
The W used can be characterized by W={w
ij
} such that w
ij
=1 if i and j are neighboring districts, w
ij
=0 otherwise,
and w
ii
=0 for all i. The rows of W are then normalized such that each observation’s neighboring districts have the
same amount of influence, that is                   , for all i. In addition it will be assumed that each neighboring district
of a given district carries equal weight, w
ij=
 w
ik
 for non-zero elements (neighbors) k and j for firm i. If more
information were available about the amount of influence each district yields, this could be incorporated into the W
matrix (regarding the different possible structures see Anselin, 1988).
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Therefore, OLS estimates are no longer efficient but they are still unbiased. Furthermore,
given that the lambda coefficient is unknown, the regression coefficients cannot be estimated
using Generalized Least Squares (GLS), and therefore in our last specification we estimate
the lambda coefficient jointly with the regression coefficients using full maximum likelihood
estimation techniques.9
In order to identify the effects of geography on households we also use the LSMS
household surveys and perform an estimation of the levels of consumption and an estimation
of the growth of consumption using two household panels, one for 1991-1994 and another
one for 1994-1997. The specification used is very similar to the one in equation (1). We include
again as regressors a set of individual characteristics such as human assets (x), a set of private
assets (z), a set of public assets at the district level (r) and a set of variables comprising specific
geographic characteristics such as climate, soil characteristics and altitude (g). Specifically
the equation we estimate is:
(4)
in which the subscript i refers to a household and the subscript d refers to district level
information10. Additionally, to analyze the effects of geography on the income distribution of
the households we perform quantile regressions.
We also develop a micro model for consumption growth allowing for constraints on
factor mobility and externalities, whereby geographic factors -in the specific region or in
neighborhood regions- can influence the productivity of a household’s own capital. For this
purpose, we follow Islam (1995) and estimate the following model:
(5)
This methodology will allow us to test over time the effect of geographic variables as
well as the convergence rate. As mentioned by Jalan and Ravallion (1998), "one should not be
surprised to find geographic differences in living standards in this setting. For one thing,
restrictions on labor mobility can perpetuate spatial concentrations of households with poor
9 For a more extensive technical discussion of the relative merits of the various estimators suggested in the literature
see Anselin (1988, 1990).
10 In contrast to our previous specification we can not correct for the presence of spatial autocorrelation because we
do not know the exact location of the households and therefore we cannot construct the spatial matrix (W).
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endowments. But geography can also have a deeper causal role in the dynamics of poverty in
this setting. If geographic externalities alter returns to private investments, and borrowing
constraints limit capital mobility, then poor areas can self perpetuate. Even with diminishing
returns to private capital, poor areas will see low growth rates, and possibly contractions."11
Lastly, the third stage follows Ravallion and Wodon (1997) and tries to use the results
of the previous specifications and break down the geographic effects into their component
elements. For this purpose, we compute the expected gain (or loss) in consumption from
living in one geographic region (Costa for example) against living in another geographic
region (i.e. Sierra) specifying how much of the gain is explained by geographical variables,
location (urban or rural areas), infrastructure and private assets:
(5)
where XM C,  are the sample means for mountain and Costa regions for example, and β is the
parameter of the respective variables under analysis (i.e. geographical, location, infrastructure
and private assets).  This break-down represents the differential impact on a household’s living
standard of all non-excluded variables in the two regions.
4.4. The Data
To be able to answer the major questions outlined in the previous section we have developed
four different databases: census, household surveys (LSMS), and a panel database from the
LSMS surveys, all of which were linked to a geographical database (see data sources).
We have used the population and Household Censuses of 1972, 1981 and 1993 to
construct a set of variables that allow us to analyze the kind of changes that have emerged in
the geographical pattern of Peru’s most important socioeconomic variables during the last
three decades. Additionally, using the methodology of Hentschel, et al. (2000), we estimate a
household-level expenditure equation using the information from the 1985-86 and 1994 LSMS
surveys (see Annex A4.1 for details on the estimation) which allowed us to model the
determinants of per capita expenditure growth at the provincial level. This, in turn, allows us
to determine what role geographic variables -both natural and manmade- play in explaining
per capita expenditure differentials across regions in Peru.
We also used the cross-sectional LSMS household surveys, given that they had vast
information on household characteristics, income and expenditures, as well as on household
access to private and public services. This cross-sectional micro data is therefore used in our
second methodological strategy to test for geographic effects on living standards at a point in
time.  For an example, see Borjas (1994) on effects of neighborhood on schooling and wages
11 See Jalan and Ravallion (1998) for formal tests of poverty traps.
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in the U.S.; and Ravallion and Wodon (1997) on effects of geography on the level of poverty
in Bangladesh) as well as on the importance of public and private assets in explaining regional
poverty variations.
Lastly, in order to apply Jalan and Ravallion’s methodology we built up a panel between
1991, 1994 and 1997 using the LSMS surveys. The advantage of having standard panel data
with time invariant fixed effects on households, allowing for latent household heterogeneity,
is that it will protect against spurious geographic effects that arise solely because geographic
variables proxy for omitted non-geographic, but spatially autocorrelated, household
characteristics.
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Peru’s Geography and its regional differences in expenditure
In this section we analyze the kind of changes that have emerged in the geographical pattern
of Peru’s most important socioeconomic variables during the last three decades. In addition
we analyze changes in expenditure estimates, at the provincial level, between three Census
dates (1972, 1981 and 1993).
We analyze 24 variables at the provincial level for a panel of three Census years (1972,
1981 and 1993), as well as 160 additional variables at the provincial level and 88 additional
variables at the district level for variables that were available only for 1993 and beyond.
Annex A4.1 describes these variables as well as the databases that generate them.
In order to more comprehensively analyze the changes that occurred in these geographic
patterns we have constructed a per capita expenditure variable at the provincial level.  Following
a procedure similar to that of Hentschel, et al. (2000), we used household data to construct
expenditure functions using the Peruvian LSMS surveys of 1985 and 1994. We used the 1985
expenditure function to construct provincial level expenditure estimates, using data taken
from the 1972 and 1981 Censuses as explanatory variables. We used the 1994 expenditure
function to construct the provincial level expenditure estimates based on data taken from the
1993 Census. The exact procedure and data involved in these calculations can be found in
Annex A4.1.
The geographical evolution of Peru’s per capita expenditure between 1972 and 1993
demonstrates that higher per capita expenditure is to be found along low altitude coastal regions.
This pattern, which is already clear using 1972 data, is even more apparent as time passes. It
is interesting to note that the Gini coefficients are extremely low (0.118 in 1972, 0.088 in 1981
and 0.187 in 1993). It must be noted however that inter–regional expenditure variance is very
low, at least when compared to within-region variance, making these Gini perfectly consistent
with a national Gini coefficient of 0.42 and 0.38 in 1985 and 1994 respectively12.
12 See chapter 3.
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Figure 4.1 shows the pattern of distribution of inter-annual per capita expenditure growth
rates between Census years. Here it can be noted that the provinces whose per capita expenditure
has grown faster tend to be clustered, as do those provinces showing little or even negative
growth. Provinces showing high growth tend to be clustered in the higher Selva. Table 4.5
confirms the graphical analysis showing high and statistically significant Moran Index and
Geary Index values for all three Census years. In addition, high Moran and Geary indexes
values can also be found for per capita expenditure growth.
Figure 4.1 Changes in per capita expenditures (percentage)
Variables Moran Index Prob. a/ Geary Index Prob. a/
Per-capita expenditure
1972 0.4131 0.00 0.6078 0.00
1981 0.5709 0.00 0.3993 0.00
1993 0.4888 0.00 0.4565 0.00
Change in per-capita expenditure
1972-81 0.3708 0.00 0.6186 0.00
1981-93 0.4990 0.00 0.4616 0.00
1972-93 0.2427 0.00 0.7308 0.00
a/ Probablity to reject null hypothesis (absence of spatial autocorrelation)
Source: Own estimates
Table 4.5 Spatial autocorrelation of province-level expenditure variables
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Table 4.6 shows some of the most significant spatially autocorrelated variables in our
data set. Using the Moran and Geary Indexes, we find that aside from some obviously spatially
correlated variables such as annual precipitation or altitude of the province or district capital,
critical socioeconomic variables such as household size, percentage of households headed by
women, or total and female illiteracy rates are heavily clustered, showing high values in high
altitude zones and low values in coastal areas. A similar situation can be found in other variables
such as percentage of houses with inadequate flooring or overcrowded housing, malnutrition
rates, and school drop-out rates and schooling years. A summary welfare variable, per capita
expenditure, for 1993 displays a high and statistically significant Moran Index value and
Geary Index. It is also interesting to note that the variable of soil depth, constructed to show
agricultural land potential, also has a highly spatial autocorrelated pattern.
Aside from some obvious variables, such as those related to urban areas (urban density
or number of towns per province, for example) there are very few variables that do not show
a clear geographical pattern. Only three variables deserve some mention: Change in household
size between 1972 and 1981; the growth of the illiteracy rate between 1981 and 1993; and the
growth in per capita expenditure between 1972 and 1981.  These do not show any geographical
pattern measured by the Moran spatial autocorrelation index or the Geary Index.
Variables Moran Index Z-Value Geary Index Z-Value
South latitude 0.9302 20.21 * 0.057 -18.76 *
North longitude 0.8870 19.27 * 0.093 -18.04 *
Precipitation 0.7573 16.47 * 0.259 -14.73 *
Household size 1993 0.7495 16.30 * 0.241 -15.10 *
Temperature (average) 0.7486 16.29 * 0.256 -14.79 *
Temperature (min.) 0.7469 16.25 * 0.255 -14.83 *
Temperature (max.) 0.7422 16.15 * 0.265 -14.62 *
Altitude of the district capital
(meters over sea level) 0.6693 14.57 * 0.322 -13.47 *
% household head that are female 1993 0.6560 14.28 * 0.325 -13.43 *
Inadequate floor 0.6518 14.19 * 0.339 -13.16 *
Soil depth 0.6422 13.99 * 0.328 -13.37 *
Total illiteracy rate 1981 0.6352 13.83 * 0.356 -12.82 *
Overcrowded houses 1993 0.6286 13.69 * 0.339 -13.15 *
Household size 1981 0.6130 13.35 * 0.377 -12.39 *
Per-capita expenditure in 1981 0.6084 13.26 * 0.399 -11.95 *
Perimeter of the province 0.6032 13.14 * 0.390 -12.12 *
Note: p<0.01=*, p<0.5=~, where p is the probablity to reject null hypothesis (absence of spatial autocorrelation)
Source: Own estimates
Table 4.6 Highly spatial autocorrelated variables
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4.5.2 Testing the causal role of geography on the evolution of welfare:
Provincial level data
As we have seen in Section 4.3, it is possible to derive a connection between the asset
endowment of an individual household and its expenditure level. Following the same reasoning
we can derive a connection between the level of private and public assets that can be found at
some level of spatial aggregation (here the provincial level) and the per capita expenditure
level that can be found in that area.
Table 4.7 shows the econometric results of what could be called the determinants of
per capita expenditure growth at the provincial level. To reduce any possible endogeneity bias
in explaining 1972-1993 per capita expenditure growth rates we have chosen initial asset
endowments as independent right hand side variables. To this basic data set we have added
several key geographic variables to check whether they can provide some explanation of
causes of expenditure growth. Table 4.8 shows the Moran spatial autocorrelation index for the
four different specifications that were evaluated: (1) only private assets, (2) private assets plus
geographic variables; (3) the previous variables plus public assets; and, (4) all the variables
plus changes in access to key public assets.
We have used the log difference of per capita expenditures a dependent variable. The
reason for this choice (as opposed to using percentage changes) is related to functional form
issues. If there is any misspecification in the per capita expenditure equations (which have
been estimated as semi-log functions) the log difference of per capita expenditure will clean
the bias, provided that these variables have similar effects over the years.
As can be seen in Table 4.7, when geographic variables are included as the only
explanatory variables, altitude and longitude prove to be highly significant in explaining
expenditure growth. In particular it can be shown that the higher altitude provinces tend to
have slower expenditure growth rates. When we add the variable of basic needs, which
encompasses the absence of critical public infrastructure (sanitation, water, telephone and
electricity) we can see that altitude remains significant but its negative impact diminishes
considerably. This effect can be viewed as demonstrating the importance of public infrastructure
to lower negative geographic externalities. It is important to note that when we add private
assets (some of which are obviously correlated with public assets) the importance of geography
almost vanishes. This initial finding will be followed up more rigorously in the next section.
It is interesting to note that despite the fact that this expenditure growth function has
included all relevant geographic variables at hand, the residuals continue to show spatial
autocorrelation. As can be seen in Table 4.8, although the Moran Index diminishes as we
include explanatory variables it remains significant. This fact suggests that there may be non-
geographic non-observables that may be affecting the expenditure pattern. This is consistent
with Ravallion and Wodon (1997)when they show that sizable geographic differences in living
standards can persist even if we take into account the spatial concentration of households with
readily observable non-geographic characteristics conducive to poverty.
Chapter 4
82
Table 4.7 Determinants of percapita expenditure growth rate: 1972-1993
(OLS estimations with robust standard errors, at province level)
Variables at initial period
Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 4.8269 * 4.6892 * 4.3913 * -0.0277 -0.3270
(1.631) (1.563) (1.585) (1.385) (1.706)
Altitude -1.1081 * -0.7872 ~ -0.5096 0.2616 0.4580
(0.385) (0.377) (0.447) (0.385) (0.389)
Latitude -0.0226 -0.0308 -0.0288 -0.0231 -0.0170
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Longitude -0.0561 * -0.0570 * -0.0543 * -0.0182 -0.0171
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
Soil slope -0.0012 0.0016 0.0021 0.0033 0.0035
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Soil depth -0.0030 -0.0017 -0.0018 0.0020 0.0023
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Igneous rock -0.2143 -0.2944 ~ -0.3102 * -0.3197 * -0.2757 *
(0.126) (0.123) (0.123) (0.100) (0.106)
Metamorphic rock 0.0732 0.0536 0.0863 -0.1318 -0.1362
(0.149) (0.145) (0.146) (0.122) (0.122)
Temperature -0.0191 -0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0114 -0.0082
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Basic needs -0.0561 * -0.0393 ~ -0.0222 -0.0225
(0.013) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016)
High*basic needs -0.1110 0.0045 -0.0149
(0.097) (0.090) (0.080)
School attendance rate 0.0143 * 0.0144 *
(0.003) (0.003)
Household headed by women (%) -0.0109 ~ -0.0134 ~
(0.005) (0.005)
Working children (%) 0.0533 * 0.0462 ~
(0.020) (0.018)
Household size 0.0783 0.1057
(0.133) (0.128)
Household size growth a/ -0.2624 -0.2208
(0.140) (0.136)
Number of migrants 0.0171 0.0101
(0.029) (0.029)
Spatial autocorrelation 0.2305 ~
(0.102)
Number of observations 190 190 190 190 190
Adjusted R-squared 0.122 0.195 0.197 0.486 0.526
a/ Intrumental variables are shown in the appendix
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis and p<0.01=*, p<0.5=~
Model 1: Geography
Model 2: Geography + infraestructure.
Model 3: Geography + infraestructure.+Geo*infra.
Model 4: Geography + infraestructure.+Geo*infra+private assets
Model 5: Geography + infraestructure.+Geo*infra+private assets, modelling first-order spatial error autocorrelation.
Source: Own estimates
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Type of  association
Regression Model Residuals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Moran Index 0.1091 0.1005 0.0973 0.0816
Z-value 3.1226 2.9658 2.9357 2.7877
Probability 0.0018 0.0030 0.0033 0.0053
Model 1: Geography
Model 2: Geography + infraestructure.
Model 3: Geography + infraestructure.+Geo*infra.
Model 4: Geography + infraestructure.+Geo*infra+private assets
Source: Own estimates
Table 4.8 Spatial autocorrelation of growth regression residuals, by model
The last column in Table 4.7 shows the estimated parameter values corrected for spatial
autocorrelation.13 The results confirm that when public and private assets and household
characteristics are included, the impact of geographic variables is dampened.
4.5.3 Testing the causal role of geography in the evolution of welfare:
household data
To be able to identify specific effects of geography on households we use the LSMS household
surveys and estimate the levels of consumption and growth of consumption using two household
panels, one for 1991-1994 and a second one for 1994-1997. The specification used is detailed
in equations 4 and 5. As mentioned previously, we include as regressors a set of individual
characteristics as human assets (x), a set of private assets (z), a set of public assets at the
district level (r) and a set of variables taking in specific geographic characteristics such as
climate, soil characteristics and altitude (g).
Table 4.9 shows the results of the determinants of current consumption expressed in
logs and, as in Section 4.2 we use four different specifications. The first specification includes
only geographic variables (Model 1), the second includes geographic plus location variables
(urbanization, and distance to capital), the third adds public assets to the previous variables,
and finally, model 4 includes variables that measure the possession of private assets.
When geographic variables are included as the only explanatory variables, the negative
and non-linear effect of temperature appears to be significant in explaining the level of
consumption of the households. Therefore, as previously shown in Table 4.3, poverty increases
for households located in regions with low temperatures and in regions with extremely high
temperatures. On the other hand, as we add variables for presence of infrastructure, and control
13 The likelihood -Ratio test for spatial error dependence for the equation in the last column in Table 4.7 has a value
of 3.67 with 1 degree of freedom, which confirms that the estimation has been properly corrected for spatial
autocorrelation.
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Variables
Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 6.2476 * 5.3807 * 6.1735 * 6.1749 *
(0.187) (0.217) (0.219) (0.180)
Altitude -0.2417 0.2718 -0.2204 -0.1226
(0.132) (0.292) (0.292) (0.229)
Temperature 0.0733 * 0.1058 * 0.0676 * 0.0378 *
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014)
Temperature squared -0.0018 * -0.0024 * -0.0014 * -0.0006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Igneous rocks -0.1033 0.1066 0.0414 0.1129 ~
(0.071) (0.073) (0.069) (0.052)
Sediments rocks -0.1892 * -0.1322 * -0.0937 ~ -0.0142
(0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.031)
Land depth 0.0001 0.0018 ~ 0.0030 * 0.0012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urbanization 0.3920 * -0.0623 -0.1205
(0.090) (0.102) (0.080)
Distance to province capital -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urbanization*altitude 0.6970 ~ 1.0291 * 0.6072 ~
(0.351) (0.347) (0.275)
Percapita schools in town 0.3598 * 0.1613
(0.114) (0.095)
Percapita medical centers in town 0.2752 0.3368
(0.298) (0.243)
Unsatisfied basic needs -0.2183 * -0.0704 *
(0.010) (0.010)
Household size -0.1158 *
(0.004)
Schooling years (household head) 0.0417 *
(0.003)
Schooling years (other members) 0.0429 *
(0.003)
Potential labor experience 0.0057 *
(0.001)
Household head gender -0.0132
(0.026)
Number of migrantes 0.0158 ~
(0.007)
Spell of illness (household head) 0.0005
(0.008)
Savings 0.0310 *
(0.007)
Value of durable goods 0.0033
(0.002)
Observations 3623 3623 3623 3623
Pseudo Rsquared 0.037 0.071 0.176 0.492
Table 4.9 Determinants of per-capita expenditure at household level: 1994
(OLS estimation with robust errors including geographics variables)
Model 3: Geography + localization + infraestructure.
Model 4: Geography + localization + infraestructure + private assets.
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis and p<0.01=*, p<0.5=~
Model 1: Geography.
Model 2: Geography + localization.
Source: Own estimates
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for the private assets of the households, this variable loses significance (see fourth column). A
similar pattern is found with the presence of sedimentary rock which could imply a relatively
poor soil. In the first model these variables have a negative and significant effect as expected,
but as we include public and private assets its negative effect is reduced and the variable loses
significance.
Furthermore, when adding the variable of basic needs which, as previously mentioned,
encompasses the absence of critical public infrastructure (sanitation, water, telephone and
electricity) as well as overcrowded housing, we can see that the negative effect of temperature
(temperature squared) and of sedimentary rock diminish considerably.
Altitude, on the other hand, despite having a negative sign, is not significant as was
shown in the provincial level model for consumption growth. Nevertheless, when we correlate
altitude with urbanization the coefficient is significant and positive, showing the marginal
positive effect that urbanization has on high altitude regions.
The variable that measures the potential presence of mineral resources underlying the
surface (igneous rock) moves from negative and insignificant to positive and significant after
we control for the presence of public and private goods. This could be an indicator that as
more private and public resources are present, it becomes easier for the households in the
region to be able to profit from this type of natural resource that requires high levels of
investment and infrastructure to be exploited. Similarly, soil depth becomes positive and
significant when including the public infrastructure variables; this again could be an indication
that the presence of public infrastructure facilitates the exploitation of the land in regions
endowed with a significant depth of soil.
Finally, and as expected, the most important variables measuring private assets, such
as education, labor experience, migration experience and household size, come to have the
expected signs and to be significant.
In attempting to assess whether the impact of our explanatory variables was different
between poor and rich households, in Table 4.10 we present the results of an econometric
exercise in which we run quantile regressions.14 By calculating regressions for different
quantiles, it is possible to explore the shape of the conditional distribution. This is of great
interest for the present study because it will allow us to determine whether richer households
are less affected by adverse geographic characteristics.
Table 4.10, presents the results of our full consumption level specification for the 10th,
20th, 60th, 80th and 90th percentiles. Although there are not great differences in the magnitude of
14 Quantile regressions are also used to analyze the presence of heteroskedasticity. Quantile regressions other than
median can be defined by minimizing:
where q<1 is the quantile of interest, and the value of the function 1(z) signals the truth (1) or otherwise (0) of the
statement z. For further details see Deaton (1997)
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the coefficients, there are some important findings. First, for the poorest percentiles, when the
main geographic variables (temperature, soil depth and altitude) are compared to urbanization,
they play a larger role in explaining the levels of consumption of the lowest percentiles (10th)
compared to the effect they have on the 80th and 90th percentiles. For example, the square of
temperature is negative and significant for the 10th percentile while it is not significant for the
90th percentile. This result was analyzed through graphs which showed how the confidence
interval increased significantly from the poorest to the richest percentiles.
In addition, our variable that captures the impact of the access to public infrastructure
also seems to have a stronger effect on the poorer households. The basic needs variable is
negative and significant for the first percentile and loses its significance for the 90th percentile.
The variables measuring the impact of private assets, mainly schooling years and potential
labor experience, are significant and seem to be similar among poor and rich households. On
the other hand, the two variables that we use as a proxy for wealth, savings and value of
durable assets, become bigger and more significant the richer the household.
Finally, as mentioned in Section 4.3 following equation (5) we develop a micro model
for consumption growth allowing for constraints on factor mobility and externalities, whereby
geographic factors -in the specific or neighboring regions- can influence the productivity of
household’s own capital. For this purpose we develop two household panels, one for 1991-
1994 and the other for 1994-1997 to explain the changes in expenditure using geographic
variables, infrastructure and private assets. The results are shown in Table 4.11.
As with our previous findings, geographic variables do seem to be significant. Altitude
is negative and significant in the last panel. Temperature also reveals its negative effect when
its level is too high or too low (the coefficient for temperature is positive while the coefficient
for its square term is negative and significant). The presence of public assets, measured through
unsatisfied basic needs, also seems to be very important in explaining changes in expenditure
differentials between households. Furthermore, private assets, measured by schooling years,
again showed themselves to be significant and positive.
Lastly, the lagged expenditure is negative and significant. This can be explained by the
reduction in inequality, especially in the period of 1991-1994, for which the Gini coefficient is
reduced from 0.369 to 0.364. On the other hand, when recovering the implied λ there is a
clear indication of convergence. In this respect, it is important to mention that there is much
debate about the possible evidence of convergence and there is not yet a consensus on which
is the best method to use for measuring it.15
15 Furthermore, Quah (1993) and Friedman (1992) question the methodology of estimating the convergence rate
using the growth and the lagged expenditure variables. They argue that this methodology suffers from the Galton
Fallacy.
87
Variables
Percentile:
10 20 60 80 90
Intercept 4.8091 * 5.3829 * 6.6526 * 7.0426 * 6.9805 *
(0.2790) (0.2569) (0.2146) (0.2401) (0.3279)
Altitude -0.0248 -0.0819 -0.1628 -0.3209 0.1202
(0.3922) (0.3453) (0.2602) (0.2896) (0.3738)
Temperature 0.0933 * 0.0557 * 0.0195 0.0084 0.0151
(0.0215) (0.0197) (0.0166) (0.0187) (0.0256)
Temperature squared -0.002 * -0.0009 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Igneous rocks 0.2338 * 0.1043 0.0772 0.0908 0.1196
(0.0865) (0.0789) (0.0614) (0.0677) (0.0916)
Sediments rocks 0.0052 -0.0165 -0.0266 0.0184 0.0453
(0.0507) (0.0465) (0.0360) (0.0406) (0.0542)
Land depth 0.0032 * 0.0023 ~ 0.0011 0.0007 0.001
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0012)
Urbanization -0.0872 -0.1099 -0.2073 ~ -0.202 ~ -0.0259
(0.1414) (0.1280) (0.0932) (0.0998) (0.1295)
Distance to province capital 0.0009 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0007
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Urbanization*altitude 1.0585 ~ 0.9463 ~ 0.6216 ~ 0.4445 0.1177
(0.4821) (0.4284) (0.3112) (0.3409) (0.4445)
Percapita schools in town 0.2197 0.2551 0.0254 0.0261 0.2235
(0.1691) (0.1478) (0.1108) (0.1240) (0.1682)
Percapita medical centers in town 0.6409 0.2873 0.3552 -0.0034 -0.3481
(0.4281) (0.3907) (0.3049) (0.3426) (0.4468)
Basic needs -0.0917 * -0.0881 * -0.0671 * -0.0442 * -0.0164
(0.0169) (0.0148) (0.0111) (0.0125) (0.0174)
Household size -0.0955 * -0.0964 * -0.1199 * -0.1224 * -0.1247 *
(0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0085)
Schooling years (household head) 0.0371 * 0.0413 * 0.0356 * 0.0354 * 0.0347 *
(0.0049) (0.0044) (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0052)
Schooling years (other members) 0.05 * 0.0428 * 0.0371 * 0.0346 * 0.0346 *
(0.0053) (0.0047) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0056)
Potential labor experience
(household head) 0.0053 * 0.0059 * 0.0047 * 0.0057 * 0.0049 *
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Household head gender -0.0775 -0.0135 -0.024 -0.0198 -0.0307
(0.0431) (0.0375) (0.0287) (0.0320) (0.0439)
Number of migrantes 0.0245 0.0132 0.0135 0.0097 0.0154
(0.0126) (0.0112) (0.0087) (0.0100) (0.0134)
Spell of illness (household head) -0.0216 -0.0046 0.0134 0.0164 0.0299 ~
(0.0126) (0.0111) (0.0084) (0.0093) (0.0125)
Savings 0.0231 * 0.0234 * 0.0311 * 0.0325 * 0.0316 *
(0.0016) (0.0064) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0025)
Value of durable goods 0.0004 0.0034 ~ 0.023 * 0.0309 * 0.0342 *
(0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Observations 3623 3623 3623 3623 3623
Pseudo Rsquared 0.2673 0.2764 0.3095 0.3294 0.3454
Group of variables Joint test: All coefficients equal to zero (Pr>Fstat)
Geography 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.421
Localization 0.039 0.076 0.095 0.213 0.792
Infraestructure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.477
Private assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis and p<0.01=*, p<0.5=~
Source: Own estimates
Table 4.10 Quantile regressions of (log) percapita expenditure: 1994
(At household level)
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4.5.4 Breakdown of regional per capita expenditure
To disentangle the effect of geography on regional expenditure and expenditure growth we
have applied the break down technique described in Section 4.3 to the household level estimation
performed for per capita expenditure and shown in Table 4.9. For this break down we have
assumed that parameters are stable across the three main geographic areas: Costa, Sierra and
Selva. This initial break down is shown in Table 4.12. In the first column we see that most of
the difference in log per capita expenditure between the Sierra and the Costa can be accounted
for by the differences in infrastructure endowments and private assets. In other words, once
the main geographic variables are accounted for (altitude, temperature and surface
characteristics), only private assets and infrastructure endowments are needed to explain
regional expenditure differences. Similarly, the second column shows the break down of the
differences in log per capita expenditure between the Selva area and the Costa, showing again
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Table 4.11 Panel data analysis of per capita expenditure growth rate: 1991-94, 1994-97
(OLS estimation with robust errors including geographics variables)
Variables (final period)
Periods
1991-94 1994-97
Intercept 2.792 * 2.893 *
(0.266) (0.306)
Schooling years (household head) 0.045 * 0.043 *
(0.004) (0.004)
Age (household head) 0.006 * 0.009 *
(0.001) (0.001)
Household head gender (male=1) -0.115 * -0.167 *
(0.037) (0.048)
Unsatisfied basic needs -0.053 * -0.162 *
(0.018) (0.019)
Altitude 0.536 -0.974 *
(0.176) (0.184)
Temperature 0.047 0.056 ~
(0.025) (0.025)
Temperature squared -0.001 * -0.002  ~
(0.001) (0.001)
Expenditure (initial period) -0.542 * -0.578 *
(0.024) (0.029)
Number of observations 1212 900
R-squared adjusted 0.3136 0.4097
Gini (initial period) 0.369 0.358
Gini (final period) 0.364 0.400
Annual growth rate (%) 10.8 2.3
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis and p<0.01=*, p<0.5=~
Gini coefficients and growth rates calculations are based on percapita expenditure
Source: Own estimates
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that once main geographic variables are accounted, for most of the regional expenditure
differences can be explained by infrastructure endowment and private asset composition.
Obviously, the fact that geography has no additional impact on regional per capita expenditure
differences has to do with the fact that key infrastructure variables such as schools and medical
facilities, access to electricity, water and sanitation, as well as private assets, have dampened
the effect of geography on regional expenditure differentials. To see this, Table 4.13 performs
the same break down exercise introducing each set of variables sequentially. First, geography
variables are entered in the model alone, and the break down exercise is conducted only with
these variables. In this case, geography is highly significant in explaining per capita expenditure
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Table 4.12 Decomposition of regional per capita expenditure differences
(Log differences)
Group of variables Highland-Coast Jungle-Coast
Geography -0.163 0.031
Altitude -0.036 -0.004
Temperature -0.235 * 0.173 *
Temperature squared 0.117 -0.121
Igneous rocks 0.015 ~ -0.004 ~
Sediments rocks -0.004 -0.009
Land depth -0.022 -0.005
Location 0.050 0.039
Urbanization 0.055 0.038
Distance to province capital -0.005 0.001
Geography*location 0.081 ~ 0.007 ~
Urbanization*altitude 0.081 ~ 0.007 ~
Infrastructure -0.024 ~ -0.064 ~
Perinhabitant schools in town 0.024 0.023
Perinhabitant medical centers in town 0.010 0.009
Basic needs -0.058 * -0.095 *
Private assets -0.185 * -0.258 *
Household size -0.031 * -0.064 *
Schooling years (household head) -0.061 * -0.065 *
Schooling years (other members) -0.069 * -0.102 *
Potential labor experience -0.013 * -0.024 *
Household head gender 0.000 -0.001
Number of migrantes -0.009 ~ -0.005 ~
Spell of illness (household head) 0.000 0.000
Savings 0.002 * 0.000 *
Value of durable goods -0.003 0.004
Explained -0.241 -0.244
Residual 0.024 0.077
Total -0.217 -0.167
Note: *=p<.01, ~=p<=.05, +=p<.1.
Source: Own estimates
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Table 4.13 Decomposition of regional per capita expenditure differences, by model
Group of variables
Highland-Coast Jungle-Coast
1 1+2 1+2+3 1+2+3+4 1 1+2 1+2+3 1+2+3+4
(1) Geography -0.239 * -0.162 ~ -0.283 ~ -0.163 -0.152 * -0.084 ~ -0.052 ~ 0.031
(2) Location -0.181 0.024 0.05 -0.123 0.021 0.039
(3) Geo*location 0.093 * 0.137 * 0.081 ~ 0.008 * 0.012 * 0.007 ~
(4) Infrastructure -0.118 * -0.024 ~ -0.237 * -0.064 ~
(6) Private assets -0.185 * -0.258 *
Explained -0.239 -0.250 -0.240 -0.241 -0.152 -0.199 -0.256 -0.244
Residual 0.022 0.033 0.023 0.003 -0.015 0.032 0.089 0.072
Total -0.217 -0.217 -0.217 -0.217 -0.167 -0.167 -0.167 -0.167
Source: Own estimates
Public Infrastructure under Geographic Constraints
differentials between Sierra and Costa, as well as between the Selva and Costa regions of
Peru. Geography remains highly significant even after we introduce location variables and
their cross–products into the analysis. However, once infrastructure variables come into play
in the analysis, the impact of geography disappears, as the coefficients associated with these
types of variables are shown to be jointly non-significant. This could be because, in the models
without infrastructure, the geography variables were choosing their effect and therefore when
improving our specification the effect of these variables disappears.
The same type of break down can also be done with the per capita expenditure growth
equations that we reported in Table 4.7. In this case, per capita growth rate differentials between
Sierra and Costa regions and between Selva and Costa regions can be broken down into their
main determinants: geographical differences, infrastructure differences and asset endowment
differences, as reported in Table 4.14. Here, as was the case with the previous result, geography
does not appear to significantly contribute to growth differentials, once infrastructure differences
and private asset endowment differences are accounted for. In this case, however, only private
asset endowment differentials seem to play an important role in explaining differential growth
patterns between Sierra, Selva and Costa regions.
As was the case in the analysis of differential expenditure levels across regions, the
role of geographic variables seems to be shadowed by the presence of infrastructure and private
asset endowments. To see whether this is the case, Table 4.15 shows the same break down
exercise introducing each set of variables sequentially. First, geographic variables are entered
in the model alone and the decomposition exercise is conducted only with these variables. In
this case geography is highly significant in explaining per capita expenditure growth
differentials. However, once infrastructure variables are introduced into the analysis, the
significance of geography disappears, and does not reappear as the remaining variables are
introduced. It must be noted that the analysis remains valid even if we correct for possible
spatial autocorrelation due to possible omitted non-geographic spatially correlated variables.
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Table 4.14 Decomposition of regional per capita expenditure differences
(Growth rates differences at province level)
Group of variables Highland-Coast Jungle-Coast
Geography 0.2126 0.1296
Altitude level 0.1182 0.0055
Latitude -0.0280 0.0471
Longitude 0.0437 0.0396
Soil slope 0.0518 -0.0159
Soil depth -0.0020 0.0379
Igneous rock -0.0329 * 0.0222 *
Metamorphic rock 0.0300 0.0399
Temperature 0.0319 -0.0467
Infrastructure -0.0431 -0.0920
Basic needs -0.0431 -0.0920
Geography*Infrastructure -0.0125 -0.0041
Altitude*Basic needs -0.0125 -0.0041
Private assets -0.3430 * -0.0031 *
School attendance rate -0.1335 * -0.0663 *
Female household head (%) -0.0739 ~ 0.0147 ~
Working children (%) 0.0278 ~ 0.0090 ~
Household size -0.0689 0.0580
Household size growth a/ -0.0881 + -0.0133 +
Number of migrants -0.0063 -0.0051
Total explained -0.1860 0.0304
Residual 0.1048 0.0989
Total -0.0812 0.1293
a/ Intruments variables are shown in the appendix
Note: *=p<.01, ~=p<=.05, +=p<=0.1
Source: Own estimates
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Table 4.15 Decomposition of regional per capita growth expenditure differences, by model
(At province level)
Group of variables
Highland-Coast Jungle-Coast
1 1+2 1+2+3 1+2 1+2 1 1+2 1+2+3 1+2 1+2
+3+4 +3+4 a/ +3+4 +3+4 a/
(1) Geography -0.163~ -0.113 -0.047 0.158 0.213 0.023~ 0.154 0.136 0.126 0.130
(2) Infrastructure -0.108* -0.075~ -0.043 -0.043 -0.229* -0.161~ -0.091 -0.092
(3) Geo*infrastructure -0.093 0.004 -0.013 -0.031 0.001 -0.004
(4) Private assets -0.327* -0.343* -0.025* -0.003*
Explained -0.163 -0.221 -0.215 -0.208 -0.186 0.023 -0.075 -0.056 0.012 0.030
Residual 0.082 0.139 0.134 0.127 0.105 0.106 0.205 0.185 0.118 0.099
Total -0.081 -0.081 -0.081 -0.081 -0.081 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129
a/Modelling first-order spatial error autocorrelation.
Note: *=p<.01, ~=p<=.05, +=p<=0.1.
Source: Own estimates
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4.6. Conclusions
Peru’s enormous geographic diversity makes it an extremely interesting case study to analyze
whether geography has a causal role in determining how household welfare evolves over
time. We know that there are huge welfare disparities across Peru, and there is a heavy
concentration of very poor people throughout the most geographically adverse regions, as in
the Sierra and Selva. Although these welfare disparities can be attributed to geography, they
can also be related, at least in part, to a significant dispersion in access to infrastructure and
other public assets. Therefore, there is no clear evidence that regional income differences can
only be explained by geography or that they had been hampered (or facilitated) by local or
neighboring natural or manmade geographical endowments.
Despite the fact that there have been many efforts to link Peru’s geographical diversity
to key issues as important as settlement location or construction of administrative or political
regions, very little has been done to analyze the links between this geographic diversity and
development, economic growth or poverty.
To reduce this gap, our research strategy consisted of describing how geography might
play a fundamental role in regional economic growth, and what relationship there is between
geographic variables and expenditure levels and growth across regions within Peru. To formally
answer whether geography is a determinant of the evolution of welfare over time, we developed
a micro model of consumption which not only took in the local effect of geographic variables
but also included public and private assets as variables that could reduce the potentially adverse
effect of geography. For this purpose we used national census data for 1972, 1981 and 1993,
the LSMS surveys for 1991, 1994, 1996, and 1997, information from the district–level
infrastructure census, geographical datasets, and information from the III National Agrarian
Census of 1994. This cross-sectional analysis helped us in attempting to understand whether
geographic externalities arising from local or neighboring public assets, or local endowments
of private goods, entail that living in or near a well-endowed area implies that a poor household
can eventually escape poverty.
We have shown that what seem to be sizable geographic differences in living standards
in Peru can be almost fully explained when one takes into account the spatial concentration of
households with readily observable non-geographic characteristics, in particular public and
private assets. In other words, the same observationally equivalent household has a similar
expenditure level in one place as in another with different geographic characteristics such as
altitude or temperature. This does not mean, however that geography is not important, but its
influence on expenditure level and growth differential comes about through a spatially uneven
provision of public infrastructure. Furthermore, when we measure the expected gain (or loss)
in consumption from living in a particular geographic region (i.e. Costa) as opposed to living
in another geographic region (i.e. Sierra), we found that most of the difference in log per
capita expenditure between the Sierra and the Costa can be accounted for by the differences
in infrastructure endowments and private assets. This could be an indication that the availability
93
of infrastructure could be limited by the geography and therefore the more adverse geographic
regions are the ones with less access to public infrastructure.
Another interesting result is that despite the fact that in our models of expenditure growth
we included all relevant geographic variables, as well as infrastructure and private assets variables,
the residuals continue to show spatial autocorrelation. This fact suggests the idea that there may
be non-geographic non-observables that may be affecting the provincial expenditure pattern.
This is consistent with Ravallion and Wodon (1997) when they show that sizable geographic
differences in living standards can persist even if we take into account the spatial concentration
of households with readily observable non-geographic characteristics conducive to poverty.
It is important to note that there appear to be non–geographic, spatially correlated
omitted variables that need to be taken into account in our expenditure growth model. Therefore
policy programs that use regional targeting do have a rationale even if geographic variables do
not explain the bulk of the difference in regional growth, once we have taken into account
differentials in access to private and public assets.
Lastly, an issue that we had not taken into account, and which could be very important
for future research, is the fact that adverse geographic externalities can provide incentives to
migration. This is something which we do not control for in this research. The migration effect
could be twofold. On the one hand, it could be the reason why households with fewer private
assets are the ones which choose to locate in the more adverse geographical regions. On the
other hand, it could be very important for policy-making in developing infrastructure, in the
sense that certain investments in infrastructure, such as education, are mobile with migration,
while others are not. Therefore, it could be more profitable to invest in mobile infrastructure in
the more adverse geographic regions, to give the individuals the necessary tools to migrate
from these regions and therefore increase their probability of escaping a poverty trap.
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Annex A4.1: Data description
A4.1 Provincial level per capita expenditure estimates
To estimate per capita expenditure at provincial levels for Census years 1972, 1981 and 1993,
we estimated a household-level expenditure equation based on information available in the
LSMS surveys for 1985-86 and 1994. Following Escobal, J. et al (1998) we regress per capita
expenditure on private and public assets, allowing interactions between them. A more detailed
discussion of these estimations can be found in Escobal, J. et al. (1998).
Table A4.1 shows the results of this procedure. The endogenous variable in each equation
was the per capita expenditure in constant Nuevos Soles of 1994. From the coefficients obtained
in Table A.1, we simulated the province-level per capita expenditure using the province-level
variables obtained from the Census data, and the means of the household surveys whenever
there was not a counterpart variable in the census. For 1972 and 1981 we used the parameters
of LSMS 1985-86 and for 1993 the calculations of LSMS 1994, due to the proximity of the
sample surveys and Census dates.
The province-level variables used in all Census years were: household size, percentage
of houses without access to potable water, without drainage, without electricity, total illiteracy
rate, schooling attendance rate, percentage of child laborers and percentage of  population
living in urban areas. Additionally, for 1993 we included the percentage of non-professional,
economically active population, percentage of households headed by women, and college
attendance rate. We complete the set of variables (to estimate province-level expenditure)
using sample average values of the LSMS by regions. As we mention above, LSMS are divided
in geographical regions to improve the quality of the sampling. These regions were included
in the regression as dummy variables associated with location: northern Costa, central Sierra,
and greater Lima, for example.
Per capita expenditure at the provincial level in each Census year was adjusted to
reproduce the Aggregate Consumption growth rate of National Accounts within those years.
Using 1981 as an anchor, we changed slightly the intercept coefficients of the other regressions
to re-estimate the projected variables. Thus, we replace the OLS estimated coefficients 6.690
with 6.350 and 7.695 with 7.595 for 1993 and 1972, respectively. In this way the growth rate
of the projected per capita expenditure (weighted by population in each year) is equal to the
macroeconomic statistics. The coefficients reported in Table A4.1 display the new values for
the intercepts.
Finally, the number of provinces had not remained constant in the last 30 years. In
1972 the number of provinces was 150, in 1981 was 153 and 188 in 1993, therefore we had to
homogenize province areas and shapes through time. With this purpose we decided to use the
political-administrative division of Peru in 1993 because the Geographical Information System
(GIS) was developed following the 1993 Census. To impute the values in 1972 for new provinces
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we repeated the "original" province information in each of its new regions or areas. For 1981
we had district-level data and since the creation of a new province is basically a new clustering
of districts we aggregate those district values to create data for the new provinces.
Variables
Census year
1972 a/ 1981 a/ 1993 b/
Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev.
Intercept 7.6959 (0.1954) 7.7777 (0.3271) 6.3502 (0.1377)
Access to credit 0.1384 (0.0399) 0.1351 (0.0364) 0.0826 (0.0366)
Access to drinking water -0.1051 (0.0589) -0.1316 (0.0535)
Access to electricity 0.0846 (0.0541) 0.0788 (0.0497) 0.0021 (0.0004)
Access to in-house drainage services 0.1165 (0.1455) 0.1032 (0.1030) 0.0016 (0.0009)
Cattle 0.1288 (0.0827) 0.1368 (0.0800) 0.0913 (0.0788)
Durable goods 0.0680 (0.0092) 0.0681 (0.0087) 0.0051 (0.0046)
Fertilizers usage 0.1619 (0.0436) 0.1839 (0.0414) 0.1056 (0.0327)
Household head gender 0.0278 (0.0627) -0.0035 (0.0523)
Household members with
  secondary education (%) 0.0031 (0.0023)
House with inadequate floor -0.0042 (0.0009) -0.0038 (0.0008) -0.0021 (0.0003)
Household size -0.2760 (0.0341) -0.3361 (0.0306) -0.3253 (0.0283)
Illiteracy rate -0.0017 (0.0008) -0.0012 (0.0008) -0.0016 (0.0007)
School attandance (children) 0.0010 (0.0006) 0.0006 (0.0006)
Land size 0.0432 (0.0503) 0.0185 (0.0413)
Number of migrants (houshold members) -0.0061 (0.0410) -0.0039 (0.0409) 0.1359 (0.0261)
Number of rooms in the house 0.0050 (0.0015) 0.0041 (0.0013) 0.0562 (0.0108)
Non-professional labor force 0.0002 (0.0028)
Potential work experience -0.0001 (0.0065) 0.0002 (0.0057) 0.0153 (0.0058)
Savings 0.0772 (0.0343) 0.0471 (0.0349) 0.0775 (0.0359)
Schooling attendance rate 0.0004 (0.0004)
Schoolling years (household head) 0.0167 (0.0119) 0.0168 (0.0114) 0.0310 (0.0073)
Schoolling years (other members) 0.0372 (0.0188) 0.0388 (0.0160) 0.0326 (0.0070)
Seeds usage 0.1419 (0.0366) 0.1390 (0.0335) 0.0798 (0.0322)
Social networks 0.2282 (0.0601) 0.2197 (0.0620) 0.0862 (0.1102)
Spell of illness (household head) 0.0153 (0.0299) 0.0268 (0.0299) -0.0516 (0.0326)
Urban zone 0.0064 (0.0021) 0.0092 (0.0034) 0.0176 (0.1592)
Working children (%) -0.0014 (0.0005) -0.0013 (0.0005)
Northern coast -0.1374 (0.0334) -0.1408 (0.0321) -0.0460 (0.0257)
Central coast -0.1991 (0.0375) -0.2033 (0.0393) -0.0304 (0.0332)
Southern coast -0.0352 (0.0595) -0.0552 (0.0642) -0.0939 (0.0490)
Northern highlands -0.5987 (0.0541) -0.5789 (0.0508) 0.1185 (0.0358)
Central highlands -0.3599 (0.0379) -0.3670 (0.0374) -0.0564 (0.0267)
Southern highlands -0.7135 (0.0365) -0.0413 (0.0356) -0.0769 (0.0287)
Northern high altitude jungle -0.4818 (0.0579) -0.4313 (0.0583) -0.2987 (0.0488)
Central high altitude jungle -0.4875 (0.0547) -0.4324 (0.0509) -0.2745 (0.0501)
Low altitude jungle -0.2327 (0.0561)
Durable goods (squared) -8.59E-04 (0.0003) -8.07E-04 (0.0002) -7.72E-06 (0.0000)
Household size (squared) 0.0120 (0.0024) 0.0156 (0.0021) 0.0153 (0.0020)
Table A4.1 Determinants of (Log) per-capita expenditure
(OLS estimation with robust errors)
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Number of migrants
  (houshold members) squared 0.0002 (0.0072) -0.0019 (0.0073)
Potential work experience (squared) 1.07E-05 (0.0001) -3.00E-05 (0.0001) -1.63E-04 (0.0001)
Savings (squared) 0.0002 (0.0003) 0.0004 (0.0003) -0.0015 (0.0007)
Schoolling years
  (other members, squared) -0.0020 (0.0022) -0.0034 (0.0021)
Spell of illness (household head) squared 0.0002 (0.0063)
Durable goods*social networks -0.0060 (0.0022) -0.0035 (0.0021) 0.0007 (0.0037)
Household size*potential work
  experience 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0004 (0.0003) 0.0001 (0.0002)
Household size*savings -0.0065 (0.0033) -0.0053 (0.0036) -0.0032 (0.0017)
Household size*spell of illness 0.0011 (0.0078) 0.0020 (0.0084) 0.0076 (0.0135)
Number of migrants*durable goods -0.0002 (0.0005) -0.0003 (0.0006) 0.0005 (0.0009)
Number of migrants*land size 0.0296 (0.0319) 0.0227 (0.0354) 0.0596 (0.0506)
Number of migrants*savings 0.0043 (0.0023) 0.0040 (0.0026) -0.0004 (0.0030)
Potential work experience*durables goods -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0001)
Potential work experience*number of
  migrants -0.0003 (0.0006) 0.0001 (0.0006) -0.0017 (0.0006)
Potential work experience*savings -0.0005 (0.0004) -0.0004 (0.0004) 0.0002 (0.0004)
Potential work experience*spells of illness -0.0001 (0.0006) -0.0003 (0.0006) 0.0007 (0.0006)
Savings*durable goods -5.06E-05 (0.0002) -2.19E-05 (0.0002) -2.12E-04 (0.0001)
Schoolling years
  (household head)*durable goods -0.0001 (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0003) -0.0006 (0.0003)
Schoolling years
  (household head)*land size -0.0113 (0.0120) -0.0053 (0.0102) 0.0092 (0.0089)
Schoolling years
  (household head)*potential work
  experience -0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0000 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0002)
Schoolling years (household head)
  *potential work experience 0.0023 (0.0019) 0.0027 (0.0020) -0.0067 (0.0016)
Schoolling years (household head)
  *savings -0.0044 (0.0016) -0.0044 (0.0017) 0.0003 (0.0013)
Schoolling years (household head)
  *spells of illness -0.0026 (0.0023) -0.0013 (0.0022) 0.0056 (0.0017)
Spell of illness*durable goods 0.0005 (0.0007) 0.0002 (0.0007) -0.0001 (0.0006)
Spell of illness*number of migrants -0.0024 (0.0044) -0.0028 (0.0045) -0.0014 (0.0057)
Spell of illness*savings 0.0042 (0.0024) 0.0024 (0.0026) -0.0006 (0.0033)
Urban zone*household head gender -7.85E-05 (0.0007) 1.95E-04 (0.0006)
Urban zone*land size 0.0007 (0.0013) 0.0001 (0.0012)
Urban zone*savings (squared) -6.82E-06 (0.0000) -8.07E-06 (0.0000) 1.29E-03 (0.0006)
Urban zone*schoolling years
  (household head, squared) 7.18E-05 (0.0001) 4.79E-05 (0.0001) 6.57E-03 (0.0066)
Urban zone*schoolling years
  (other member) -0.0001 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0015 (0.0079)
Urban zone*schoolling years
  (other member, squared) 2.20E-05 (0.0000) 3.07E-05 (0.0000)
Urban zone*access to credit 0.0004 (0.0005) 0.0004 (0.0004) 0.0560 (0.0540)
Urban zone*access to drinking water 0.0009 (0.0007) 0.0010 (0.0006)
Urban zone*access to electricity -1.31E-04 (0.0007) -4.18E-05 (0.0006) -7.86E-04 (0.0006)
Variables
Census year
1972 a/ 1981 a/ 1993 b/
Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev.
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Urban zone*access to in-house drain
  age services -0.0003 (0.0015) -0.0001 (0.0011) -0.0006 (0.0009)
Urban zone*cattle -0.0009 (0.0013) -0.0004 (0.0012) -0.0223 (0.1018)
Urban zone*durable goods -0.0003 (0.0001) -0.0003 (0.0001) 0.0519 (0.0056)
Urban zone*durable goods (squared) 6.12E-06 (0.0000) 5.38E-06 (0.0000) -3.06E-04 (0.0000)
Urban zone*fertilizers usage -0.0011 (0.0008) -0.0011 (0.0008) -0.1592 (0.0816)
Urban zone*household size 0.0009 (0.0004) 0.0013 (0.0003) 0.0609 (0.0326)
Urban zone*household size (squared) -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0054 (0.0024)
Urban zone*illiteracy rate 7.28E-06 (0.0000) 6.38E-06 (0.0000) 7.38E-04 (0.0010)
Urban zone*number of migrants 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001)
Urban zone*number of migrants
  (squared) -0.0001 (0.0004) -0.0003 (0.0004)
Urban zone*number of room in
  the house -2.31E-05 (0.0000) -3.27E-05 (0.0000) -0.0004 (0.0122)
Urban zone*pesticides usage 0.2702 (0.0764) 0.3074 (0.0659) 0.1272 (0.0326)
Urban zone*potential work experience 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0032 (0.0059)
Urban zone*potential work
  experience (squared) -7.84E-07 (0.0000) -1.12E-06 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0001)
Urban zone*savings 0.0006 (0.0003) 0.0008 (0.0003) -0.0535 (0.0255)
Urban zone*schoolling attendance rate 0.0006 (0.0005)
Urban zone*seeds usage -0.0024 (0.0008) -0.0017 (0.0007) 0.0109 (0.0830)
Urban zone*social networks -0.0009 (0.0005) -0.0011 (0.0005) 0.0554 (0.0770)
Urban zone*spells of illness 0.0003 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0002)
Urban zone*Urban zone*inadequate
  floor 4.02E-05 (0.0000) 3.51E-05 (0.0000) 0.0004 (0.0005)
Urban zone*working children 2.04E-05 (0.0000) 1.62E-05 (0.0000) -0.0989 (0.0863)
Number of observation 4949 4949 3623
R-squared 0.7546 0.7612 0.8596
a/ Based on 1985-86 LSMS.
b/ Based on 1994 LSMS.
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis and p<0.01=*, p<0.5=~
Source: Own estimates
Variables
Census year
1972 a/ 1981 a/ 1993 b/
Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev.
conclusion...
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Data sources
At household level
• Living Standard Measurement Surveys 1985-86 and 1994, Cuánto Institute.
At provincial -level
• Population and Household Censuses 1972, 1981 and 1993 Instituto Nacional de
Estadística e Informática: population and household characteristics.
• Third National Agrarian Census 1994, Instituto Nacional de Estadística e
Informática: agricultural variables, cattle and land.
• Basic Needs Map 1994. Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática: basic needs
and health variables
• Social Investment Map 1994, FONCODES: poverty index and its components,
living standard.
Geographic variables
• Arc data Online in: http://www.esri.com/data/online/esri/wothphysic.html. This
information was afterwards overlaid on a map of Peru at provincial and district
levels. The score for each province or district was selected according to the position
of its centroid on the thematic map: earthquake zones, precipitation, soils and
vegetation.
• Natural Resources in Peru 1995, Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales:
bioclimatic and land potential scores.
• Social Investment Map 1994, FONCODES: altitude and geographic location.
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Chapter 5
The Role of Public Infrastructure in Lowering
Transaction Costs
5.1. Introduction
When attempting to evaluate the impact of specific policies on rural households, the specialized
literature commonly assumes a complete integration of product and factor markets and factors
on the part of rural households. However, empirical evidence suggests that rural markets tend
to be thin, underdeveloped or even nonexistent. The dearth of markets is due to the limited
economic development or to obstacles to their development.
In this context, the response of farmers, for example, to an increase in prices on the
international, national, regional or local markets, has commonly been overestimated. This lack
of knowledge of the microeconomic determinants of farmer integration with product factors
markets has multiple implications. The most important include those associated with the
implementation of pricing policies, which attempt to have a homogeneous and almost
instantaneous impact on agricultural supply and/or production, something which does not occur
(to the surprise of those who promote such policies).    De Janvry, et al. (1987) showed how, in
different contexts, the erroneous modeling of how rural households make decisions could lead
to the overestimation of price elasticities of agricultural supply. Typically, this overestimation
originates from mistakenly assuming that decisions on consumption and production are separable.
Udry (1995) cites the work of Fafchamps, Rosenzweig, Foster and Rosenzweig, and that of
Jacoby (the case of the Peruvian highlands) to demonstrate how imperfections in the labor market
condition the non-separability of production and consumption decisions.
In the case of Peru, the topic of the market integration of farmers has received little
attention. Recent studies carried out by GRADE in the framework of the Economic Research
Consortium have examined the issue of agricultural trade and market integration. Escobal and
Agreda (1998), using time series data of 12 agricultural goods in 12 Peruvian cities, showed
that markets for agricultural products in Peru are reasonably integrated (from a spatial point of
view). It also demonstrated that access to public goods and services is a determinant factor in
explaining the speed at which consumer price information is disseminated to different cities
around the country. Results also showed that in the long term, there is a complete transmission
between wholesale and farmgate prices for some staple crops (i.e. potato or onion).
Although these results demonstrate that agricultural markets in Peru are reasonably
spatially and vertically integrated in the long term, they also show important deviations in the
short term. Additionally, the results obtained to date reveal little about the level of efficiency
in which these markets actually operate. Finally, these results do not respond to the question
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of why certain producers choose to integrate into the market as net-sellers while others choose
to remain subsistence farmers. Information on how access to assets in general and to public
good and services in particular influences the way in which farmers integrate into markets can
be used to design alternative policies to promote farmers’ more successful market integration.
This study posits that there are high household-specific transaction costs, which limit
the capacity of poor farmers to integrate into agricultural markets. The fact that many rural
households do not participate in certain agricultural markets due to the existence of transaction
costs has been documented in the economics literature. Notwithstanding, the relationship
between these costs and marketing strategies has received little attention. Moreover, the
relationship between access to public infrastructure and lower transaction costs has not been
documented at all. Lowering transaction costs may be one of the most effective ways of
integrating the poor into a market economy, allowing them to grasp the benefits that come
with the division of labour and specialization that market relations promote.
Additionally, an important criticism of the literature on transaction costs is that theoretical
development has not been accompanied by successful measurement of transaction costs. This
chapter will attempt to partially fill this gap, proposing a methodology to estimate these costs
and applying it to the case of potato farmers of the Tayacaja Province, in the Huancavelica
Department, in the Andes of Peru.
This chapter is divided into four sections, besides this introduction. Section 5.2 defines
transaction costs and the activities related to those costs. It also proposes a microeconomic
model that associates transaction costs with the marketing option each rural household chooses.
Additionally, it suggests an alternative to directly estimate transaction costs. Section 5.3
describes the study zone, presents the sample frame used to evaluate transaction costs in the
Peruvian potato market and presents the main results of the study. Finally, Section 5.4 lay out
the main conclusions and policy implications. This section also suggests future lines of research
associated both with transaction costs and with the database that this study has generated.
5.2. The role of public infrastructure in a costly exchange environment:
conceptual framework
Transaction Cost Theory develops from the work of Ronald Coase in its 1937 article "The
nature of the firm"1. He argues in that article that market exchange was not costless and
underlined the importance of transaction costs in the organization of firms and other contractual
arrangements. Transaction arrangements evolve so as to minimize their implicit costs given
the social, political and economic environment that prevails.
North (1990) defined transaction costs as the costs of measuring what is traded as well
as the costs of monitoring compliance with agreements. In general, there are no precise
1 Coase, R. H. (1937) : "The nature of the firm", Economica, 4, 1-37.
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definitions of these costs, but they are recognized as being the costs associated with establishing
contracts, monitoring them and ensuring their compliance.  Transaction cost economics, unlike
traditional neoclassical economic theory, recognizes that trade activity does not occur in a
frictionless economic environment. According to Eggertsson (1990), transaction costs originate
from one or more of the following activities:
• The search for price and quality information for the goods or inputs to be traded, as well as
the search for buyers and/or potential sellers (including relevant information about their
conduct).
• The negotiation necessary to identify the relative negotiating power of buyers and sellers.
• The establishment of contractual agreements.
• The monitoring of parties to the contract to verify their compliance.
• The costs associated with fulfillment of the agreement, as well as penalties originating
from non-compliance of the contractual relationship.
• The protection of property rights before third parties.
Transaction costs can be classified in three groups: information, negotiation and
monitoring costs. Information costs occur before the transaction is made and include the costs
of obtaining information on prices and products, as well as the costs associated with identifying
commercial counterparts. Negotiation costs are costs associated with the development of the
transaction and usually include commissions, the act of negotiating specific transaction
conditions and the costs associated with the drawing up of contracts (whether formal or
informal). Monitoring costs occur after the transaction is made and are usually associated
with the costs of assuring that product quality and payments are as agreed upon.
According to  Hobbs (1997) a critical element of transaction costs economics is that,
ceteris paribus, vertical coordination among the different production, process and distribution
stages will be carried out in the most transaction-cost-efficient manner.2
The empirical literature on transaction costs is based mainly on the strategy proposed
by Williamson (1979). In this strategy, the need to directly evaluate transaction costs associated
with different trade relationships is "evaded" by reformulating arguments associated with the
transaction cost economics literature in terms of the effects that certain observable attributes
would have on the differential costs of implementing, or not implementing, a market transaction.
Formally, if we establish that between two possible transactions (T1 and T2) the one
with lower transaction costs (TC) will occur, we would have:
(1)
2 Note that when we refer to a household that makes production and consumption decisions, we are actually considering
an economic agent integrated vertically that produces for self-consumption to minimize transaction costs.
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Although TC1 and TC2 are not directly observable, it is enough to observe vector X, which
represents observable attributes that affect transaction costs:
(2)
Empirically, the probability of observing T1 would be equivalent to:
     (3)
Although we will initially follow Williamson’s strategy for evaluating the determinants
of whether or not a farmer will participate in a particular product market, we will also attempt
to determine a way to directly estimate transaction costs.
As mentioned, an important criticism of the literature on transaction costs is that its
theoretical development has not been accompanied by successful measurement of transaction
costs. We must remember that transaction costs, like any other cost in economic theory, are
opportunity costs. As such, they can be estimated. One possibility would be to evaluate the
time spent in their "production", to later place a value on this time according to an hourly
wage. However, this alternative would require a detailed recounting of all activities undertaken,
as well as their duration. Another alternative would be to estimate (econometrically) how
much each activity associated with these transaction costs contributes to determining the price
the farmer receives.3
5.3 Market integration and transaction costs
5.3.1 Review of literature
The fact that the existence of transaction costs keeps many rural households from participating
in certain agricultural markets has been documented in the economics literature by De Janvry,
et al. (1991). Transaction costs drive wedges between purchasing and selling prices of a
household, based on the concept of non-tradable goods taken from international trade theory.
However, the literature has not used the same concept to determine why one household opts
for a particular sales market for its product while another does not. Although risk considerations
obviously could determine that a household will diversify the markets for its product, the
transaction costs associated with each household and the differential transaction costs between
markets would also help explain the "mix" of destinations a farmer chooses.
We have slightly modified the methodology proposed by De Janvry, et al. (1995) in
two aspects to account for the direct measurement of transaction cost. First we are modeling
the decision of selling at the farmgate or selling at market. We believe that the decision of a
3 This can be done using the «hedonic price» technique. See Section 5.2.3.
The Role of Public Infrastructure in Lowering Transaction Costs
103
household to participate in a certain agricultural market depends on that household’s position
of supply and demand relative to the range of prices created as a result of the difference
existing between effective buying and selling prices on that market. This range originates
from a group of transaction costs, some of which are specific to the household, while others
are related to the environment or region in which the household is located and still others are
associated with the specific market of destination.
In this context, a particular market "fails" when a household is faced with a large
difference between the price at which a product or input could be bought and the price at
which it could be sold. Given the wide margin between these two prices, it may be better for
the household not trading the product or input on that market. While this decision occurs in all
markets to which the household is associated, the household will prefer to remain self-subsistent
for that crop.4 Generally, households can be classified in different categories according to the
"mix" of markets in which they have decided to participate.
The second modification, which will be described in more detail in the next section, is
the introduction of a hedonic price function to account for the transaction costs differences.
If p is the effective price that determines production and consumption decisions, each
household faces the following:
Supply of agricultural product (4)
Demand of agricultural product in market j (5)
Idiosyncratic transmission of prices in market j (6)
Transaction costs in market j (7)
where zq, zdj, zpj  and  zij are exogenous variables that affect supply, demand, sales price and
transaction costs, respectively. Thus, for the retailers of a product in market j, the effective
price at level of each household would be:
(8)
In this framework, the condition of being a retailer of potato in market j would be:
        (9)
This model can be estimated using the following probit equation:
     (10)
4 In this case, the shadow or subjective price of the household (that which equals its supply and demand) falls within the
margin: it is higher than the price the farmer would receive if he had sold the product, for which reason he decides not
to sell; and is lower than what it would cost him to buy the product, for which reason he decides not to buy it.
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The expanded model can make estimates based on either a probit or logit specification
or a multivariate probit or logit, depending on whether we are dealing with two or more
destinations. If we use the participation of sales in each market as the base and take into
account that the endogenous variable is between values 0 and 1, the valid estimation method
would be a Two-Limit Tobit Model. In our case, we are attempting to simulate a strategy
associated with the decision to sell at the farmgate or elsewhere so we will try to capture this
decision using a probit model.
5.3.2 Strategies used to measure transaction costs
After estimating the equation (10), the reduced form of the equation of supply conditioned on
the selected strategy can be derived:
(11)
The estimation of equation 11 equals an estimation in two stages, where the Mills ratio
is introduced [obtained from estimating equation (10)] to take into account the endogenous
nature of the decision (sell only at the farmgate or also sell at other locations).
To associate transaction costs to the effective price each farmer receives, we chose to
estimate a hedonic price equation. The word "hedonic" is normally used in the economics
literature to refer to the underlying profit that is obtained when consuming a good or service.
A good that has several characteristics generates a number of hedonic services. Each one of
these services could generate its own demand and would be associated with a hedonic price.
Rosen (1974) developed the theoretical framework on which hedonic models are based. We
interpret the model somewhat differently. The price the farmer receives has a set of "premia"
or "discounts" for a series of services that have been generated, or perhaps omitted.
Therefore, the average farmgate price can be defined as a function of hedonic prices,
which is simply the mathematical relationship between the prices received by this added value
(i.e. potato) and the characteristics of the transaction associated with this product. This is:
(12)
where P
j
 is the average price obtained by j-th farmer for the potato sale; and where (z
1j
, z
2j
...z
Kj
) represents the vector of characteristics associated with the transactions completed by
the farmer. The price function was estimated in accordance with the strategy followed.
It is clear in the literature of hedonic price functions that h(z) does not strictly represent
a "reduced form" of the functions of supply and demand that could be derived from the
5 See Rosen, S. (1974) or Wallace, N.E (1996)
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production or utility functions of the economic agents involved in the transaction.5 Rather, h(.)
should be seen as a restriction in the process of optimization of sellers and buyers. Rosen
(1974), and more recently, Wallace (1996)showed that while growing marginal costs exist for
some of the characteristics (in this case associated with the generation of information,
negotiation and monitoring of the transactions) for farmers and/or sellers, the hedonic function
could be non-linear. In this case, the non-linearity would mean that the relative importance of
transaction costs is not the same for all farmers.
The estimation of an equation such as the one proposed here permits us to disaggregate
the price received by the farmer into a series of components associated with the attributes of
the transactions. A complementary way of interpreting this equation is where the constant
estimate represents a price indicator that results from following the "law of one price",  the
rest of the equation being the elements that must be discounted from the price due to the
differences in the distance of the farmers from the market and other associated transaction
costs. Comparing the transaction costs between households with different endowments (private
and public assets) will allow us to understand the importance of key assets in reducing
transaction costs.
5.4 Transaction costs in rural Peru
5.4.1 The study area
For this study, we focused on an area where an important contrast could be found in farmers’
way to access markets. To facilitate the analysis and to enable policy decisions to be made, we
decided to study farmers living in the same ecological zone who devoted most of their production
to a single crop. At the same time we were interested in evaluating the differences that come
about when public infrastructure is provided so we focused on farmers with different access to
local markets. With these restrictions in mind, we chose as our study area the districts of Pazos
and Huaribamba of Tayacaja Province, Huancavelica Department, between 2,500 and 3,500
meters above sea level. This area has 1,400 farmers who grow potato for sale in the local markets
of Pichus, Huaribamba and Pazos, the regional market of Huancayo and eventually, Lima. For
most of these farmers, the town of Pazos constitutes their main marketing node. However there
are two type of road infrastructure that connects rural dwellers to local markets. Part of rural
population in this area is connected to Pazos through motorized roads while the other part is
connected to the same markets via non-motorized tracks.
Pazos is a Spanish town located in the Mantaro valley, in Peru’s central highlands, 70
kilometers south of the City of Huancayo in Junín Department. Only three decades earlier, it was
a small village housing small-scale subsistence farmers. Like all Andean towns, residents work
mostly in agricultural activities, especially in the production of a variety of potato seeds, due to
the favorable conditions of the area. In Pazos, two agro-ecological zones predominate, each with
different characteristics of climate, soil and especially, water availability, which permit farmers
to obtain yearly potato harvests. Farmers also produce other tubers, grains and cereals.
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The area’s inhabitants report that since the construction of the Pazos-Pucará highway in the
late 1960s, they have been able to reach the central highway that joins the Mantaro Valley (the
major production valley of the Sierra region) with Lima (the country’s largest city). Since that
time, important changes have occurred in Pazos. With the highway came electric power and
later, potable water service. Then, came people from other regions, interested in marketing
potato and other products. New schools and health centers were also built. Dry goods and
agricultural supply stores opened up and merchants and drivers permanently settled in the
area. All this resulted in an increase in the area’s rural-urban population.
By the mid 1970s, Pazos had become a district encompassing 18 villages and small
communities. Due to the district’s strategic location, it became a center in which the agricultural
production of its villages and even those located in the neighboring district of Huaribamba, 22
kilometers from Pazos, converged.  Its greater growth and dynamism had considerable effects
on nearby communities, especially those connected to Pazos via paved roads. Examples of
this include the villages of Chuquitambo, Vista Alegre, Mullaca, Nahuin, etc., in which the
construction of the highway connecting them to Pazos resulted in deep changes in the intensity
and use of the land. Three major changes took place: a) Seeds of native potato varieties were
replaced by improved seed, whose production was destined for the Lima market; b) the potato
planted area increased, and c) community pastureland gave way to privately owned land.
However, Pazos district also has villages and communities that are currently connected
to the district capital via non-motorized tracks (community roads). The following villages are
examples: Pariac, Potacca, Chicchicancha, Yanama, Ñuñunga, etc. These population centers
are connected to Pazos via Pichus, a community connected to the district by a recently built
highway, where all main non-motorized tracks converge.
The farmers of Pazos district and its communities enjoy similar natural conditions. The
conditions of altitude, climate, soil, presence of frosts and droughts, availability of irrigation
water, etc. are all similar. The main difference is the mode of access to the district capital
(paved road/non-motorized track).
5.4.2 Sample Design
As mentioned earlier, the population under study consists of potato farmers living in the districts
of Pazos and Huaribamba, Tayacaja Province, Huancavelica Department, at between 2,500
and 3,500 meters above sea level. Using the 1994 Agricultural Census as a reference, 1,396
farmers were identified in the study area.6
Since we were interested in evaluating the decisions for market integration and
transaction costs these farmers face, we decided to use the census question that identified the
6 According to the Peruvian Agricultural Census, there are a total of 2,844 potato producers in the zone; however, of
these, 1,448 are outside the study area since they are in different agro-ecological zones.
The Role of Public Infrastructure in Lowering Transaction Costs
107
destination of the largest percentage of each farm’s production as a key variable to obtain a
stratified random sample. In Tayacaja Province 69 percent of the potato planted hectares is
sold at market. This indicator was slightly lower in the study area, where owners of the 49.3
percent of potato planted fields reported that their harvest is mainly destined for market.
Taking into account that in the study area there is significant variability partially
associated with the size of the agricultural plots or with the characteristics of the main access
route to the market, we chose to stratify the population by size and type of access route, as
shown in Table 5.1. "Small" refers to farmers with potato fields less than one hectare, "medium"
refers to those with plots between one and three hectares and "large" refers to farmers with
more than three hectares.
Considering stratification in two domains (access by non-motorized track and access
by highway) and the three sizes mentioned, as well as a precision rate equivalent to 21 percent
of the mean population by stratum, the optimum sample size is 188 observations, for a
confidence interval of 95 percent. Finally, the sample was "rounded off" to 190 farmers
distributed among the strata according to their level of heterogeneity.
Table 5.1 Sample design
   Level of articulation with the market
Study domain Size Population
Extension
Mean Standard Variability Precision1/
Sample
  
(Has.)
 deviation (cv) 
 size
Motorized track Small 483 0.6 35.9% 41.10% 114.6% 7.5% 46
Medium 527 1.8 53.8% 37.90% 70.4% 11.3% 46
Large 210 5.8 67.5% 34.60% 51.2% 14.1% 17
 Subtotal 1220 2 49.1% 109
Non-motorized track Small 77 0.6 51.1% 47.00% 92.0% 10.7% 38
Medium 84 1.9 48.9% 41.00% 83.9% 10.2% 37
Large 15 4.6 58.2% 35.90% 61.7% 12.2% 6
 Subtotal 176 1.5 50.7% 123.90% 244.6% 81
Total  1396 2 49.3% 190
1/ Relative precision is equivalent to 20.95%. Reliability rate is 95%.
Source: Own estimations
5.4.3 Main Results
Table 5.2 shows the mean values of the main variables used in the study, differentiated according
to each farmer’s principal access route to market. Among the key characteristics evident in
this table are the following:
• Farmers living in areas with market access via non-motorized tracks reported more than
twice as many bad transactions experiences compared with those connected to the market
by highways (4.7 versus 2.3).
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I. Human capital
Age of head of household Years 46.44 9.27 50.02 9.93 47.97 9.7
Educational level 1/ 2.39 0.78 2.09 0.79 2.26 0.8
Family size Number 6.69 1.73 6.57 1.28 6.64 1.55
Gender head of house hold Male=1 0.93 0.26 0.9 0.3 0.92 0.28
II. Organizational capital
Belongs to an association Yes=1 61.0% 49.0% 36.0% 48.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Sends or receives money
  from migrants Yes=1 55.0% 50.0% 52.0% 50.0% 54.0% 50.0%
III. Physical capital and
technology
Total land Has 6.1 3.2 5.44 2.11 5.82 2.8
Value of durable consumer
  goods  Soles 23332.14 1534.88 23514.22 1175.74 23409.76 1392.65
Uses chemical fertilizer Yes=1 78.9% 41.0% 63.0% 48.6% 72.1% 45.0%
Uses pesticides or other
  chemical inputs Yes=1 69.7% 46.2% 59.3% 49.4% 65.3% 47.7%
Uses improved seed Yes=1 83.5% 37.3% 69.1% 46.5% 77.4% 42.0%
Uses a tractor Yes=1 56.9% 49.8% 0.0% 0.0% 32.6% 47.0%
Uses an ox plow Yes=1 59.6% 49.3% 58.0% 49.7% 58.9% 49.3%
IV. Main flows
Total production Kg 30499.1 26147.48 20067.9 14738.71 26052.11 22569.49
Staple food costs  Soles 163.65 106.54 225.98 138.08 190.22 124.55
V. Transaction costs:
Information
Believes it is important to
  have access to a telephone Yes=1 62.0% 49.0% 7.0% 26.0% 38.0% 49.0%
Knows the price in Pichus Yes=1 17.4% 38.1% 100.0% 0.0% 52.6% 50.1%
Knows the price in
  Huaribamba Yes=1 11.9% 32.6% 1.2% 11.1% 7.4% 26.2%
Knows the price in Pazos Yes=1 99.1% 9.6% 100.0% 0.0% 99.5% 7.3%
Knows the price in
  Huancayo Yes=1 100.0% 0.0% 61.7% 48.9% 83.7% 37.0%
Knows the price in Lima Yes=1 87.2% 33.6% 19.8% 40.1% 58.4% 49.4%
Knows neighbor’s price Yes=1 98.2% 13.5% 100.0% 0.0% 98.9% 10.2%
Calls to learn price Yes=1 93.0% 26.0% 7.0% 26.0% 56.0% 50.0%
Price is below spected Yes=1 27.0% 44.0% 35.0% 48.0% 30.0% 46.0%
No. of merchants who
  visited the farm Number 4.61 1.56 0.12 0.56 2.7 2.55
No. of days’ delay in
  knowing price Days 0.66 1.12 3.38 1.83 1.82 1.99
No. of merchants farmer sold to Number 2.87 1.38 3.96 0.98 3.34 1.34
Travels to learn price Yes=1 70.00% 46.00% 100.00% 0.00% 83.00% 38.00%
No. of merchants farmer
  visited Number 3.87 1.83 6.46 2.09 4.97 2.32
VI. Transaction costs:
Monitoring
No. of times merchant
  went to pay farmer Number 1.74 0.81 1.51 0.55 1.64 0.72
Merchant makes
  payments Always=1
Never=0 0.8 0.4 0.85 0.36 0.82 0.38
Farmer is discounted
  extra costs Yes=1 83.0% 37.0% 72.0% 45.0% 78.0% 41.0%
Table 5.2 Average and standard deviation of the main variables according to access route
Variable Unit  
Motorized tracks Non-motorized tracks Total
Average Stand. dev. Average Stand. dev. Average Stand. dev.
Continued...
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Farmer can demand that
  crop quality be recognized Always=1
Never=0 87.0% 16.0% 63.0% 12.0% 77.0% 19.0%
The price is as agreed upon Yes=1 66.0% 48.0% 58.0% 50.0% 63.0% 49.0%
No. of times farmer was
  not paid Number 2.26 1.81 4.74 2.63 3.32 2.51
No. of times farmer went
  to negotiate price Number 1.47 0.85 1.07 0.35 1.3 0.7
VIII. Transaction costs:
Transport
Distance to Pazos Km 24.53 19.29 82.02 11.45 49.04 32.88
Time to Pazos Min 78.67 82.44 388.15 71.29 210.61 172
Merchant provides
  transportation Yes=1 32.0% 47.0% 35.0% 48.0% 33.0% 47.0%
Average condition
  of the road Bad=0, Good=1 0.55 0.28 0.31 0.26 0.45 0.3
Average distance to the
  sales point Km 3.16 1.51 2.37 1.27 2.82 1.46
Average time to the
  sales point Min 40 22.66 51.67 23.32 44.97 23.6
IX. Transaction costs:
Future sales
Farmer makes future sales Yes=1 18.0% 39.0% 16.0% 37.0% 17.0% 38.0%
Percentage of future sales % 4.4% 10.1% 3.8% 9.3% 4.1% 9.8%
No. of years of future sales Years 0.71 1.81 0.53 1.44 0.63 1.66
X. Other transaction costs
No. of years farmer has
  grown potato Years 18.28 4.99 20.2 4.41 19.09 4.84
Merchant pays farmer
  on consignment Yes=1 52.0% 50.0% 46.0% 50.0% 49.0% 50.0%
XI. Other important
  variables
Sells at the farmgate Yes=1 100.0% 0.0% 6.0% 24.0% 60.0% 49.0%
Sells in Huancayo Yes=1 83.0% 38.0% 16.0% 37.0% 54.0% 50.0%
Sells in Lima Yes=1 37.0% 48.0% 0.0% 0.0% 21.0% 41.0%
Sells in Pazos Yes=1 39.0% 49.0% 100.0% 0.0% 65.0% 48.0%
Sells in Pichus Yes=1 3.0% 16.0% 95.0% 22.0% 42.0% 50.0%
No. of sales destinations Number 2.61 0.62 2.17 0.38 2.43 0.57
Farmgate price  Soles 0.49 0.06 0.5 0 0.49 0.06
Price in Huancayo  Soles 0.74 0.04 0.76 0.04 0.74 0.04
Price in Lima Soles 1.01 0.12 . . 1.01 0.12
Price in Pazos Soles 0.58 0.08 0.57 0.04 0.58 0.06
Price in Pichus Soles 0.5 0.1 0.45 0.06 0.46 0.06
Sales price Soles 0.46 0.08 0.36 0.05 0.42 0.09
Amount sold at farmgate Kg 8035.87 9081.49 98.15 485.83 4651.89 7919.53
Amount sold in  Huancayo Kg 5012.75 6404.22 607.9 2437.82 3134.89 5542.8
Amount sold in  Lima Kg 3313.76 6889.21 0 0 1901.05 5460.82
Amount sold in  Pazos Kg 1534.22 2495.06 2862.59 4402.57 2100.53 3492.2
Amount sold in  Pichus Kg 29.82 236.2 3101.6 3275.52 1339.37 2625.5
Total sales Kg 22908.26 21857.51 12981.48 11394.2 18676.32 18766.51
Total sales value Soles 12140.68 14650.77 3631.4 4799.46 8513.04 12255.9
Proportion of
  self-consumption of
  production (%) 9.0% 6.0% 15.0% 6.0% 12.0% 7.0%
1/ 1=Incomplete primary 2=Complete primary 3=Incomplete Secondary 4=Complete Secondary
Source: Own estimates
Variable Unit  
Motorized tracks Non-motorized tracks Total
Average Stand. dev. Average Stand. dev. Average Stand. dev.
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• The delay in finding out the price that the transaction resulted in is substantially higher
among those who are connected to the market via non-motorized tracks (3.4 days versus
0.7 days).
• The number of merchants visited by farmers before carrying out a commercial operation is
much higher among those who are connected to the market via non-motorized tracks (6.5
versus 3.9).
• The level of informality of the transaction is quite higher among farmers who have market
access through non-motorized tracks (79 percent versus 55 percent do not exchange any
type of documentation).
• While 100  of farmers who have access via non-motorized tracks must travel to learn the
product price, 30 percent of those living in areas with highway access do not have to do so.
• While an average of 4.6 merchants visits each producer located in areas with highway
access, only 0.12 visits farmers located in the non-motorized track areas.
• None of the farmers who have access via non-motorized tracks report owning a tractor
while 56.9 percent of those located in motorized access zones owns or reports using one.
• While only 7 percent of farmers who access the market via non-motorized tracks call to
find out about prices, 93 percent of those located in highway access zones do so.
• 87 percent of farmers connected to the market via a motorized road reports being informed
on potato prices in Lima, compared to less than 20 percent of those with access via non-
motorized tracks.
Finally, while 88 percent of those located in highway access areas reports feeling
confident about being able to change merchants, if necessary, only 32 percent of those who
access the market via non-motorized tracks believe they have an opportunity to do so.
As Table 5.3 demonstrates, the type of market integration established and the possibility
of obtaining a better selling price seems to depend on the set of assets owned by the farmer,
especially human capital assets such as education and family size; organizational assets such
as membership in associations, and; physical and technological assets such as plot size and
the use of improved seed or chemical fertilizers.
Transaction Costs
Transport costs are obviously some of the most important transaction costs. While the
households surveyed in areas of highway access require an average of 78 minutes to reach
Pazos, those located in areas of non-motorized track access need 388 minutes. Additionally,
non-motorized tracks tend to be in worse condition than highways.
As Table 5.4 shows, farmers who live closer to Pazos tend to produce and sell more
potatoes at higher prices. Moreover, some indicators of information costs incurred, as detailed
in Table 5.5, show that farmers who have more timely access to price information average a
higher selling price.
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Table 5.3  Household assets and market access
 Production Sale Sales Price Sales Value Sale/Prod
(Kg) (Kg) (Nuevos Soles/Kg) (Nuevos Soles) (Ratio)
Educational level
 Incomplete primary 26865 18769 0.37 8068 0.7
  Complete primary 26687 19274 0.43 8997 0.72
  Incomplete secondary 24341 17455 0.41 7526 0.72
  Complete secondary 25313 18000 0.47 9430 0.71
Gender of head of household
  Female 18931 12000 0.4 4709 0.63
  Male 26707 19290 0.42 8920 0.72
Family size
  Fewer than 6 20059 14073 0.42 6277 0.7
  Between 6 and 8 28867 20684 0.42 9647 0.72
  More than 8 25461 18520 0.42 8327 0.73
Membership in an organization
  Is not a member 29873 21658 0.42 10158 0.73
  Is a member 22232 15695 0.42 6974 0.71
Size of farm plot (hectares)
  Less than 1 9929 5643 0.38 2167 0.57
  Between 1 and 3 21337 14753 0.41 6233 0.69
  More than  3 87313 69313 0.53 37496 0.79
Use of improved seed
  Does not use 17509 11477 0.41 4717 0.66
  Uses 28551 20782 0.42 9692 0.73
Use of chemical fertilizer
  Does not use 17272 11443 0.4 4598 0.66
  Uses 29449 21474 0.43 10101 0.73
      
Source: Own estimates
Table 5.4 Transport costs and market access
 Production Sales Sales Price Sales Value Farmgate Price Sale/Prod
 (Kg) (Kgs) (Nuevos Soles/Kg) (Nuevos Soles) (Nuevos Soles/Kg) (Ratio)
Condition of road
Bad 19654 13000 0.36 4710 0.5 0.66
Average 20958 14468 0.41 6102 0.5 0.69
Good 39173 29700 0.47 15271 0.5 0.76
Distance to Pazos  (km)
Fewer than 15 29289 21868 0.49 11211 0.5 0.75
Between 15 and 54.9 31780 24218 0.45 11552 0.5 0.76
Between 55 and 74.9 25615 17487 0.4 7729 0.5 0.68
75 or more 18793 12129 0.36 4563 0.5 0.65
Time to Pazos  (min)
Fewer than  30 31750 23933 0.49 12356 0.5 0.75
Between 30 and 180 30690 23283 0.46 11156 0.5 0.76
180 or more 21560 14335 0.38 5875 0.5 0.66
Source: Own estimates
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Additionally, farmers who had visited fewer traders before deciding on carrying out
the transaction tended to attain higher prices. This is because the sample contains farmers who
had previously incurred costs to establish their trade relations and as a result, today they enjoy
more stable relationships with merchants in the zone.
Table 5.6 lists some indicators of negotiation costs and market access. Again we see
how farmers who incur higher transaction costs are precisely those who have not been able to
establish trusting, stable relationships with potato buyers. These farmers receive a lower price
for their crop on average and tend to sell less than those who have managed to establish more
stable working relationships and who do not require numerous visits to negotiate their
transactions.
Interestingly, farmers who go to negotiate a transaction more often believe it is «risky»
to approach other merchants. As a consequence, these farmers believe they are commercially
«tied» to the merchant with whom they negotiate. In effect, as Table 5.6 shows, farmers who
Table 5.5  Information costs and market access
 Production Sales Sales Price Sales Value Farmgate Price Sale/Prod
 (Kg) (Kg) (Nuevos Soles/Kg) (Nuevos Soles) (NuevosSoles/Kg) (Ratio)
Membership in an
association
  Is not a member 29873 21658 0.42 10158 0.5 0.73
  Is a member 22232 15695 0.42 6974 0.5 0.71
Sends or receives cash
  yes 24919 17636 0.41 7725 0.5
  no 27029 19574 0.43 9291 0.5
Price is lower than
what farmer knew
  Is not lower 26616 19278 0.42 8833 0.5 0.72
  Is lower 24737 17272 0.41 7941 0.5 0.7
Travels to inquire
for prices
  yes 42042 32273 0.48 16787 0.5
  no 22691 15818 0.41 6838 0.5
Number of days’ delay
in learning price
  Zero 33411 25581 0.48 12929 0.5 0.77
  One or more days 21358 14272 0.39 5782 0.5 0.67
Number  of traders who
visited before selling
  Fewer than 2 33963 25500 0.44 12233 0.5 0.75
  Between 3 and 5 26813 19548 0.43 9244 0.5 0.73
  More than 5 22149 15078 0.4 6405 0.5 0.68
Source: Own estimates
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believe they cannot approach other buyers receive a much lower price and tend to produce and
sell much smaller quantities than those who feel free to approach other buyers.
Table 5.7 lists some indicators associated with the monitoring of contracts. In general,
as Table 5.2 shows, a small percentage (21 percent) of farmers located in areas with non-
motorized track access does not establish formal contact with the merchant, while 45 percent
of producers located in paved road access areas establish formal contractual relations. In this
context, Table 5.7 shows that farmers who have contractual backing generally obtain higher
prices. Additionally, farmers who can demand the merchants to recognize the quality of their
crop tend to produce more, to sell more and to receive higher prices.
Also noteworthy is that the longer farmers have known their merchants, the more often
contracts are honored (whether formal or informal) and the more farmers produce and sell at
a higher average price.
 Production Sales Sales Price Sales Value Farmgate Price Sale/Prod
 (Kg) (Kg) (Nuevos Soles/Kg) (Nuevos Soles) (Nuevos Soles/Kg) (Ratio)
N° of times farmer
went to negotiate price
0 52462 41077 0.51 21713 0.5 0.78
1 25417 18136 0.41 8178 0.5 0.71
2 21488 14690 0.42 6245 0.5 0.68
3 20714 14500 0.47 6672 0.5 0.7
Possibility of
approachin
go ther buyers
Can not 21934 14787 0.37 5857 0.5 0.67
Can 28348 20844 0.45 10075 0.5 0.74
      
Source: Own estimates
Table 5.6  Negotiation costs and market access
Econometric Estimation
Table 5.8 shows the results of the Two-Limit Tobit Model derived from equation (10). As
mentioned earlier, this estimation will serve as basis for estimating both the supply and
price equations. Here we note that the greater the commercial experience (numi7.ber of
years producing potato), the greater the organizational capital of the community where the
farmer lives, the greater the social capital (community ties with the outside) and the greater
the probability that the farmer will establish more stable trade relations and that the merchant
will go the farm rather than the farmer being obligated to go to the local or regional fair to
sell his crop.
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 Production Sales Sales Price Sales Value Farmgate Price Sale/Prod
 (Kg) (Kg) (Soles/Kg) (Soles) (Soles/Kg) (Ratio)
No. of times farmer
approached merchant
for payment
1 28299 20636 0.43 10020 0.5 0.73
2 24635 17169 0.4 7280 0.5 0.7
3 21889 16167 0.44 7211 0.5 0.74
4 18500 12333 0.41 5111 0.5 0.67
Farmer had problems
receiving payments
from merchant
Always 20279 13662 0.44 6253 0.5 0.67
Never 27310 19769 0.42 9070 0.5 0.72
Farmer can demand
that merchant recognize
product quality
Rarely 17050 10500 0.34 3592            , 0.62
Almost always 21622 14626 0.39 5940 0.5 0.68
Always 34484 26377 0.48 13510 0.5 0.76
Final price is equal to
agreed price
No 24359 16958 0.41 7283 0.5
Yes 27062 19702 0.43 9331 0.5
Merchant deliver
ssupporting document
Yes 27476 19932 0.44 9330 0.5 0.73
No 25294 18008 0.41 8159 0.5 0.71
Days of delay of
payment
1 30998 23286 0.46 11716 0.5
2 24602 17250 0.4 7607 0.5
3 24833 17833 0.43 7927 0.5
No. of years farmerhas
known merchant
Fewer than 3 19351 12853 0.4 5297 0.5 0.66
Between 4 and 6 24615 17615 0.42 7960 0.5 0.72
More than 6 44721 34471 0.46 17456 0.5 0.77
       
Source: Own estimates
Table 5.7  Monitoring costs and market access
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Table 5.8 Determinants of farmgate sales
(Probit estimate of farmgate sales)
Explanatory Variables Coefficients St. Error1/
Constant -66.177 -34.3 +
No. of years producing potato 0.406 0.25 +
Age of household head -0.136 -0.08 +
Family size 0.343 0.3
% of households in the community that belong to associations 34.903 19.09 +
Use of chemical fertilizers (1=yes) -1.672 -1.43
Use of pesticides (1=yes) -3.47 -2.02 +
% of community households with ties outside the farm 27.686 16.01 +
Use of improved seed (1=yes) 1.831 1.32
Number of productive assets -0.854 0.57
Land size (has.) 0.597 -0.57
Average distance to sales point (km) 14.249 7.15 ~
No. of observations 190
Pseudo R squared 0.902
1/p<0.10 = +, p<0.05= ~
Source: Own estimates
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 show the estimations of the equations (11) and (12).  The
supply equation (Table 5.10) can be interpreted as a reduced form of the model shown in
the previous section.
The results of the price equation show that the Mills ratio is significant, which means
that differences exist in the prices received, depending on the marketing strategy adopted. The
price equation shows that the effects of the interaction between transaction costs are key;
therefore, the direct interpretation of the parameters is not simple. In the case of the sales
equation, organizational capital, social capital, technology used, as well as access to public
goods and services (highway and paved roads, police post and court of justice) are important
determinants of the amount sold at market. We should also consider other transaction costs,
such as those associated with information (delay in learning price, level of trust established
with the merchant) and with contract monitoring (frequency of merchant compliance, respect
for price agreed upon).
As described earlier, it is possible to estimate and disaggregate transaction costs using
as a base the estimations presented in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. While equation 9 enables us to
evaluate to the price increases for potatoes that each household would have received if it had
not incurred transaction costs in its relations with merchants, equation 10 permits us to assess
the effect that reducing these costs would have on sales.
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Table 5.11 shows the discounts in price perceived by households surveyed due to the
transaction costs incurred. The high value obtained is noteworthy. These estimates suggest that
prices are 36.5 percent lower of what they would have been without transaction costs. Standard
deviations confirm that the transaction costs estimated here are statistically significant. The
table also shows that the most important transaction costs are those associated with monitoring
and information costs. Negotiation costs are just the opposite of expected — as mentioned
earlier, the farmers who incur more transaction costs are the same ones who have not been able
to establish trusting, stable relationships with potato buyers. Thus, farmers who incur greater
monitoring costs obtain lower prices. If this is true, the estimated transaction costs should
consider monitoring costs with a negative rather than a positive sign, in which case the total
transaction costs would be even higher (equivalent to 82.7 percent of the average price).
Table 5.12 attempts to measure the impact on sales that a reduction of estimated
transaction costs would have. The results are the outcome of a partial equilibrium exercise, for
which reason no attempt was made to measure the impact of an increased commercial surplus
on the local price. Since the production in the study area only accounts for a small part of the
market trading in Pazos, Huaribamba or Huancayo, the proposed exercise is reasonable.
Explanatory Variables Coefficient St. Error1/
Constant 0.545 -0.030 *
Inverse Mills ratio -0.011 0.000 *
Inverse Mills ratio squared 0 0.000 *
Frequency of merchant compliance -0.362 -0.070 *
Merchant compliance* trust in input supplier -0.138 -0.070 ~
Possibility of demanding that *merchant recognize quality 0.162 -0.050 *
Possibility of demanding quality*trust in input supplier -0.282 -0.100 *
Possibility of demanding quality*ratio of effectiveness 0.277 -0.110 *
Mills ratio*delay in learning price 0.002 0.000 *
Respect for price agreed upon* trust in input supplier 0.331 -0.070 *
Respect for price agreed upon *bias of the information (1) 0.055 -0.020 *
Respect for price agreed upon *type of prices known -0.109 -0.030 *
Respect for price agreed upon *ratio of effectiveness (2) 0.076 -0.030 ~
Pays to obtain information*merchant complies 0.229 -0.060 *
Bias of the information*trust in sellers of inputs 0.2 -0.060 *
Bias of the information*prices known -0.136 -0.030 *
Ratio of effectiveness*merchant complies 0.111 -0.040 *
Ratio of effectiveness *pays for information -0.194 -0.080 ~
Ratio of effectiveness *bias of the information 0.094 -0.030 *
Recognizes product quality*trust in input supplier 0.193 -0.070 *
Recognizes product quality *respects price agreed upon -0.139 -0.050 *
Recognizes product quality *bias of the information 0.12 -0.060 ~
Delay in learning price*ratio of effectiveness -0.037 -0.010 *
No. of observations: 190 R squared: 0.613
1/ p<0.10 = + , p<0.05= ~, p<0.01=*
(1): Bias of the information: if the effective price is below that known.
(2): Ratio of effectiveness: (number of merchants who visit/number of merchants farmer sells to)
Source: Own estimates
Table 5.9 Determinants of sales price
(OLS Estimation of Sales Price)
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Table 5.10 Determinants of amount sold off the farm
(OLS Estimation of Sales Quantity)
Explanatory Variables Coefficients St. Error 1/
Constant -0.374 -0.13 *
No. of years producing potato 0.004 0 *
Gender of head of household (I =male) 0.06 0.02 *
% of community households belonging to associations 0.306 0.08 *
% of community households with outside ties 0.281 0.09 *
Use of improved seed (1=yes) 0.042 0.01 *
Use of ox plow (I =yes) 0.025 0.01 ~
Size of farm plots (has.) 0.162 0.01 *
Existence of a court in the community (1=yes) -0.082 -0.04 ~
Average distance from sales point (km) -0.072 -0.03 ~
Inverse Mills ratio 0.006 0 *
Existence of a health post in the community (1=yes) -0.023 -0.01 ~
No. of days’ delay in learning price -0.006 0
Level of trust in input supplier -0.218 -0.06 *
Frequency of merchant compliance 0.027 0.01
Respect for price agreed upon (1=yes) 0.033 0.01 ~
Existence of a police post in the community (1=yes) 0.052 0.03 ~
Lives in Chuquitambo (I =yes) 0.243 0.07 *
Lives in Collpa (I =yes) 0.097 0.03 *
Lives in Mullaca (I =yes) 0.153 0.04 *
Lives in Pariac (I =yes) 0.064 0.02 *
Lives in Pichus (I =yes) 0.078 0.04 ~
Lives in Putacca (1=yes) 0.048 0.02 ~
Lives in San Cristobal de Nahuin (1=yes) 0.15 0.03 *
Lives in Santa Cruz de Ila (1=yes) 0.122 0.04 *
Lives in Tongos (1=yes) 0.117 0.03 *
No. of observations: 190 R squared: 0.856
1/ p<0.05 = -, p<0.01=*
Source: Own estimates
Characteristics
Type of Transaction Cost
Information Negotiation Monitoring
Total % Price 1/
Total -0.164 0.195 -0.185 -0.154 -36.5
(0.046) (0.043) (0.048) (0.050)
Type of Access
Non-motorized track -0.177 0.212 -0.173 -0.139 -38.4
(0.062) (0.046) (0.047) (0.057)
Motorized track -0.154 0.182 -0.193 -0.165 -35.4
(0.040) (0.041) (0.049) (0.050)
Type of  Producer
Small -0.165 0.195 -0.19 -0.161 -39.5
(0.047) (0.043) (0.047) (0.050)
Medium -0.161 0.184 -0.174 -0.15 -36.5
(0.046) (0.041) (0.046) (0.051)
Large -0.166 0.231 -0.202 -0.138 -27.6
(0.044) (0.053) (0.055) (0.049)
1 / A negative value indicates discounts in the price the farmer receives while a positive value suggests a price increase.
Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Based on data in Table 5.9
Source: Own estimates
Table 5.11 Discount in sales price by type of transaction cost
(Nuevos Soles per kg)
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Table 5.12 Discount in amount sold by type of transaction cost
(Kg)
Type of Transaction Cost
Characteristics
Information Negotiation Monitoring Distance Total
% Quantity 1/
Total -107 -927 425 -1876 -2485 -13.3
(61) (235) (142) (838) (948)
Type of Access
Non-motorized track -200 -909 418 -1523 -2214 -17.1
(114) (231) (142) (680) (817)
Motorized track -39 -940 430 -2138 -2686 -11.7
(22) (239) (142) (955) (1049)
Type of Producer
Small -117 -931 416 -1833 -2466 -20.6
(67) (236) (139) (819) (933)
Medium -107 -956 415 -1874 -2522 -17.5
(61) (243) (138) (837) (952)
Large -74 -805 495 -2037 -2421 -4.1
(42) (204) (168) (910) (989)
 
1/ A negative value indicates discounts in the quantity sold while a positive value expresses an increase in the quantity sold.
Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Based on data in Table 5.10
Source: Own estimates
The results of the simulation based on the function of supply show that the quantity
sold would have been 13 percent higher if transaction costs had not been incurred. In this case,
transport costs (whose proxy is the distance to market) are the most important, followed by
negotiation costs.
If we combine the effects of price and quantity sold we can obtain a global estimate of
what transaction costs represent in the study area. Table 5.13 shows how much the transaction
costs incurred by the study population would have reduced the gross sales value. The estimates
suggest that sales were 48.5 percent lower due to transaction costs, with transport costs being
the most important, followed by monitoring and information costs.
As expected, transaction costs are higher for farmers who are connected to the market
via non-motorized tracks and among farmers with lower production levels.
5.5 Conclusions
Public Infrastructure connects to welfare through diverse channels. In this chapter we have
evaluated one of those channels: public infrastructure helps to lower transaction costs, that is,
the costs to reach markets and establish transaction in those markets. Lowering transaction cost
is at the heart of increasing specialization and division of labour and hence is a driving force for
improving efficiency and income generating opportunities for the rural poor.
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Table 5. 13  Discount in amount sold by type of transaction cost
(Nuevos Soles)
Type of Transaction Cost
Characteristics
Information Negotiation Monitoring Distance
Total % GVP 1/
Total -3083 3065 -3347 -789 -4153 -48.5
Type of Access
Non-motorized track -2334 2226 -2170 -549 -2827 -58.3
Paved road -3531 3563 -4305 -994 -5267 -46.5
Type of Producer
Small -2009 1777 -2195 -745 -3173 -63.2
Medium -2353 2092 -2408 -773 -3442 -56.6
Large -9744 12875 -11654 -1020 -9543 -31.3
       
1/  A negative value indicates discounts in the GVP and a positive value indicates an increase. Based on data in tables 5.11 and 5.12
Source: Own estimates
The study used a representative sample of 190 potato farmers living in the districts of
Pazos and Huaribamba in Tayacaja Province, Huancavelica Department, at between 2,500
and 3,500 meters above sea level, to attempt to evaluate the importance of transaction costs on
market integration decisions. It also made a first estimation of these costs.
As the results show, transaction costs in the study area equal almost 50 percent of sales
value, being appreciably higher (60 percent) for farmers who have access to the market via
non-motorized tracks. Likewise, the results confirm that transaction costs are considerably
higher for small-scale farmers than for large-scale ones (67 percent versus 32 percent of sales
value). The results show that besides distance and time to the market, key variables for
explaining the market integration strategy (i.e. when to sell and to what market) include several
indicators associated with how much experience the farmer has with the market in which he
operates; how stable his relations are with different agents he trades with, and; how much of
an investment he makes to obtain relevant information and monitor compliance with implicit
contracts associated with the transactions completed.
Although transaction costs are in absolute value greater the larger the scale of the farm,
they represent a larger proportion of the value of output for small farmers thus, policies aimed
to improve connections between local and regional markets will have also sizable positive
impact for small farmers. The benefits that a small farmer can get from lower transaction costs
are multiple. First, they can expect to see more merchants coming to their farmgate asking for
their products, increasing their bargaining power. It is very likely that they will learn about the
price the same day which in turn, will help them monitoring the compliance of the exchanges
they have done. The relationship with those merchants will evolve and will not be as risky as
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they are, when the information asymmetries are large. They might even decide to reduce the
number of merchants they sell to being able to capture a higher expected effective price and at
the same time reducing the uncertainties of trade.
In the long term farmers with lower transaction costs will be interested in selling their
products not only to local or regional markets, but also to national and, eventually, international
markets. In turn, increasing their marketable surplus will allow them to exploit the benefits of
specialization.
The results showed here are consistent with the idea that larger transaction costs are
associated with lower market responsiveness of farmers, especially of small farmers. If public
infrastructure reduces transaction costs as has been shown here, it is expected that the farmers
will be more able to respond more quickly and effectively to market incentives.
Finally, the literature review carried out suggests that, as far as we know, this is the first
study that attempts to estimate directly transaction costs in agricultural markets. However, we
believe some pending modifications will permit a better estimation of these costs and the
subsequent evaluation of the role that public infrastructure has in lowering those costs. In the
first place, we believe that transaction cost should also be analyzed in a dynamic context. If
we recognize that contractual arrangement evolve in time, we could have a better understanding
of the impact of key elements such as trust in developing contractual arrangements. In addition,
the relation between risk bearing behavior and transaction cost minimizing behavior should
also be evaluated. Equation (10), which shows the marketing options, can be expanded to
consider more than two marketing options and in this way could identify different marketing
strategies that can correspond to a risk diversification strategy or to the existence of differential
transaction costs for each market.
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Chapter 6
Market integration for agricultural output markets in
Peru: the role of public infrastructure
6.1 Introduction
The Enke-Samuelson model Roehmer (1995) which is a generalization of an arbitrage model,
has been widely used to explain price differences between spatially separated markets.  This
model predicts that if transportation costs decrease, price differences and dispersion between
cities reduces while traded volumes increase.  Similarly, if transaction costs between two or
more cities increase, then price differences increase and correlation decreases rapidly.
Nevertheless, the application of this model to agricultural markets has been constrained by the
lack of information about this type of costs. In view of the difficulty of estimating transaction
costs, many specialized studies have used a modified definition of integration (analyzing the
variations on price differentials).  Following this approach, two markets are said to be integrated
if price variations observed in one market are generated by variations in the other one.  If these
markets are geographically separated, these markets can be defined as spatially integrated.
Many studies have shown that domestic agriculture markets have some degree of spatial
integration. The degree of market integration has been measured through various methodologies,
from the usage of correlation analysis to the use of autoregressive models, causality tests or
cointegration techniques1. After reviewing the more recent literature on this topic, this chapter
seeks to measure market integration in Peruvian agriculture using as a case study the Peruvian
potato market. Further, after estimating the speed of adjustment of interrelated markets facing
an external shock, the chapter proceeds and shows the impact of infrastructure investment on
agricultural market integration.  Using daily price series of one of the most important crops in
Peru – potato- collected from 10 cities during the period January 1995 through May 2001, this
chapter presents some evidence supporting the hypothesis of long-run spatial integration of
Peruvian agricultural markets.  Nevertheless, there exist transitory disequilibria that affect the
efficiency in the transmission of information across those markets. An error correction model
is used to estimate causality relations between spatially distributed markets as well as their
speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium.  Distance between markets as well as geographical
differences restrict and distort spatial integration and efficiency between markets.  However,
other elements susceptible of government intervention, such as telecommunication facilities,
road density or access to wholesale markets, are also important to improve efficiency and
integration between markets.
1 See Goletti, et al. (1993).
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The chapter is divided into five major sections. The second section presents a brief
literature review on agricultural market integration showing how this literature has dealt with
the presence of transaction costs and potentially asymmetric price behavior. The third section
presents a simple Threshold Cointegration Model that will be used to assess the speed of
adjustment towards the equilibrium, the presence of transaction costs and the probabilities of
successful and failed arbitrage between spatially distributed markets. Section four described
the basic characteristics of the potato market in Peru, which is used here as a case study to
evaluate spatial market integration in Peruvian Agriculture. After calculating the speed of
adjustment of spatially distributed potato markets, we assess the importance of infrastructure
in the reduction of transaction costs and the improvement of spatial integration between potato
markets in Peru. Finally, section five summarizes the results and discusses some new lines of
research that can be pursued.
6.2 Agricultural market integration and arbitrage relations: a brief
literature review
The specialized literature has used alternative ways to define and measure the spatial integration
of markets.  On the one hand, it has been established that a set of markets is integrated if there are
enough agents who, through arbitrage, act in such a way that prices reflect all the available
information, without the presence of systematical extraordinary profits in any of those markets.
Alternatively, the degree of integration has been identified as the difference between market
prices.  From this view, a significant difference of prices between two markets would reveal a
low degree of integration (probably due to the existence of significant arbitrage costs), while a
small difference would be a sign of a higher degree of integration.
Following Barrett and Li (2000), from a more formal approach, integration may be
defined as tradability or contestability between markets.  This would imply the transfer of
Walrasian demand excess for goods from one market to the other, the transmission of shocks
in prices between markets, or both.  From this approach, an actual physical transfer of goods
does not need to be observed to assure that markets are spatially integrated.
According to Sexton, et al. (1991) and Lutz, et al. (1995), two factors may explain the
lack of spatial integration of markets.  First, physical barriers for trading, incomplete
information, risk adverse agents, among others, may be obstacles for an efficient arbitrage.
Second, imperfect competition structures in the markets under analysis may constitute barriers
to entry that would prevent price arbitrage.  Moreover, if the transaction costs were higher
than price differentials between localities, the arbitrage process between regions would be
blocked causing markets segmentation.
In absence of simultaneous information about prices and trade flows, the correlation
analysis of prices between different pairs of regions has been traditionally used as the appropriate
framework to analyze spatial integration of markets [Fafchamps and Gavian (1996); Alexander
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and Wyeth (1994)].  Within this framework, a higher (lower) correlation is understood as a
higher (lower) degree of spatial integration, whereas the sign of the correlation is taken as
indicator of direction of the effects.  A criticism this approach has received is that within this
framework it is impossible to establish which region, among those being analyzed, is the main
central market (if there exists one).  On the other hand, if the impact of changes in prices over
the different regions were not contemporaneous but lagged, the correlation analysis would
indicate a low degree of integration even if there is actually market integration although it is
not instantaneous2.
Considering these limitations, several efforts have been made to introduce a dynamic
framework, with the purpose of verifying the existence of integration in the short run and long
run.  Ravallion (1986) developed the distributed lags model that incorporates a dynamic
component3.  His proposal consists on evaluating separately spatial market integration allowing
for long run integration as well as short run integration (that is, allowing for a lags structure
that accounts for integration delay).  In mathematical terms, this model can be presented as
follows:
(1)
where, P
i
 (i = 1...N) represents the price in each local market, R is the central market price, X
i
represents other exogenous variables that influence these markets’ dynamics, and  (ε
t
 ν
t
)
 
are
random error terms.  Estimating and contrasting the parameters allow testing three important
hypotheses: (1) spatial market segmentation: there is no influence of one particular market
over the others [b
i0
 = b
i1
 = 0], (2) long run integration: despite delays in the impact over other
markets, full transmission is finally achieved [a
i 
+ b
i0 
+ b
i1
 = 1], and (3) short run integration:
the adjustment of prices to shocks is instantaneous [b
i 
= 0, b
i1 
= a
i0 
= 0].  Additionally, we must
consider that this model assumes a specific structure of integration relationship.  It imposes, a
priori, a restriction according to which there exists a central market; that is, a market that
behaves as an articulating axis around which there are peripheral or satellite markets.
Silvapulle and Jayasuriya (1994) have indicated the main limitations of the radial model.
First, the assumption of a central dominant market (i.e., the assumption that any link between
cities is necessarily established through a central market) might not be an accurate way to model
the dynamics of spatial integration between markets.  Even in the case a central market actually
exists, it is preferable testing the hypothesis of existence rather than imposing it a priori.
2 Yet another criticism is supported on time series theory.  If the series are non-stationary, the trend that leads them
(either deterministic or stochastic) could be the cause of a high degree of correlation.  In this case, the observed
linkages would be based not on economic relations, but on spurious correlations.
3 This model is also known as Radial Model. See Lutz, et al. (1995).
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Subsequently, the radial model has been extended by using the vector autoregressive
(VAR) technique, allowing for testing the existence of a central market.  Despite this
improvement, two problems become apparent.  First, price series are typically non-stationary,
so it is possible that spurious correlations arise. Second, spatial integration between agricultural
markets has been studied from a one-way directional perspective, that is, the verification of
the radial model hypothesis has been done by analyzing market pairs, assuming within each
pair case the existence of a central market.
In the first case, the cointegration analysis enhances the study of long run behavior of
the series, even when these are non-stationary.  However, little literature on the second problem
has been developed until now.  Silvapulle and Jayasuriya (1994) as well as Gil and Sanjuan
(2001), use the multivariate cointegration methodology to solve the second problem. In this
sense, testing the hypothesis established by Ravallion’s model is still the aim, but now within
a framework where no a priori restriction is imposed.  In the following section we present
briefly the links between multivariate cointegration analysis and spatial integration of markets.
The first studies that introduced the cointegration techniques into the study of market
integration, such as Palaskas and Harriss-White (1993) and Badiane and Shively (1996),
assumed the existence of central agricultural markets as well as symmetric and "smooth"
price responses.  Under these assumptions, a shock in the central market may cause the same
answer in all peripheral markets, independently of whether there is an increase or a decrease
in prices, and independently of the magnitude of the shock.
Multivariate cointegration studies, as for example those carried out by Alexander and
Alexander and Wyeth (1994), Silvapulle and Jayasuriya (1994) and Gil and Sanjuan (2001),
expanded this type of analysis to a multimarket context, assuming the existence of a common
trend that moves prices of regional markets towards their long run equilibrium levels after
facing an exogenous shock.  Nevertheless, this mechanism may not work in all periods if there
are factors (as the arbitrage costs or information failures, for example) that hinder the adjustment
mechanism. In such cases, only when deviations from equilibrium surpass a critical threshold,
the profits due to adjustment exceed the costs, so the economic agents react to the shock and,
consequently, the system returns to the equilibrium level.  On the other hand, all these studies
also assume that prices respond to exogenous shocks in a symmetric way and that transaction
costs do not generate either asymmetries or discontinuities in such response.  However, certain
characteristics particular to agricultural product markets may in fact generate discontinuities
or asymmetries in the responses of prices to shocks, reducing the robustness of these results.
6.2.1 Discontinuity and asymmetry in the price mechanisms of adjustment in
regional agricultural markets
In the absence of exit and entry barriers for traders, the degree of arbitrage and integration
will depend on both, prices differential and transaction costs Abdulai (2000). However,
some characteristics of the agricultural production, commercialization, and consumption,
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such as inappropriate transportation infrastructure, entry barriers and information failures,
may turn the arbitrage process into a less smooth process than assumed by traditional models
of market integration.
A source of asymmetry in the prices response to shocks that is commonly mentioned is
the market power Scherer and Ross (1990).  For example, the oligopolistic intermediaries in
an agricultural market may react collusively in a faster way to shocks reducing their profit
margins than they would react to shocks that increase them, generating as a result asymmetries
in the transmission of those shocks to other segments of the market.  Because of this, an
increase in the central market prices would be spread to the regional markets in a faster way
than would a decrease in such prices.
On the other hand, the role of inventory accumulation as a source of discontinuities in
the adjustment of prices between markets has been documented Blinder (1982).  According to
this argument, variations in prices send signals to inventory holders that lead them to accumulate
or reduce stocks.  The expected increase in the dominant market’s price in the next periods
constitutes an incentive for traders to increase inventory holdings, thus buying big quantities
of a certain agricultural product in the present.  But the increase in local market stocks pushes
prices down, so the actual increase is not as high as originally expected.  If, on the other hand,
it was expected that the dominant market prices decrease, there would be an incentive for
traders to reduce their inventory stocks, response that would moderate the magnitude of the
prices fall in the next periods. Under the argument of inventory holdings, regional market
prices would not fully adjust to changes in the dominant market prices.
Other argument that explains the presence of discontinuous or asymmetric price
responses is the existence of menu costs, understood as those costs that result from the repricing
and information process that consumers face in the presence of exogenous variations Mankiw
and Ball (1994).  If variations in the costs of the agricultural product were perceived by the
agents as temporary, the menu costs might constitute an incentive not to adjust prices even
when a decrease in the product costs has actually occurred.
Finally, we should mention that the presence of search costs on imperfect regional
agricultural markets has also been quoted by many researchers as a source of asymmetry or
discontinuities in the prices adjustment process that occurs as response to exogenous shocks
Blinder, et al. (1998).  In many regions, some firms can exercise local market power, due to
the absence of other firms located in spatial proximity that could compete with them.  The
consumers that face these dominant firms face high search costs to get all the information
about prices offered by other firms.  Under these conditions, dominant firms may raise their
prices quickly when the dominant market’s prices increase, whereas they could reduce them
little or nothing when prices in the central market decrease.
For Baulch (1997), there are three factors that affect the degree of market integration
and generate discontinuities in the price responses to exogenous shocks.  The first one is the
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presence of high transaction costs relative to the price differential between two regions that
determines the existence of autarkic markets.  The second factor is the presence of barriers to
entry, risk aversion and information failures.  Finally, the existence of imperfect competition
in relevant segments of the markets may cause high price differentials between markets that
cannot be attributed to the transaction costs.
6.2.2 Alternative frameworks for the analysis of market integration in the
presence of transaction costs
Taking into consideration the possible sources of discontinuity and asymmetry in the responses
of agricultural market prices, researchers have used alternative frameworks to carry out studies
about spatial integration of agricultural markets that introduce transaction costs as elements
that affect arbitrage relations between different regions.  As we will discuss later, the different
techniques relate to concepts implicit in the dynamic model proposed by Ravallion (1986),
reconsidered in terms of the cointegration method and error correction model [Silvapulle and
Jayasuriya (1994); Palaskas and Harriss-White (1993)], as well as with notions from the parity-
bounds model formulated by Sexton, et al. (1993) and Baulch (1997).  A similarity between
all of these models is that they study arbitrage relations between two regions by using, mainly,
nominal price series of a particular product.
The analysis framework that almost all of these research works have used is the law
of one price adjusted by transaction costs, described as follows.  C
ijt
 is the transaction cost
of trading an agricultural product from the market i to j and P
it
 is the price of the agricultural
product in the market i.  The efficient spatial arbitrage requires that no extraordinary profits
could be generated by trading between regions i and j.  In other words, it is necessary that
the law of one price, adjusted by transaction costs, is fulfilled.  The law is described in the
following expression:
(2)
Under efficient arbitrage, null trade flows imply equation (2) holds with equality (binds).
Also, the relation might determine bilateral trade flows from i to j or from j to i, depending on
the market conditions in each city. When (2) holds with equality (binds), the prices are said to
be in the parity threshold, whereas when the margin is bigger than the threshold, extraordinary
profits from trade might be generated.  A strict inequality in (2) would require non-null trade
flows.  Specialized literature involves different approaches to modeling arbitrage relations
between two regions by using (2), furthermore, such approaches allow for estimations of
transaction costs. In first place, linear models stand out4.  This formulation seeks to explain
4 See Badiane and Shively (1996).
Market integration for agricultural output markets in Peru
127
linearly the price formation in two cities, defining (only) one market equilibrium.  The basic
equation of the model is:
(3)
where "time" is a linear trend and µ
t
  is a random error term.  With prices measured in levels,
the intercept C
12
 in the equation (3) shows the fixed transaction cost and the beta coefficient
measures the proportional mark-up or the cost of trading between markets 1 and 2.  Although
equation (2) is informative, it is still incomplete since it does not introduce dynamic aspects
on its specification.  Another problem, of methodological nature, is the presence of unit roots
in the price series, which causes spurious estimations of the equation (3) if the error term µ
t
 is
non-stationary.
As Palaskas and Harriss-White (1993) sustain, if (2) was valid and µ
t
 was stationary,
then we would say that both spatially separated markets are integrated and the expression (3)
would be a cointegrating equation, which establishes the existence of a long run relation
between price series. Therefore, the weak form of the spatial integration condition is defined.
This condition establishes that if (2) was valid, the spatial integration might occur in the long
run with temporary short run deviations5.  It is worth to note that, in order to assure that the
model is consistent with an efficient arbitrage situation, this framework is implicitly assuming
that trade between the two cities is continuous and that there is no reversion in the direction
that trade flows take.  In this context, the fixed arbitrage cost is estimated independently of the
patterns and continuity of trade.  Nevertheless, empirically, only in few cases condition (2) is
satisfied, so the model excludes situations in which no profitable trade carries on as well as
those in which market conditions in different regions vary enough so as to generate reversions
in the trade flows. In this sense, the existence of cointegration between price series is not
enough to determine the existence of efficient arbitrage, and it will be necessary, in order to
evaluate whether market relations are actually efficient, to compare transaction costs in (3)
with observed costs or any other information about markets.
In second place, an alternative framework to study the integration relations between
markets is the Parity Bounds Model6 that assumes that transaction costs have a constant mean
C
12t
 and a random component V
ct
 which is normally distributed with zero mean and constant
variance. These costs constitute thresholds for a band of possible equilibrium, with respect to
which the prices from both markets can be situated.  The price differential P
1t
-P
2t
, in this
context, may define two possible regimes.  If this differential is inside the band, it means
P
1t
-P
2t
=C
12t
-ν´
ct 
, an efficient arbitrage takes place where there is trade without the presence
5 See Ravallion (1986) and Alexander and Wyeth (1994).
6 See Baulch (1997) and Park, et al. (2002).
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of extraordinary profits.  On the other hand, if the differential is outside the band, it means,
P
1t
-P
2t
=C
12t
-ν0
ct
 , little trade takes place and extraordinary profits come out to be exploited
through arbitrage.  In this setting, arbitrage failures or reversions of trade flows may occur.
If ν´
ct 
 and ν0
ct
 were assumed to be independently distributed it is easy to formulate the
likelihood function for the two regimes and, by maximizing this function, we could estimate
the probability of successful or failed arbitrage, as well as the transaction costs.  However, this
model has some limitations.  First, the model identification depends on the assumptions about
the distribution of ν´
ct 
 and  ν0
ct
(normality is usually assumed).  On the other hand, the assumption
of independence of the error terms does not seem to be reasonable since it would imply that all
the information contained in the errors in one period would be completely lost in the future
and, hence, it would not allow for the existence of a mechanism of adjustment that corrects the
distortions in the arbitrage process.  Other limitation of the Parity Bounds Model is that it does
not include the dynamic component in the transaction costs analysis and, as a consequence, it
does not allow us to infer anything about the speed of the price adjustment when there exists
profitable trade opportunities (in other words, when the price differential is above the
equilibrium band).  Finally, to get conclusive results it is necessary to have additional
information about trade flows and arbitrage costs between cities in order to carry out
comparisons with the probabilities of occurrence of the possible regimes and with the estimated
transaction costs.
In the presence of the limitations of the described analysis frameworks, the challenge,
hence, is to develop a dynamic model that considers the presence of transaction costs,
discontinuity and reversion in the trade patterns (or direction), and also that allows to make
inference about the speed of price adjustment to equilibrium levels.  In that sense, the bivariate
cointegration techniques with threshold as well as the Band-TAR models constitute an analysis
framework to overcome some of the limitations mentioned earlier.  In this document, we use
this type of approach with the purpose of analyzing market integration in presence of transaction
costs for the Peruvian potato market case.  The formal presentation of the technical details of
the model will be described in the third section.
6.2.3 Structural determinants of the integration relations and the arbitrage costs
The last topic to discuss in this section is the structural determinants of the spatial integration
of markets.  Even though literature shows a special emphasis on the study of the existence of
some type of market integration, the identification of the structural determinants of such
integration has not received much attention.  The identification of these factors is needed for
the implementation of investment policies oriented to develop agricultural markets.  Following
this concern, the first step in the analysis consists on identifying an indicator of market
integration. Literature has pointed out some indicators: a) the simple correlation coefficients
between city pairs, b) the cointegration coefficients (which capture the existence of a long run
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linear relation between prices), and c) the parameters representing the speed of adjustment of
prices from different regional markets to their equilibrium.  In this chapter, we use the third
indicator as a proxy of the degree of market integration since it gathers the dynamic aspects of
the relationships between cities [(Ejrnaes and Persson (2000)].
The second step in the analysis is oriented to identify the factors that explain the degree
of market integration.  It is worth to note that the research work that has been done on this
topic is scarce. Goletti, et al. (1995) have developed one of these studies, they sustain that the
degree of market integration is a result of the trade action itself as well as the operational
environment, which is determined by the availability of transportation and telecommunication
infrastructure and by the policies that affect the price transmission mechanism. Using a
regression that links a market integration indicator with infrastructure variables, these authors
find that for the rice market in Bangladesh, the main factors that determine the market integration
were the transportation (mainly paved roads) and telecommunication infrastructure, distance
between localities and price variability. Nevertheless, most of research on this issue does not
come across the identification of structural determinants of the degree of market integration in
presence of arbitrage costs, restraining their attention to the analysis of market integration.
In contrast with previous studies, the contribution of this chapter is that it tries to explain
the degree of spatial market integration in presence of arbitrage costs by the existence of
public assets in the cities under analysis, not only emphasizing on the transportation
infrastructure as a determinant of integration between markets, but also taking into account
other factors such as electrical energy and telecommunication infrastructure and the presence
of public works. Furthermore, this study takes into account other determinants such as the
existence of wholesaler commercialization centers in the localities under study and the presence
of geographical differences between regions, by using regression analysis with the purpose of
evaluating the factors that may influence in the determination of market integration.  Once we
have discussed the main contributions in the specialized literature, we proceed to present the
model used in this research.
6.3. A simple threshold cointegration model
6.3.1 The model
In this section, we present a dynamic model that incorporates the existence of transaction costs
and the reversion of trade flows patterns in the analysis of the series of agricultural products
prices.  In addition, it allows us to make inference about the speed of prices adjustment to their
equilibrium levels and other parameters of interest by using the threshold cointegration method.
The model7 explains the behavior of price differentials between two cities where an
agricultural product is traded.  Let X
1t
 be the logarithm of the output in the city 1 whose price
7 See Prakash and Taylor (1997) for an application of this model to the Gold Standard case during the last century.
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in logarithms is p
1t
.  The first part of the model consists on specifying the demand function
that, for simplicity, is assumed to be linear and symmetric for both cities:
(4)
In this equation, a
1
 and n
1
>0 (price elasticity of demand) are parameters and u
1t
 is a
random variable that represents the demand shocks.  The equation establishes that an increase
in X
1t
 in the first city leads to a decrease in its market price.  u
1t 
is probably non-stationary in
the long run, and this may be a sign of the existence of permanent demand shocks.  Moreover,
if the price series is daily, it would be sensible to think that u
1t 
will  show serial autocorrelation.
Following Ejrnaes and Persson (2000), the spatial arbitrage condition is given by:
(5)
From equation (5) we may infer that city 1 will import from city 2 if the autarkic price
in city 2 plus the arbitrage costs are less than or equal to the price in city 1.  If the price p
1t
differs from the autarkic price (p
1At
), profits from trade would be available as long as such
profits exceed the arbitrage costs.  In both directions, the product importation (exportation)
will imply that: ∆X
lt
 = ∆F
t
 , where ∆F
t
 is the product inflow from city 2 to city 1 (or vice versa,
when the analyzed case is city 2).  To complete the model it is necessary to define a specification
for the arbitrage costs.  Here, to simplify, following Prakash and Taylor (1997), we describe a
logarithmic symmetric costs function by using a quadratic specification:
(6)
Thus, there is efficient arbitrage when the marginal income (MgI) is equal to the
marginal cost (MgC).  If   MgI = (P
lt-1
-P
2t-1
) and MgC= c
12
 + b∆F
t 
, making equal both
expressions we have that:
(7)
Solving for ∆F
t
 from (7) and taking into account that ∆X
lt
 = ∆F
t
 we find:
(8)
From (4),P
1t-1
-P
1t-2
=a
1
-n
1
X
1t
+u
t
-a
1
+n
1
X
1t-1
-u
t-1 
= -n
1
∆ X
t1
 + e
1t 
, where e
t1
= u
t
-u
t-1
 ~ N(0, σ
1
2 ) is
white noise.  Replacing the previous result in (8) we get the following system:
Market integration for agricultural output markets in Peru
131
(9)
Since a similar expression is obtained for ∆P
2t 
, we may find a simple error correction
model with symmetric thresholds (TVECM).  This model takes into account the spatial price
margin by differentiating ∆P
1t
-∆P
2t
=∆m
t 
:
(10)
In (10) we have that α=(n
1
+n
2
)/b, which is the parameter of adjustment to an equilibrium
band determined by certain thresholds, which are the symmetric marginal costs of arbitrage in
each direction of trade, constant and equal c
12
.  This parameter of adjustment depends on the
price elasticities of the demand functions of both cities.  The prices of the agricultural product
in the cities 1 and 2 (expressed in logarithms) are assumed to be non-stationary, being m
t-1
=
P
1t-1
-P
2t-1
 the price differential.  The estimated value of α is expected to be within the interval
]0,-1]8.  Finally, ε
t
=e
1t
-e
2t
~ N(0,σ2).
A useful characteristic of this model is that it does not require empirical information
about trade flows or transaction costs for its estimation.  Moreover, from this specification we
can distinguish three trade regimes: m
t
>c
12
, m
t
<-c
12
  and, finally m
t
≤C
12
. The last regime
corresponds to the condition for efficient spatial arbitrage, which is consistent with two
situations: the first one, where trade occurs and arbitrage is efficient, and the other one, where
no profitable trade occurs.  In the first (second) regime, intermediaries do not exploit profitable
trade opportunities by exchanging the agricultural product from 1 to 2 (2 to 1).  If arbitrage
takes place with lags, under these conditions, m
t
 will be pushed so as to adjust to the equilibrium
band [-c
12
, c
12
].  This adjustment process will occur outside the band only until the threshold
values of the band are reached.
The Threshold Error Correction Model (TECM), presented above, allows us to model
the type of behavior described for m
t
. Thus, if the price margin between cities is situated
within the equilibrium band -that is when arbitrage is efficient- the error correction mechanism
will not work, so the margin will not show a central trend but follow a random walk9.  Otherwise,
8 α will be zero if C
12
 is sufficiently large so as to prevent arbitrage from occurring, if it is never possible to observe
profitable arbitrage opportunities, or if the markets are not integrated because of the existence of market failures or
high transportation costs.  See Dercon and Van Campenhout (1999).
9 Notice that, even when m
t
 is globally stationary, locally, within the band, it will show a non-stationary behavior.
See Dercon and Van Campenhout (1999).
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when the margin is outside the band, arbitrage takes place and the error correction mechanism
will work adjusting the price differential towards the thresholds10.  To build a more sophisticated
version of this model that allows incorporating information about observable commercialization
costs, we assume that arbitrage costs vary according to the innovations in fuel prices. This is
convenient to control for the existence of transportation costs within the total arbitrage cost
(which includes information costs, negotiation costs, etc).  Moreover, we incorporate in first
place a set of dummy variables to control for the inherent seasonality of high frequency price
series (for example, daily prices), in second place a set of lags ∆m
t
 to control for the possible
presence of serial autocorrelation in the data and, finally, a lag of the price differential in the
equation that describes the behavior inside the band in order to test the existence of non-
stationary behavior within this regime11.  With these innovations, the model to be estimated
has the following form:
(11)
Where β is the weight for the price of fuel (c
12t
), d
i
 are the parameters of the seasonal
dummies, γ
i
 are the coefficients of the lags of ∆m
t
.  λ should be statistically equal to zero if,
within the band defined by the thresholds, the price differential shows a non-stationary
behavior12.  Finally,  φ is the transaction cost (which would represent the negotiation,
information, enforcement costs, etc).
If the price of fuel is non-stationary, then as a first step it will be necessary to evaluate
whether prices and this type of costs are cointegrated or not.  If the existence of cointegration
cannot be rejected, it will be possible to estimate the model without ambiguities.  The estimation
of  φ (the implicit transaction cost) provides additional information about market performance.
In particular, if φ is positive, there is evidence of market imperfections (entry barriers, incomplete
information, etc)13.
Under this specification of the model, within the equilibrium band, there is no dynamic
relationship between the price variations in each market.  Nevertheless, outside the band the
error correction mechanism (controlling the seasonal factors and autocorrelated data) may be
observed.  The variations in one market are transmitted with errors to the other, but an adjustment
process that will correct such errors in each period will work.  Similarly to other conventional
10 The magnitude of the adjustment will be a percentage of the price margin deviation in each period.
11 This last innovation in the basic model has been suggested by Dercon and Van Campenhout (1999).
12 It is necessary to use the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test or a similar test to test this hypothesis. See Chien Lo
and Zivot (1999).
13 However, as Balke and Fomby (1997) sustain, it is not possible to make statistical inference about φ the parameter
by using the conventional techniques due to the non linearity of the model.
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error correction models used in previous studies of market integration, a natural measure of
spatial integration -for given transaction costs and an existing long run equilibrium band- is
the speed of adjustment α: the closer the estimated parameter is to -1, the better the degree of
integration.
The model presented here implicitly shows a clear relation between cointegration and
efficient arbitrage.  If an efficient arbitrage occurs, a non-stationary behavior must be observed
in the margin m
t
. Otherwise, that is only if imperfect arbitrage occurs, it will be possible to
observe a cointegrating relation between prices and, hence, the formulation of an error correction
approach will be valid.
Other useful estimators that may be obtained with this model are: the average time that
prices take to adjust to the long run equilibrium, the percentage of cases in the sample where
the efficient arbitrage condition is violated and the percentage of cases where the arbitrage
condition is satisfied.  These two last indicators are similar to the probabilities of a successful
and failed arbitrage, which are estimated in the Parity Bounds Model.
In conclusion, the TECM is clearly consistent with the efficient spatial arbitrage models:
it allows for discontinuities and reversion in trade flows, just as the parity bounds model.
However, this model introduces more sensible assumptions about the probability distributions
and explicitly incorporates dynamic elements by modeling the arbitrage process in a nonlinear
error correction framework14, so it results advantageous for this research.
6.3.2 Methodology
The research will take the Peruvian potato market as case of study, using the threshold bivariate
cointegration methodology for the analysis.  For the statistical tests we will use consumer
price series of daily frequency, from the following cities:  Lima, Huancayo, Arequipa, Puno,
Trujillo, Ica, Piura, Huancavelica, Ayacucho and Cusco.  Moreover, we will use daily data of
the price of fuel Diesel 2 as a proxy variable to control for transportation costs.  With the
purpose of evaluating the dynamics of transmission of information between cities at regional
level and, from that, the existence of threshold relations in prices, we have considered convenient
to model these variables by using a nonlinear dynamic system (described on section 6.3.1) in
which we explicitly incorporate long run relations between the prices of the set of pairs of
cities and the transaction costs15.
In first place, we will describe the characteristics of the Peruvian potato market analyzing
the production and consumption behavior in order to verify empirically the existence of
14 The model just presented is a simple version of a large family of TECM models.  Chien Lo and Zivot (1999) as
well as Balke and Fomby (1997) present more complicated extensions in terms of more complicated lag’s structure,
different adjustment speed for each regime, etc.
15 This type of approach presents a statistical model of the behavior of the variables rather than an economic structural
model.  The advantage of this type of approach is that it allows approaching the data without establishing a priori
constraints.
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reversions in the regional trade patterns.  These reversions might be explained by the threshold
relations between prices caused by the transaction costs, as this document sustains. Secondly,
we will proceed to evaluate whether the prices expressed in logarithms present unit roots by
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, this is important since the cointegration tests can be
performed for series that show to be non-stationary of order I(1). Afterwards, we will evaluate
the existence of long run relations between prices of pairs of cities and the price of diesel,
using the Johansen and Juselius (1990) procedure as a prerequisite for the estimation of the
price threshold model.
Once the existence of cointegration between the series under analysis is verified, we
estimate the threshold error correction model described by the expression (11).  From the
estimation of this model, it will be possible to find the speed of adjustment towards the
equilibrium, the transaction costs that constitute the equilibrium band thresholds of the prices,
and the probabilities of successful and failed arbitrage at regional level, controlling for
seasonality and autocorrelation of the daily frequency price series.  Then we will perform the
likelihood ratio tests in order to evaluate the significance of the estimated transaction costs by
using the Prakash and Taylor (1997) methodology.
Finally, as a new feature of this document, we will explore whether there exists a
relationship between (i) the degree of market integration of each city and the transaction costs
and (ii) the assets endowments and public services infrastructure available in the cities (for
example: roads, telecommunication services, electrical infrastructure, etc) by using regression
techniques.  The results of applying this methodology to the Peruvian potato market case are
described in the next section.
6.4. Study of the Peruvian potato market
6.4.1 Brief description of the characteristics of the market under study
The potato market presents very special features since it has the largest cropping area16, and
hence the largest production, in Peru.  The production of potato in Peru in the last years has
been from 2.6 to 3.2 thousands of metric tons a year, proceeding from 234 to 285 thousand
annually harvested hectares (Ministry of Agriculture of Peru, 2002).  The magnitude of the
crop, which is harvested in all the departments of the Sierra as well as in several departments
of the Costa, make that any deviation on its production or prices (caused by weather, harvested
area, purchasing power, passability of roads, changes on returns, concentration of crops)
constantly affects the market conditions for its commercialization and distribution.
In reference to the spatial distribution of the potato production in Peru, 9 out of the 19
departments that produce potato account for 75% of the total production, whereas 3 out of
them contribute with 35%.  Almost all of the potato production in Peru comes from the
16 In 2001 according to FAO, Peru was the eleventh country with the biggest cropping area allocated to potato production,
out of 152 countries (See http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/collections?version=ext&hasbulk=0&subset=agriculture)
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Mountains Region characterized by sharp seasonality.  Hence, from 60% to 70% of the annual
potato production is harvested between the months of March and June, and around 55% is
harvested from April to June.
As mentioned before, the potato production is sharply affected by seasonality.  This is
so because the weather conditions determine the timing for the sowing season and consequently
the harvest season. The variety of the climatic formations in this country makes it possible to
sow during the whole year, although in different proportions.  In some cases, sowing responds
to programs for harvesting in low production seasons, so as to supply markets whose demand
for fresh potato persists the entire year.
Because of its high concentration of population, good purchasing power, distance from
the production areas and consumption tradition, Lima city is the largest permanent consumer
market of potato in Peru (more than 1200 metric tons daily in average).  Lima city has a
wholesale commercialization market (Mercado Mayorista), where most of this tuber is
consumed or sold to other markets to be commercialized.  This market center keeps daily
register of incoming production specifying information about origin and "varieties" (species)
as well as of the wholesale corresponding prices.
Analyzing this market, it is worthwhile noting that in Peru, a high percentage of the
potato production is destined to self-consumption and also to local or regional consumption.
In addition, there exists a wide dispersion of small productive units (mainly in the department
of Puno).  The most important markets (such as the city of Lima, Trujillo, etc.) are supplied by
the production shares destined to trade and by the variable surplus quantities left by another
producers, strongly affected by relative prices.  Only a small share of the total production is
intended for international market.
6.4.2 The data
The previous step required to perform the statistical exercise described in Section 6.3, consisted
on building an appropriate data base.  In order to do this, we gathered daily information about
wholesale nominal prices from a data base of daily prices compiled by INEI (Instituto Nacional
de Estadística e Informática) to build the CPI (consumption price index).  The period of analysis
that was chosen is January 1995 through May 2001.  Such data base was verified with
information obtained from documents published by the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG).
The cities selected for the analysis are: Lima, Arequipa, Huancayo, Ica, Ayacucho,
Piura, Puno, Huancavelica, Trujillo and Cusco.  They were chosen because their price series
had the least number of missing observations17, and also because they have a significant share
17 We used the random imputation method to solve the missing observations problem.  In particular, we applied the
procedure proposed by King et al. (2001).  This procedure assumes that the data base follows a multivariate normal
distribution, and generates a set of random simulations from the original data base by using a distributed lags
approach in order to complete the missing observations.  The post-imputations results were consistent with the
series data expressed in logarithms and showed to be superior to those obtained by the interpolation linear method.
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in the regional distribution of production (see Table 6.1).  With the purpose of homogenizing
the data, we considered five-day weeks since in the original data base there were too many
missing observations for the weekends.  We verified that excluding these weekend observations
did not generate any bias.  The final data base contains 1,540 observations for each city.
Table 6.1  Regional distribution of potato production
in Peru 2001
Regions Tons Percentage
Lima 119236 3.77%
Ica 34306 1.08%
Arequipa 119257 3.77%
Ayacucho 140725 4.45%
Junín 421052 13.30%
Huancavelica 186675 5.90%
Cusco 178196 5.63%
Puno 397062 12.54%
Piura 10401 0.33%
La Libertad 318825 10.07%
Total national 1925735 60.84%
Source: Own estimates
6.4.3 Model estimation and test of hypothesis
Using the data base described in the previous section, we proceeded to estimate the TECM
presented in Section 6.3.1 in order to find the transaction costs and the speeds of adjustment
for a total of 45 city pairs.  Previously, we verified that all the price series were non-stationary
in levels but stationary in first differences.  Moreover, we verified that all the pairs of price
series in logarithms for the analyzed cities cointegrated with the price of fuel, at least at a 10%
significance level18.  Generally, the estimations of the cointegration coefficients of prices were
close to one, which is consistent with the presence of spatial market integration with constant
real transaction costs.  Subsequently, we estimated the TECM described in (11) from which
we were able to estimate the transaction costs and the parameters of adjustment towards the
equilibrium band.  In order to carry out comparisons, we consecutively estimated an (auto
regressive) AR (1) model in which we assumed there are no discontinuities or reversions in
the trade flows.  The estimation of this last model is useful to compare the goodness of fit of
the TECM model using adjustment parameters; this coefficient is usually mentioned in studies
of market integration.  Table 6.2 shows, in addition to the described estimators, the average
time that prices take to adjust towards the equilibrium band, the Dickey-Fuller test to evaluate
18 The results of the statistical tests are available upon request.
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the presence of non-stationarity within the equilibrium band (according to the description in
the expression 7), the joint significance statistical tests of the price margin lags and the seasonal
dummies, and the weight for the transportation cost.
The thresholds or transaction costs obtained here are estimators of the distortions in
potato commercialization. Comparing them with observed transportation cost information
may become a basis for future research about the efficiency of Peruvian agricultural markets.
Unfortunately, given the currently available econometric techniques, it is not clear how to
make statistical inference on these estimators since the parameters have a non standard limit
distribution which depends on the sample moments (see Hansen 1997).  Nevertheless, Chan
(1993) and Chan and Tsay (1998) have proved that the threshold parameters are
superconsistent19, and that the other parameters of the TECM models are asymptotically
distributed as a standard normal distribution with the typical formulas for the variance-
covariance matrices, being independent of the threshold parameters. Hence, it is possible to
evaluate the significance of the remaining parameters of the model using the traditional Wald
test because the statistics are asymptotically distributed following a Chi-squared function
[Chien Lo and Zivot (1999);  Hansen 2001].
Despite it is not possible to make statistical inference about the transaction costs, the
superconsistency of the thresholds guarantees that, for this research, these estimators can be
treated as the real transaction costs.  Moreover, the existence of a considerable dispersion in
the estimated costs20 strengthen the previous argument because, despite it is possible that
some thresholds show to be non-significant, it is unlikely that all the costs result non-significant
given the important number of city pairs under study.  Finally, it should be noticed that there
exist other indirect ways to evaluate the importance of transaction costs in the arbitrage relations.
A first alternative way consists on evaluating the significance of the adjustment parameter.
This is a useful indicator since a coefficient statistically equal to zero would lead to reject the
existence of a threshold error correction mechanism, and consequently, the existence of
transaction costs.  A second alternative consists on performing a likelihood ratio test to verify
whether the proposed model with thresholds provides a better fit than alternative specifications
without thresholds.  In this context, validating the TECM model indirectly implies verifying
the existence of transaction costs in the arbitrage relations.  Following Prakash and Taylor
(1997), we perform this test having as null hypothesis that the model specification is AR(1)
without thresholds.  Given that, as Chien Lo and Zivot (1999) point out, the distribution of the
statistic is not standard, we used the Montecarlo Simulations method to find the critical values
and approximate p-values.
19 According to Chan (1993), these parameters converge to T, which is the number of observations.
20 The variation coefficient of the transaction costs presented on Table 6.3 is 0.412.
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138 Table 6.2 Transaction costs and speed of adjustment to the equilbrium of the Peruvian potato market
Lima - Huancayo 0.205  -0.256 *** 7.802 -7.524   0.076 * 146.836  *** 142.417 *** 2 -0.173 *** 12.123
Lima - Piura 0.545  -0.191 *** 10.839 -2.586  -0.278 * 18.171 *  21.612 *** 6  -0.058 *** 38.639
Lima - Arequipa 0.239  -0.179 *** 11.684 -2.956    -0.154 *** 18.277 *  27.232 *** 4 -0.093 *** 23.509
Lima - Trujillo 0.296  -0.637 *** 2.275 -6.086 0.057   21.531 ***  65.793 *** 2 -0.103 *** 21.001
Ica - Lima 0.111    -0.512 *** 3.212 -1.912     -0.102 ***  47.138 *** 218.138 *** 5  -0.174 ** 12.024
Lima - Ayacucho 0.204  -0.225 *** 9.033 -5.569     -0.101 *** 45.385 *** 21.971 *** 8 -0.081 *** 27.359
Lima - Huancavelica 0.526  -0.354 *** 5.273 -6.549 -0.123 37.003 *** 8.908 ** 2 -0.078 *** 28.849
Lima - Cusco 0.314  -0.084 *** 26.189 -1.263 -0.122 8.576 13.367 *** 2  -0.034 *** 66.141
Huancayo -  Huancavelica 0.245  -0.247 *** 8.116 -1.998 -0.098 19.680 *** 32.075 *** 6  -0.099 *** 21.944
Ayacucho - Huancayo 0.314   -0.229 *** 8.82 -6.22 -0.098 36.159 *** 70.518 *** 4  -0.096 *** 22.79
Huancayo - Cusco 0.414  -0.165 *** 12.804 0.512 -0.121 28.247 *** 12.791 *** 3  -0.048 *** 46.72
Huancayo - Ica 0.282  -0.277 *** 7.092 -7.932 0.028 64.405 *** 65.311 *** 2  -0.167 *** 12.578
Huancayo - Trujillo 0.404  -0.357 *** 5.208 -6.098 0.005 25.119 *** 137.046 *** 2  -0.107 *** 20.316
Piura - Trujillo 0.325  -0.239 *** 8.408 -3.437 0.009 30.925 *** 22.437 *** 2  -0.090 *** 24.388
Piura - Ica 0.413    -0.187 *** 11.099 -1.943  -0.213 ** 17.437 * 79.659 *** 2    -0.075 *** 29.587
Arequipa - Piura 0.567    -0.196 *** 10.534 -2.204  -0.486 *** 85.406 *** 42.924  *** 2    -0.069 *** 32.044
Piura - Huancayo 0.453  -0.067 *** 32.961 -1.467 -0.403 17.520 *** 52.884 *** 2    -0.078 *** 28.377
Piura - Huancavelica 0.657  -0.256 *** 7.791 -5.762 -0.131 39.642 *** 21.279 *** 2  -0.1 *** 21.797
Piura - Ayacucho 0.576  -0.102 *** 21.364 -3.358 0.243 25.418 *** 222.204 *** 2  -0.064 *** 35.055
Arequipa - Ayacucho 0.562  -0.123 *** 17.711 -4.498 -0.056 45.522 *** 337.76 *** 3  -0.055 *** 40.859
Arequipa - Puno 0.396  -0.071 *** 31.511 -0.902  -0.669 *** 22.866 *** 16.529 *** 3  -0.037 *** 61.769
Arequipa - Trujillo 0.442  -0.739 *** 1.716 -6.309  -0.096 * 25.954 *** 137.777 *** 3  -0.086 *** 25.549
Transaction Speed of Average  ADF Test to Weight of the  Nullity test to Nullity test Number Speed of Average
costs adjustment  period of evaluate the observable the seasonal for the lags of lags adjustment period of
Market Pairs adjustment regime inside transaction dummies  adjustment
(90% of the band cost (90% of
equilibrium equilibrium
value) value)
Threshold Error Correction Model AR (1) Model without thresholds
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Arequipa - Ica 0.232    -0.205 *** 10.047 -1.009  -0.359 *** 60.79 *** 567.306 *** 3   -0.119 *** 18.035
Huancayo - Arequipa 0.553  -0.106 * 20.517 -7.262 0.046 60.202 *** 31.669 *** 2  -0.107 *** 20.338
Huancavelica - Arequipa 0.819  -0.373 ** 4.93 -5.794  -0.257 *** 31.789 *** 49.504 *** 2  -0.065 *** 34.121
Puno - Trujillo 0.516  -0.261 *** 7.618 -2.246 -0.05 18.045 * 73.343 *** 2  -0.055 *** 40.436
Ayacucho - Puno 0.798  -0.456 *** 3.782 -4.644 0.566 35.863 *** 38.901 2   -0.031 *** 74.013
Puno - Ica 0.744  -0.199 *** 10.369 -0.856  -0.33 ** 31.579 *** 202.342 *** 1  -0.039 *** 57.979
Huancayo - Puno 0.942  -0.267 *** 7.424 -5.958 -0.066 51.927 *** 15.786 *** 2  -0.039 *** 56.668
Huancavelica - Puno 0.769  -0.235 *** 8.614 -4.843 -0.121 42.328 *** 21.147 *** 2  -0.046 *** 49.314
Huancavelica - Trujillo 0.368  -0.461 *** 3.72 -6.987 0.127 * 32.890 *** 115.140 *** 2  -0.087 *** 25.429
Huancavelica - Cusco 0.714  -0.480 *** 3.519 -4.886  -0.222 ** 2.026 25.521 *** 2  -0.056 *** 39.976
Trujillo - Ica 0.199  -0.197 *** 10.465 -5.54 -0.037 41.169 *** 32.525 *** 2  -0.104 *** 20.934
Trujillo - Cusco 0.68  -0.773 *** 1.554 -4.305 -0.033 11.04 104.812 *** 2  -0.045 *** 50.491
Ayacucho - Trujillo 0.557  -0.344 ** 5.468 -5.449 0.135 25.523 *** 165.457 *** 2  -0.056 *** 40.194
Ayacucho - Huancavelica 0.298  -0.126 *** 17.047 -0.333  -0.236 *** 60.811 *** 47.033  *** 2  -0.089 *** 24.695
Huancavelica - Ica 0.377  -0.219 *** 9.303 -5.179 -0.053 40.329 *** 63.33 *** 2 -0.083 *** 26.448
Lima - Puno 0.343  -0.054 *** 41.458 -0.287 -0.099 17.979 * 9.603 *** 2 -0.031 *** 73.818
Piura - Puno 0.433  -0.135 *** 15.822 -2.484  -0.259 *** 18.176 * 13.873 *** 2  -0.069 *** 32.344
Puno - Cusco 0.371  -0.118 *** 18.379 -2.516 0.019 16.959 * 7.493  ** 2  -0.047 *** 47.351
Ayacucho - Ica 0.421  -0.114 *** 19.007 -5.589 -0.027 48.006 *** 42.651 *** 2  -0.065 *** 34.001
Cusco - Ayacucho 0.483  -0.107 *** 20.297 -4.605 -0.029 12.346 84.999 *** 2  -0.049 *** 45.354
Ica - Cusco 0.437  -0.152 ** 14.006 -1.431 -0.057 9.078 69.039 *** 2  -0.041 *** 55.105
Piura - Cusco 0.477  -0.120 *** 17.969 -3.779  -0.162 * 47.089 *** 69.399 *** 2  -0.069 *** 31.861
Cusco - Arequipa 0.415  -0.138 *** 15.56 -1.138 -0.064 26.068 *** 28.969 *** 2  -0.047 *** 47.986
Transaction Speed of Average  ADF Test to Weight of the  Nullity test to Nullity test Number Speed of Average
costs adjustment  period of evaluate the observable the seasonal for the lags of lags adjustment period of
Market Pairs adjustment regime inside transaction dummies adjustment
(90% of the band cost (90% of
equilibrium equilibrium
value) value)
Threshold Error Correction Model AR (1) Model without thresholds
*** significative at 1%, ** significative at 5%, significative at 10%
Source: own estimates.
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6.4.3.1Main Results
In Figure 6.1 we can observe the equilibrium band defined for prices differential in the city
pair Lima-Huancayo.  The estimation results suggest that the equilibrium band is defined by
the thresholds 0.205, -0.205.  As suggested by the figure, since prices differential is either
above or within the band, most of the trade flows would be taking place in one direction
(Huancayo-Lima), with a transaction cost of 20.5%.
Figure 6.1 Estimated transaction costs: Lima vs. Huancayo
According to Table 6.2, it is possible to verify the presence of an adjustment mechanism
towards the equilibrium band, determined by the transaction costs, for all the city pairs under
study.  This is so, since the adjustment parameters are significantly different from zero.  This
result can be interpreted as evidence of intermediaries’ prediction failures about prices
differences between cities. For example, if an oversupply (undersupply) of potato takes place,
negative (positive) profits will be obtained as a result of arbitrage, but they will tend to disappear
as market adjusts to correct the disequilibrium.
In general, the estimated transaction costs are fairly reasonable for the city pairs under
analysis.  For example, in the case of the pair Ayacucho-Puno, the transaction costs are very high
(79%), so chances of trade between both cities would be small.  This result can be explained by
two reasons; first, Puno is a region that consumes by itself its potato production, and second,
there exists a considerable distance and geographical diversity between both cities.  A similar
explanation is valid for the pairs Huancavelica-Puno, Huancayo-Puno and Huancavelica-Cusco.
On the other hand, there exist intermediate cases such as Piura-Huancavelica, Arequipa-
Ayacucho, Huancayo-Trujillo, Ayacucho-Trujillo, among others, where the transaction costs
are not so high and the adjustment parameters indicate a higher adjustment speed towards the
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equilibrium.  In these cases, the integration between markets takes place, as Erjnaes and Persson
(2000) sustain, through medium cities that are used as linkage for the commercialization and
transportation of products.  For example, the pair Huancayo-Trujillo is linked through Lima
city, whereas the pair Puno-Huancavelica is integrated through the corridor Huancayo-Lima-
Trujillo.  The estimated thresholds, in these cases, can be interpreted as the differential
transaction costs from one pair of markets to a third market, with which they are linked as
suppliers or consumers.  This interpretation is consistent with Ejrnaes and Persson (2000)
arguments; these authors show that the equilibrium price differential between integrated markets
that do not trade with each other is lower than the transportation cost between them.
Moreover, it is worth to emphasize the existence of city pairs where the adjustment
towards the equilibrium is fast because transaction costs are low and, consequently, arbitrage
opportunities do not persist for too long (less than 8 days for the adjustment towards the
equilibrium).  We may quote the cases of Lima-Huancayo, Ica-Lima, Arequipa-Ica, Huancayo-
Huancavelica, Piura-Trujillo, among others.  The closeness of the cities, the similarity of
geographical conditions and the accessibility to paved roads, would facilitate the potato trade,
as they do in the case of the pair Lima-Huancayo.  An additional detail that should be mentioned
is that, in general, the city pairs located in the Coast present lower transaction costs and higher
speed of adjustment to the equilibrium, this is a sensible result since this region has better
transportation facilities, especially in terms of the good condition of the roads.
Other important result is that, in most of the cases, the TECM model proves to be a
suitable specification compared to a simple AR (1) model without thresholds.  This is so
because since, according to Table 6.3, in many of the market pairs under analysis the transaction
costs are a significant source of trade distortion, estimating arbitrage relations without taking
into account such costs would imply a specification mistake.
6.4.3.2 Identification of the different arbitrage regimes and their consistency
with the potato consumption in Peru
In order to identify different arbitrage regimes, we show in Table 6.4 the percentage of cases
in which the prices differential between markets falls either within or outside the equilibrium
band.  As observed in this table, most of the market pairs present potential reversion in trade
patterns, although the percentage of implicated observations is little.
The market pairs are most frequently situated in the Regime II, where no arbitrage
opportunities persist: the efficient arbitrage condition is satisfied in more than 70% of the
cases.  Only in few cases, we observe less than 60% of the observations from a particular pair
of cities within the Regime II (for example, the case of Puno-Cusco, Lima-Huancayo).  In
other words, even if in some occasions the trade opportunities are not completely exploited,
most of the markets are often in an efficient arbitrage situation.
It is possible to conclude that, even though the integration of markets exists in the long
run, since arbitrage opportunities are present due to rigidities in the process of adjustment to
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Table 6.3 Likelihood ratio test.
 (Ho: AR(1)  vs   H1:  TECM)
Market Pairs Ratio Probability
Lima - Huancayo 82.792 ** 0.001
Lima - Piura 86.330 ** 0.001
Lima - Arequipa 36.934 ** 0.019
Lima Trujillo 90.284 ** 0.000
Ica - Lima 468.421 ** 0.000
Lima  Ayacucho 12.864 0.136
Lima - Huancavelica 52.938 ** 0.007
Lima - Cusco 16.819 * 0.096
Huancayo - Huancavelica 24.367 ** 0.047
Ayacucho - Huancayo 26.123 ** 0.041
Huancayo — Cusco 12.426 0.140
Huancayo - Ica 8.199 0.208
Huancayo -Trujillo 14.626 0.124
Piura - Trujillo 49.484 ** 0.010
Piura - Ica 24.438 ** 0.046
Arequipa - Piura 148.204 ** 0.000
Huancayo - Piura 36.216 ** 0.021
Piura - Huancavelica 36.417 ** 0.020
Piura - Ayacucho 3.662 0.295
Arequipa - Ayacucho 127.485 ** 0.000
Arequipa - Puno 1450.225 ** 0.000
Arequipa - Trujillo 28.841 ** 0.033
Huancayo - Arequipa 13.149 0.135
Huancavelica - Arequipa 29.751 ** 0.031
Puno - Trujillo 21.579 * 0.064
Ayacucho - Puno 10.212 0.171
Puno - Ica 71.099 ** 0.002
Huancayo - Puno 9.514 0.179
Puno - Huancavelica 4.432 0.281
Huancavelica - Trujillo 18.627 * 0.080
Huancavelica - Cusco 11.911 0.150
Trujillo - Ica 55.196 ** 0.008
Trujillo - Cusco 6.223 0.249
Ayacucho - Trujillo 18.022 * 0.086
Ayacucho - Huancavelica 102.857 ** 0.000
Huancavelica - Ica 42.411 ** 0.013
Lima - Puno 21.484 * 0.067
Piura - Puno 116.192 ** 0.000
Puno - Cusco 22.199 * 0.059
Ayacucho - Ica 24.746 ** 0.040
Cusco - Ayacucho 33.016 ** 0.025
Piura - Cusco 53.261 ** 0.007
Arequipa - Cusco 52.764 ** 0.007
Critic Values: 6.195, 16.531, 23.695 and 49.360 at 25%, 10%, 5% and 1% of significance
The approximated p-value and the critic values have been found through
1000 MonteCarlo simulations.
* significative at 10%, ** significative at 5%
Source: Own estimates
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the equilibrium, the markets do not prove to be integrated in the short run.  However, for most
market pairs the efficient arbitrage situation is satisfied in more than 70% of the observations.
We should mention that without further information about the observed transaction
costs or about trade flows it is not possible to get robust conclusions either about efficiency in
arbitrage relations or about reversions in the trade patterns.  Nevertheless, some information
pieces are available for this aim.  Using information from the survey ENAHO – IV quarter
2001 performed by INEI, it is possible to estimate the consumption of potato by department
for the last three months of the year 2001, in order to contrast this estimation with information
on potato production so as to evaluate the occurrence of reversions in trade patterns.  The
results are shown in Table 6.5.
Given the large variety of climates and cropping zones in Peru, it is not surprising that
the same crop is produced in different periods during the year.  This diversity allows for the
existence of trade opportunities between regions.  As shown in Table 6.3, potato producing
departments are «net exporters» in one period of the year but «net importers» in other period
of the year. Thus, for example, the potato production in Junín exceeds by far its departmental
consumption during the first six months of the year, whereas during the second semester Junín
needs to buy potato from other departments to provide for its own consumption.  Something
similar is observed in Ayacucho, Cuzco, Huancavelica, or Ica where it is required to import
potato at least during some months of the year.  On the other hand, there are departments that
always produce more than the output they actually consume, such as Arequipa and La Libertad,
so they tend to be net exporters most of the year, while others, such as Lima and Piura, tend to
be net importers during the whole year.  With this evidence, it is possible to support the
hypothesis of the existence of reversions in the trade patterns of the potato market, as it was
pointed out from the results presented in Table 6.4.
Another way to test the existence of different arbitrage regimes as well as the reversion
in the trade patterns is comparing the behavior of the prices differential with respect to the
observed transportation costs.  On the basis of information obtained from the MTC (Ministry
de Transports) about the average freight per ton, it is possible to identify the presence of
different arbitrage regimes.  For example, as shown in Figure 6.2 for the case of the pair Lima-
Huancayo21, it is possible to identify that the trade direction goes from Huancayo to Lima
between May and September because the prices in Lima are higher than the average freight
cost.  This result is consistent with the evolution of the potato production in the country, which
is shown in Table 6.5.  During these months, the central part of the Sierra enters the harvest
period for this tuber, known as the main cropping season, having Lima city as its main
destination market.  The opportunities to trade from Huancayo towards Lima city increase in
this period. However, during September and December when the complementary cropping
21 The data and graphics for the other city pairs are available upon request.
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City Pairs
Regime I Regime II Regime III
Trade opportunities Efficient arbitrage (no Trade opportunities
profit for the profitable profit for the
first city trade opportunities) second city
Table 6.4 Probabilities of occurrence for the different kinds of arbitrage
Lima - Huancayo 0.7% 57.6% 41.7%
Lima - Piura 6.5% 93.3% 0.1%
Lima - Arequipa 12.7% 85.5% 1.9%
Lima - Trujillo 1.8% 87.0% 11.2%
Ica - Lima 10.7% 85.7% 3.5%
Lima - Ayacucho 2.9% 78.2% 18.9%
Lima - Huancavelica 0.0% 96.4% 3.5%
Lima - Cusco 8.4% 65.7% 25.8%
Huancayo - Huancavelica 12.5% 78.6% 9.0%
Ayacucho - Huancayo 11.5% 85.8% 2.7%
Huancayo - Cusco 11.8% 82.3% 5.9%
Huancayo - Ica 20% 79% 1%
Huancayo - Trujillo 9.8% 89.2% 1.0%
Piura - Trujillo 2.1% 62.6% 35.3%
Piura - Ica 1.1% 77.7% 21.2%
Arequipa - Piura 2.9% 95.9% 1.1%
Huancayo - Piura 0.9% 64.2% 34.8%
Piura - Huancavelica 0.0% 88.8% 11.2%
Piura - Ayacucho 0.0% 73.4% 26.6%
Arequipa - Ayacucho 0.0% 80.6% 19.0%
Arequipa - Puno 14.5% 82.5% 2.9%
Arequipa - Trujillo 0.3% 90.9% 8.8%
Arequipa - Ica 1.9% 77.5% 20.6%
Huancayo - Arequipa 10.3% 89.7% 0.0%
Huancavelica - Arequipa 0.6% 99.4% 0.0%
Puno - Trujillo 1% 81% 18%
Puno - Ayacucho 20.6% 79.4% 0.0%
Puno - Ica 1% 94% 5%
Huancayo - Puno 4.5% 95.5% 0.0%
Puno - Huancavelica 4.0% 96.0% 0.0%
Huancavelica - Trujillo 9.9% 88.9% 1.2%
Huancavelica - Cusco 0.13% 99.74% 0.13%
Trujillo - Ica 18.8% 70.1% 11.2%
Trujillo - Cusco 0.7% 97.9% 1.4%
Ayacucho - Trujillo 10.3% 89.0% 0.6%
Ayacucho - Huancavelica 2.6% 82.3% 15.1%
Huancavelica -Ica 9.2% 89.7% 1.0%
Lima - Puno 31.6% 65.3% 3.1%
Piura - Puno 6.5% 86.2% 7.3%
Puno - Cusco 0.5% 47.9% 51.6%
Ayacucho - Puno 18.1% 80.5% 1.5%
Cusco - Ayacucho 0.5% 87.3% 12.1%
Ica - Cusco 5.4% 81.8% 12.8%
Arequipa - Cusco 1.2% 71.0% 27.7%
Source: Own estimates
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Table 6.5  Estimation of the average potato consumption in Peru by departments for the IV quarter of 2001
Departments Estimated Consumption Production Production Production Production Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated
consumption  confidence (February)  (June) (August) (October) gap (Feb) gap (Jun) gap (Aug) gap (Oct)
(Tons) interval 95%
Arequipa 4464.46 3490.46 5438.46 17569 2531 13172 15417.00 13,105 -1,933 8,708 10,953
Ayacucho 3063.81 1786.30 4341.33 5590 21112 0 12.00 2,526 18,048 -3,064 -3,052
Cusco 4276.50 2864.79 5688.21 4536 46303 235 252.00 260 42,027 -4,041 -4,024
Huancavelica 3472.33 2181.78 4762.87 2480 17723 0 858.00 -992 14,251 -3,472 -2,614
Ica 2533.97 1673.06 3394.87 0 344 30084 7459.00 -2,534 -2,190 27,550 4,925
Junin 9014.24 6541.88 11486.59 31315 48738 6407 3771.00 22,301 39,724 -2,607 -5,243
La Libertad 6106.89 4646.68 7567.09 5758 53663 18779 14191.00 -349 47,556 12,672 8,084
Lima 44875.52 41847.53 47903.51 3022 1112 2500 25404.00 -41,854 -43,764 -42,376 -19,472
Piura 3301.32 2479.18 4123.46 1370 1004 546 437.00 -1,931 -2,297 -2,755 -2,864
Puno 5920.87 4447.51 7394.23 2259 38534 0 0 -3,662 32,613 -5,921 -5,921
Total Analizado 87029.89 82439.67 91620.10 73899.00 231064.00 71,723 67,801 -13,131 144,034 -15,307 -19,229
Resto del país 34986.92 31222.39 38751.45 83334.00 125073.00 38,516 55,954 48,347 90,086 3,529 20,967
Total Perú 122016.80 116818.60 127215.00 157233.00 356137.00 110,239 123,755 35,216 234,120 -11,778 1,738
Source: Own estimates
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6.4.4 Determinants of market integration in potato market
After estimating the transaction costs and the adjustment parameters as indicators of trade
distortion and markets speed of convergence to equilibrium, respectively, we proceed to identify
what are the determinants of these variables by evaluating the availability of public assets in the
cities under analysis, such as telecommunications and local media infrastructure, electrical energy
infrastructure, roads, among others.  The identification of the determinants of the transaction
costs existing between agricultural markets located in different cities will help to the
implementation of policies oriented to improve efficiency and competitiveness in such markets.
The information used in these sections was obtained from the National Infrastructure
Survey performed by INEI, this survey collected district data about different types of
infrastructure: roads, electricity, telephones, schools, health centers, local market infrastructure,
radio and television stations, among others, during the period 1997 to 1999.
Taking the transaction costs and the adjustment parameters as dependent variables,
two types of regressions are estimated in this section.  In the first place, we used the stepwise
method for linear regressions to evaluate the relationship between transaction costs and public
assets.  As a starting point, we estimated a first equation to analyze the relationship between
the estimated costs and the infrastructure endowment in 1999 for the districts that constitute
season takes place, the production of the central part of the Mountains (Sierra Central) decreases,
so the demand from Lima is satisfied by the department of Huanuco.  In this period of the
year, trade opportunities for Huancayo decrease because its prices are not competitive anymore
when facing Lima city’s market. Thus, the presence of reversion in the potato trade patterns
between these cities becomes apparent, and as this study verifies the direction of trade is not
unidirectional over the year.
Figure 6.2 Price differential between Lima and Huancayo per ton of potato, 2000 - 2001
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the province where the cities under analysis are located.  The independent variables in this
regression are: 1) the percentage of districts of the province where the first (second) city of the
pair under analysis is located that have access to more than 13 hours of electrical energy -
Energy 1 and Energy 2 -, 2) the percentage of paved roads in the department where the first
(second) city is located - Road 1 and Road 2 -, 3) the percentage of districts from the province
where the first (second) city is located that has local radio stations - Radio 1 and Radio 2 -, 4)
the percentage of telephone installations concentrated in the province where the first (second)
city is located - Telecom 1 and Telecom 2 -, 5) the percentage of districts in the province where
the first (second) city is located that has permanent market infrastructure - Market 1 and
Market 2 -, and 6) the percentage of districts in the province where the first (second) city is
located that has local fairs (Fair 1 and Fair 2).
The results for the Model 1 are shown in Table 6.6.  It is possible to observe that there
exists a negative relation (that is, estimated coefficients are negative and significant) between
transaction costs (the dependent variable) and access to road infrastructure, electric
infrastructure, and telecommunication means.  On the other hand, given their respective
coefficients are not significant, we would expect that accessing to local fairs and permanent
market infrastructure does not have noticeable effects on transaction costs.
The next step consisted on estimating a truncated regression to evaluate the relationship
between the markets’ efficiency, which is approximated by the parameter of adjustment to the
equilibrium. The selection of a truncated model was considered suitable since, in theory, the
speed of adjustment can be seen as distributed in the interval [0,-1], where 0 would indicate
that markets do not converge to the equilibrium and -1 would indicate a perfect adjustment to
the equilibrium in presence of exogenous shocks.  The results for Model 2 are shown in Table
6.6.  As we can notice, the results are similar to those found with Model 1: public assets play
a relevant role in the increase of markets efficiency by increasing the speed of adjustment to
transitory disequilibria.
Finally, we proceeded to evaluate the relationships between transaction costs and
adjustment parameters (as dependent variables) and changes in district infrastructure
endowment (roads, electric energy, radio stations) in the cities under analysis between 1997
and 1999 (as independent variables).  That is, taking the infrastructure endowment in 1997 as
initial stock, the estimated regressions included as regressors the changes in infrastructure
endowment observed between 1997 and 1999. As Table 6.7 shows, the increase or variation in
the proportion of roads and electric infrastructure between 1997 and 1999 are significant
variables that contribute to the reduction of transaction costs.  We find similar results for the
estimation of the Model 2, although in this case the increase in the presence of local media is
also relevant for the improvement of markets efficiency.  However, this model is not conclusive
about the effects of an increase of electric infrastructure.
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Independent Variables Coefficients Model 1 Coefficients Model 2
Intercept 4.011 ** -0.901
(2.51) (2.19)
Energy1 -2.731 ** -0.458 **
(2.12) (2.73)
Energy2 -0.514 -1.343 **
(0.41) (3.25)
Roads1 -1.971 ** 0.281
(2.37) (1.59)
Roads2 -1.865 ** -0.685 **
(2.84) (2.66)
Telecom1 -0.343 * -0.182 **
(1.63) (2.70)
Telecom2 -0.045 -0.148 **
(0.21) (2.17)
Market1 0.249 * 0.111 **
(1.87) (1.91)
Market2 -0.136 0.217 **
(0.59) (3.16)
Radio1 -0.097
(0.58)
Radio2 -0.044 -0.242 **
(0.16) (2.17)
Fair1 0.039 -0.076
(0.2) (0.80)
Fair2 0.352 0.299 **
(1.18) 3.48
No. Of observations 45 45
Log - Likelihood 21.725 66.749
Maximum likelihood R2 0.348 0.846
BIC -165.264 -187.917
Dependent Variable Model 1: Estimated Transaction Cost.  Estimated through a linear regression. In
model 2: Speed of Adjustment.Estimated through a censored regression.
In the first model, t - robust statistics in absolute value between parenthesis.
In the second model, z - robust statistics in absolute value between parenthesis.
** significative at 5%, * significative at 10%
Source: Own estimates
Table 6.6 Determinant factors in  the reduction of the transaction costs and
the increase of the speed of adjustment between markets
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Independent Variables Coefficients Model 1 Coefficients Model 2
Intercept 0.884 -0.798
(0.95) (0.79)
Energy1  (1997) -0.624 0.221
(0.81) (0.32)
Energy2  (1997) 0.745 -1.557 *
(1.45) (1.88)
Roads1  (1997) -0.357
(1.64)
Roads2  (1997) -1.285 ** -1.197 **
(3.76) (2.54)
Radio1      (1997) 0.662 * -1.079 **
(1.67) (2.91)
Radio2      (1997) -1.184 ** -1.229 **
(2.05) (2.09)
∆ Energy1 (1999 - 1997) -1.165 * 0.479
(1.62) (0.75)
∆ Energy2 (1999 - 1997) 0.962 * 1.439 *
(1.81) (1.84)
∆ Roads1 (1999 -1997) 0.294 -0.582 **
(1.27) (2.62)
∆ Roads2 (1999 -1997) -1.108 ** -0.971 **
(2.79) (1.98)
∆ Radio1 (1999 -1997) 0.226 -0.123
(1.29) (0.40)
∆ Radio2  (1999 -1997) 0.229 -0.169 *
(1.00) (1.61)
No. Of observations 45 5
Log - Likelihood 29.041 60.802
Maximum likelihood R2 0.529 0.377
BIC -183.7 -192.131
Dependent Variable Model 1: Estimated Transaction Cost.  Estimated through a linear regression. In
model 2: Speed of Adjustment.Estimated through a censored regression.
In the first model, t - robust statistics in absolute value between parenthesis.
In the second model, z - robust statistics in absolute value between parenthesis.
** significative at 5%, * significative at 10%
Source: Own estimates
Tabl6 6.7  Changes in the provision as factors that decrease the transaction costs and increase the
speed of adjustment between markets
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6.5. Conclusions
This chapter has evaluated how infrastructure endowments may affect the speed of adjustment
of spatially distributed agricultural markets. To our knowledge, this is the first time that the
connection between infrastructure endowments and market integration has been empirically
assessed in a multivariate setting. As we have described in the literature review section there
is research that has explicitly connected key public infrastructure with bivariate measures of
integration. However this has not been done yet in a multivariate cointegration framework.
We have shown that an increase in road and electrical energy infrastructure as well as
a higher access to local media and telecommunication facilities in the cities under analysis
will lead to reductions on transaction costs as well as on the average time that prices take to
adjust to their equilibrium levels when facing an exogenous shock. Consequently, the degree
of spatial integration of potato markets will increase in the long run. With these findings we
can state that the road and electric infrastructure as well as the access to local media and
telecommunications facilities are key factors for the reduction of transaction costs and the
improvement of spatial integration between markets. Apparently, the public provision of such
public services is crucial for generating conditions that improve the efficiency of the Peruvian
agricultural markets.
We believe that this analysis can be improved by implementing some adjustments to
the methodology proposed here, and thus remains an area for future research. First, we recognize
that the regression equations proposed in this chapter are in some extent ad hoc and could be
replaced in future research by equations derived from supply and demand equilibrium. Further,
complementarities between different types of infrastructure services should be assessed,
evaluating how they interact and further improve market integration.
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Chapter 7
The Role of Public Infrastructure in Enhancing
Rural Labor Markets1
7. 1 Introduction
In rural Peru almost 35 percent of labor is allocated to and 51percent of income comes from
economic activities outside of own-farming. This fact suggests that these off-farm activities,
once referred to as "complementary activities," can no longer be thus called. These activities
include activities in the non-farm sector, including manufacturing and services, both in self-
employment (e.g., operating a small handicraft enterprise) and in wage-employment, and in
the agricultural sector in wage employment.
Despite the growing importance of these activities, very little is known about them and
on the role that they play in the income generation strategies of rural households in Peru. This
chapter, thus, has two objectives. The first is to analyze the determinants of rural households’
decisions to undertake off-farm activities. We postulate that the chosen portfolio of activities
will depend on the households’ access to public and private assets, physical, financial, human,
and organizational. The second is to explore the implications of these income diversification
strategies for the pattern of income distribution in rural Peru. We find that promotion of non-
farm activity is not necessarily consonant with improvement in the income distribution, and
for it to do so, specific policy interventions are needed.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 provides a brief overview of general
issues and background from the literature. Section 7.3 uses data from the Living Standard
Measurement Studies (LSMS) surveys for Peru between 1985 and 1997 to show the growing
importance of self-employment non-farm activities and the decline in wage-employment in
the non-farm and farm sectors. Moreover, 1997 LSMS data are used to describe rural household
income sources, differentiating farm and non-farm sector and self-employment and wage-
employment. Finally, the section assesses the impact of income diversification on income
distribution. Section 7.4 looks at the effect of public infrastructure on diversification strategies,
setting the stage for Section 7.5 which evaluates the complementary effect of accessing
simultaneously to more than one infrastructure. Section 7.6 then concludes with policy
recommendations and some hypotheses about the effects of structural adjustment policies on
the course of rural income diversification.
1 Part of this Chapter is based on "The Determinants of Labor Non-farm Income Diversification in Rural Peru" by
Javier Escobal: World Development Volume 29 Number 3, March 2001. pp. 499-508.
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7.2 Issues and review of literature
The common view of the rural sector among Peruvian policymakers is that of a sector driven
almost entirely by agriculture. Rural income is equated with farm income and, even more,
with agricultural income. Thus, policymakers view policies to combat rural poverty as policies
to enhance farm productivity. Most official reports produced by the Peruvian government or
by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, as well as others, who have shaped the
Peruvian agricultural policy agenda during the past 15 years, have focused almost exclusively
on agricultural development as the way to reduce rural poverty and achieve sustainable
economic growth in rural areas. Illustrations of this way of viewing rural poverty alleviation
include World Bank (1998), Ministry of Agriculture of Peru (1986),Ministry of Agriculture of
Peru (1993) and Vásquez (2000).
Despite this narrow view, there is growing evidence in developing regions that the
rural sector is much more than just farming. Reardon, et al. (1998a) summarize the evidence
regarding the nature, importance, determinants, and effects on farm households of rural non-
farm activity in developing regions. They show the growing importance of rural non-farm
activity that accounts for roughly 25 percent of employment and as much as 40 percent of the
incomes generated in rural Latin America. Data from other regions of the world shows also
sizable income shares for the non-farm rural sector (32 percent in Asia and 42 percent in
Africa). Reardon, et al. (1998a) also show that although the pattern of income diversification
between farm and non-farm activities varies sharply across regions, it is clearly linked to the
assets or endowments of rural households. Where markets often do not operate in a competitive
or efficient way, personal and institutional constraints can play an important role in determining
participation in non-farm activities. Household wealth, private and public asset endowments,
and regional characteristics such as agroclimate can play a critical role as they may enhance or
hinder the profitability of the household endowment base.
The literature has also established that the composition of rural incomes changes varies
with wealth – whether analyzed at the individual, household, or regional level -for regions and
countries. This relationship is conditioned by cash or credit constraints as well as access to
infrastructure. That explains for example why equally poor areas such as West Africa and
South Asia differ in the composition of their rural non-farm incomes.
Many studies have shown that rural households in developing countries earn more
from own-farming than any other income source. This is the case of most studies reported in
Reardon, et al. (1998a), Elbers and Lanjouw (2001) Reardon, et al. (1998b) and Reardon
(1997). Only in a few countries, were landless peasants constitute a sizable population, is the
importance of non-farm incomes greater than own-farm income.
Moreover, in theory, the functional income distribution of off-farm income differs over
households and regions. However, there is a dearth of data to explore this empirically, and as
Reardon, et al. (1998a) note, few studies distinguish non-farm wage-income and self-
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employment income within non-farm income. However, the evidence they muster shows that
non-farm wage employment is much more important than farm wage employment income,
particularly in Africa (and less sharply in Asia and Latin America), although the poorer
households tend to be the main ones to undertake farm wage employment, and the farm wage
tends to be below the non-farm wage.  There is also some evidence that there may be a segmented
rural labor market and that there are some cases (related to highly skilled activities) for which
the agriculture wage may be higher than the average non-farm wage.
Most analyses on income diversification in rural Peru are a by-product of the literature
on rural poverty. Studies on poverty such as that of Moncada (1996) or World Bank (1999)
have shown that a little more than half of the Peruvian population - roughly 14 million - can be
considered as poor. Regional disparities are large and increasing. Most reduction in poverty
occurring in the past decade occurred in only two zones that are both urban: in the capital,
Lima, and in the urban Sierra (mountain zone). Rural Peru maintains a high poverty rate: two
of every three rural inhabitants are poor. Gonzáles De Olarte (1996) and Escobal, et al. (1998),
among others, have shown that this poverty profile can be explained by the distinct regional
allocation of human, physical, financial and organizational assets as well as the endowment of
public goods. It is likely that certain combinations of public and private assets may enhance
the opportunities of the rural poor to diversify incomes and at the same time avail themselves
of higher-skilled and better-paid rural jobs.
Several studies have shown the importance of off-farm, or more precisely, non-farm
activities in rural Peru. Figueroa (1989) study of eight rural communities in the central and
southern Sierra concluded that non-farm activities (as noted above, those activities outside of
own-farming and farm wage employment) account for as much as 37 percent of total income.
Gonzáles De Olarte (1996) showed for several communities of the northern Sierra that more
than 40 percent of net income comes from non-farm sources.
However, the Peruvian literature lacks a detailed analysis of the determinants of these
non-farm income patterns, and the roles that key public and private assets play in determining
them. Some research, however, has focused on the effect of specific assets, such as human
capital, productive capital or financial capital on incomes and employment diversification in
rural Peru. Valdivia and Robles (1997) and Valdivia (1998) point out the importance of family
size and composition as well as farm size on wage employment and earnings in rural Peru.
Valdivia (1997) and Trivelli (1997) examine how credit constraints shape the income strategies
of rural dwellers. Using a standard household model, they show that credit availability can be
an alternative to employment diversification to smooth negative idiosyncratic shocks. Jacoby
(1993), Valdivia and Robles (1997), and Laszlo (2000) have developed formal models to
analyze producer-consumer household labor supply behavior. While Valdivia and Robles (1997)
have based their estimations in a standard agricultural household model where the separability
of consumption and production decisions hold, Jacoby (1993) developed a more structural
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approach to estimate the opportunity cost of time, or shadow wages, of Peruvian rural household
workers. Laszlo (2000) examined labor supply behavior in non-farm self-employment in rural
Peru and showed that the labor market neither uniquely nor primarily determines household
earnings. Following an approach inspired by Frisch demand analysis, the author concludes
that more education is associated with a higher probability of engaging in these activities but
does little to contribute to greater non-farm self-employment profitability.
The determinants of participation in and returns to rural non-farm activities include the
household’s asset endowment (quantity and quality) and its access to public goods and services,
as shown in various studies such as Reardon, et al. (1998a), De Janvry and Sadoulet (1996),
and Elbers and Lanjouw (2001). For particular activities such as skilled jobs, particular assets
are important, such as education. Some households are "pushed" to diversify their activities
off-farm if just to cope with external shocks to their own farming (such as from drought or a
steep decline in farmgate prices).  Or, households may be "pulled" into non-farm activity
because it often pays more than farming and generates cash.
A standard rural household model of the determinants of income diversification (for
either push or pull reasons) has the following features, after De Janvry and Sadoulet (1996).
The household problem is to maximize its utility subject to several constraints; among them:
1) a cash constraint, 2) production technologies for own-farming and non-farm self-employment
activities; 3) exogenous effective prices for tradables; 4) an equilibrium condition for self-
sufficiency of farm production; and 5) an equilibrium condition for family labor. First-order
conditions of this type of model give a system of factor supply and demand functions, which
in turn permit the determination of the labor allocation between farm and non-farm sectors
and self-employment and wage-employment.
Reduced form equations for the model have the following form:
where S
ij
 represents the net income shares coming from farm and non-farm sector activities as
well as self-employment and wage-employment; p is the vector of exogenous input and output
prices; and the z vectors are the different fixed assets that are available to the household. Z
ag
represents the fixed farm assets (such as land or cattle); z
nag
 represents fixed non-farm assets
such as experience in crafts or trade; z
k
 represents other key financial assets that facilitate
access to credit; z
h
 is the vector of human capital including family size and composition (by
age and gender), as well as education; z
pu
 is the vector of key public assets such electricity,
roads, sewage, or drinking water; finally, z
g
 includes other key assets related to characteristics
of the area (agroclimate, land quality, etc.).
Lopez (1986) showed that if time allocations between on-farm and off-farm have
different utility connotations or if there is commuting time associated with off-farm work, the
shadow price of on-farm work is endogenously determined within the household. If this is so,
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production and consumption decisions are non-separable and we can therefore expect to find
household characteristics affecting labor allocation decisions. This is the reason why income
diversification equations have the specific form depicted above.
Diversification of income sources may be related to "pull" or "push" factors discussed
above. It may be limited by cash or credit constraints or by geographic characteristics. In any
case, diversification strategies will tend to be different for the poorest as compared to the
richest rural households. Reardon (1997) shows that the non-farm income share is much larger
for rich than for poor rural African households. Reardon, et al. (2000) show that this is the case
in several Latin American countries as Argentina and Mexico and Elbers and Lanjouw (2001)
show this for Ecuador. For Asian countries, however, Reardon, et al. (2000) show that the
evidence is somewhat mixed, with some areas in India and Pakistan having a smaller share of
non-farm income for the wealthiest households.
Given the importance of non-farm income in rural areas of most developing countries,
the question of whether and under what conditions non-farm employment increases or decreases
overall rural inequality is also an important issue. As Reardon, et al. (2000) point out, the
assertion that non-farm employment reduces income inequality is based on three empirical
assumptions: "…(1) that the income created by such activities is large enough to influence the
rural income distribution  (which is, as noted above, a reasonable assumption in most developing
areas); (2) that non-farm income is unequally distributed (an income source that is perfectly
equally distributed, by definition, cannot alter the distribution of total income); and (3) that
this unequally distributed income source favours the poor". They present evidence that none
of the off-farm employment sources necessarily reduces rural inequality. Since individual
asset holdings as well as public goods and services influence non-farm employment, the
distribution of these assets plays an important role in rural income distribution as well as the
incidence of such employment. Hence, for example, the distribution of education can influence
income distribution through its effect on households’ access to well paying non-farm
employment.
7.3 Patterns of income generating options for rural Peru
7.3.1 The data
The data on labor allocation come from three national surveys conducted between 1985 and
1997. These surveys are household surveys similar to the Living Standard Measurement Surveys
(LSMS) conducted by the World Bank in various developing countries. These surveys provide
a sampling framework that assures that they are statistically representative of urban and rural
Peru at the regional level (i.e., for the Costa, Sierra, and Selva regions). This chapter uses only
the rural sample, comprising 2,284 households in the 1985-1986 survey, 1,338 households in
the 1994 survey, and 1,191 in the 1997 survey.  The three surveys maintained the same format.
Thus, consumption and labor time allocation data can be compared over the surveys. Note
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that the 1996 LSMS survey was not included in our analysis due to the small rural sample
size.  The data on net income come from the 1997 LSMS survey which was the only one of the
surveys that included all sources of income. Although the LSMS questionnaire is long, survey
quality is assured through two visits to the households and directing different parts of the
questionnaire to the appropriate household member. The surveys generated detailed data on
primary and secondary wage-employment and self-employment activities. Although it is
sometimes difficult to use data from nationwide multitopic surveys to measure income and
expenditures (due to problems related to imputation, recall, and seasonality of activities, among
other challenges),  the evolution of expenditures between 1985 and 1997 as measured by the
Peru LSMS surveys tracks well the data from the National Accounts. Moreover, Deaton (1997)
notes that LSMS survey income and expenditure data are of generally good quality. The income
module of the survey uses an income recall for the twelve months prior to the survey.  Income
data include both primary and secondary sources.
We divide income into eight categories depending on whether the income is generated
by: (1) self-employment or wage-employment activities; b) farm or non-farm sector activities;
and c) skilled or unskilled labor activities. Self-employment is defined as activity that does
not generate wage or salary earnings. Self-employment typically includes petty commerce,
handicraft manufacture, and machinery repair and rental.   Skilled labor employment includes
the "professionals" such as teaching, formal commerce, and employment as military officers.
Unskilled labor includes for example unskilled operators of simple machines, unskilled soldiery.
The data patterns and regressions weight the household observations by the probability
of the household falling in the sample frame because the observations come from a stratified
random sample. The rural area was first divided in segments (Costa, Sierra and jungle) and each
segment was further divided into clusters (a bundle of geographically continuous households).
7.3.2 Time allocation and income diversification between farm and non-farm
sector activities in rural areas
Rural household labor time allocation over activities changed over the past decade, with an
apparent relation to the economic cycle. Table 7.1 shows that between 1985-1986 and 1994
there was a large increase in non-farm self-employment, with a notable shift from own-farming.
The macroeconomic stabilization program in place since 1990 initially hurt the farm sector.
Real farmgate prices for most crops declined substantially during the 1990s, reducing the
profitability of farm sector labor. Households increased the share of total labor time allocated
to non-farm self-employment 15 percent to 25 percent, and the share of labor to non-farm
wage-employment went from 10 percent to almost 13 percent. The importance of non-farm
self-employment was maintained after the adjustment crisis, apparently because the relative
return to non-farm activity had improved with the adjustment, and because of substantial
investment in rural infrastructure (roads and electrification) in the mid 1990s.
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Table 7.1 Labor allocation of Peruvian rural households
1985-1986 1994 1997
Self-employment 90.4% 87.4% 90.5%
 Agricultural activities 75.8% 62.3% 64.7%
 Non-agricultural activities 14.6% 25.1% 25.8%
Wage-employment 9.6% 12.6% 9.5%
Agricultural activities 4.3% 6.2% 4.8%
Non-agricultural activities 5.3% 6.5% 4.7%
Source: Own estimates
Table 7.2 Regional differences in labor allocation. Peru - 1997
Costa Sierra Selva Rural Peru
Self-employment 84.7% 91.5% 89.0% 90.5%
 Agricultural activities 61.3% 66.7% 58.0% 64.7%
 Non-agricultural activities 23.4% 24.8% 31.0% 25.8%
Wage-employment 15.3% 8.5% 11.0% 9.5%
Agricultural activities 9.7% 4.0% 5.5% 4.8%
Non-agricultural activities 5.6% 4.5% 5.5% 4.7%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Own estimates
Household labor allocation patterns do not vary much over regions. We had expected
that wage employment would have a greater share in total family labor allocation in the Costa
region because of a denser road network and better access to markets and towns.  However,
Table 7.2 shows, using 1997 LSMS data, that there is little difference over regions in terms of
rural household labor allocation between self-employment and wage-employment and between
farm and non-farm sector activities. For example, the share of self-employment labor in total
labor in the Sierras is only 1 percent above the national average and that of the Costa only 6
percent below.
Moreover, this lack of sharp differences in allocation stands against the substantial
inter-regional variation in per-capita household incomes, as shown in Table 7.3, which coincides
with wage variation over regions (with higher wages in the Costa region). These results do not
support the hypothesis of Klein (1992) of convergence in wage rates over locations in Latin
American countries, and rather suggests market segmentation. Table 7.3 also shows that between
the Costa and Sierra regions, labor productivity differs sharply in the farm sector but does not
differ much in the non-farm sector. Differences in the agro-climates and sizes of farms in the
two regions explain the farm productivity difference.  Wages also differ over labor categories
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due, as we explore further below, to geographic characteristics and to household and individual
assets such as education and experience. The data show a premium of at least 30 percent for
skilled labor in the farm sector and 50 percent in the non-farm sector.
Table 7.4 shows incomes by source. The data suggest that rural households earn much
more from non-farm self-employment than from farm wage or non-farm wage employment.
This is consistent with findings elsewhere in Latin America, such as in Ecuador as reported by
Lanjouw (1999) and Elbers and Lanjouw (2001). Own-farm income is still the most important
source, however, and that is so for most rural Peruvian households because most of them own
a plot and land is relatively evenly distributed. We expect that off-farm income would be
higher in areas that are richer and have better infrastructure, such as the Costa region.
Table 7.3 Average returns by income source. Rural Peru -1997
(US$ per workday)
Costa Sierra Selva Rural Peru
Self-employment
   Agricultural activities 1.5 0.3 0.6 0.4
   Non-agricultural activities 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.7
Wage-employment
  Agricultural activities 1.6 0.7 0.7 0.8
  Non-agricultural activities 1.6 2 1.1 1.8
Total 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
Source: Own estimates
Table 7.4 Net income by source. Rural Peru - 1997
(US$ per capita)
Costa Sierra Selva Rural Peru
Self-employment
Agricultural Activities 455.5 130.3 169.7 167
-67.6% -41.6% -56.5% -49.0%
Non-agricultural activities 97.8 109.2 79 101.1
-14.5% -34.8% -26.3% -29.7%
Wage-employment
Agricultural Activities 76.6 16.7 20.6 22.7
-11.4% -5.3% -6.9% -6.7%
Non-agricultural activities 44.3 57.2 31 49.9
-6.6% -18.3% -10.3% -14.6%
Total 674.2 313.3 300.3 340.6
-100% -100% -100% -100%
Source: Own estimates
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Surprisingly, the data show that the share of wage employment income and non-farm self-
employment income is actually higher in the poorer regions, the Sierra and the Selva regions.
This suggests that diversification «push» factors are important in poorer regions, as Reardon,
et al. (1998a) find for African countries. However, those with skilled labor have higher incomes
than the unskilled in the Costa – but not in the Sierra and Selva regions. That suggests relative
underdevelopment of the labor markets in these two regions.
7.3.3 Income diversification variation over income strata
Income diversification varies in extent and nature with household wealth. Poorer households
tend to concentrate on the lower-pay, easy-entry agricultural labor market, and less on skilled
labor-intensive non-agricultural wage-employment and non-farm self-employment. This is
due to their scant education and credit and cash constraints. By contrast, higher income rural
households with more education and fewer cash constraints tend to pursue non-agricultural
self-employment activities such as handicrafts, commerce, tools and machinery repair, and
agro-processing. Table 7.5 shows that even though much of the agricultural wage labor is
supplied by the poorest rural households, this is not true of the non-farm wage labor market,
due to the skills required for the latter.
Despite these household-wealth differentiated patterns, the impact of non-farm
employment on the income distribution is ambiguous. Table 7.6 shows Gini and pseudo-Gini
coefficients for total rural income and for the main rural income sources. Gini coefficients
have been calculated using all households for which a particular income source was available.
In contrast, pseudo-Gini coefficients were calculated for the full sample.
The pseudo-Ginis show that all income sources are more unequally distributed than
total rural income. Following Shorrocks (1983), we decomposed the Gini of total rural income
into its factor components (S
k
). Our decomposition rule considers the relative importance of
each income source, the pattern of inequality of each income source (measured by the pseudo
Gini coefficient), and the correlation between different income sources.
Where I (Yk), the "pseudo-Gini" value for income component k can be computed as follows:
µ being the mean value of Y.
Using this income decomposition method we can show that incomes coming from
wage-employment are important enough to account for up to 45 percent of income inequality.
Wage employment income is relatively unequally distributed (showing pseudo-Ginis of 0.92
and 0.77 for farm and non-farm wage employment incomes, respectively), but does not appear
to favor the poor because they are participating mainly in the low-wage farm labor.
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This may suggest that the non-farm wage labor market actually increases income
inequality. However, Reardon, et al. (2000) note that if an individual source of income is more
unequally distributed than overall income, that does not necessarily imply that this source is
contributing to overall income inequality.  Thus we must note that this decomposition exercise
does not necessarily imply any causal link. For example, it is possible that if those who are
currently employed in the non-agriculture wage-employment sector were engaged in some
alternate employment activity, such as agricultural wage-employment, then agricultural wage
rates might be lower and overall income inequality could actually rise.  So then rather than
raising inequality, the non-agriculture wage-employment sector could actually be keeping
inequality from rising even further. However, the segmented nature of rural markets may well
prevent this effect. This evidence is consistent with that reported by Reardon, et al. (1998a)
and Klein (1992). If that is so, based on the inter-strata differences discussed above, we can
maintain our claim that rural wage-employment income sources are contributing very little or
nothing to reduction in income inequality.
Table 7.5 Net income distribution by quintile. Rural Peru - 1997
(Row Percentages)
Self-Employment Income: Wage-Employment Income:
Quintile Agricultural Non-agricultural Agricultural Non-agricultural (2)+(3)+(4)
-1 -2 -3 -4
I 70.5% 20.0% 4.5% 4.9% 29.5%
II 62.8% 19.7% 12.8% 4.7% 37.2%
III 58.1% 22.2% 12.6% 7.2% 41.9%
IV 46.9% 29.1% 10.0% 14.0% 53.1%
V 45.5% 32.8% 4.1% 17.6% 54.5%
Rural Peru 49.0% 29.7% 6.7% 14.6% 51.0%
Note: Quintiles are ordered in increasing per capita income terms
Source: Own estimates
Table 7.6 Income inequality decomposition by income source
(Iini Index)
Sources Gini Pseudo Gini Contribution Gini
(%) decomposition
Self-Employment Agricultural activities 0.5417 0.9264 7.03 0.0135
Self-Employment Non-Agricultural activities 0.6707 0.7122 47.82 0.2977
Wage-Employment Agricultural activities 0.5299 0.9249 11.53 0.0172
Wage-Employment Non-Agricultural activities 0.615 0.7733 33.62 0.2486
Total 0.577 0.577 100 0.577
Note: Gini coefficient is calculated considering only those who participate in an activity while pseudo-Gini.
Source: Own estimates
The Role of Public Infrastructure in Enhancing Rural Labor Markets
161
7.4 Modeling income diversification strategies: the role of public infrastructure
Following the conceptual model presented in Section 7.2, we divide rural income sources into
the following six categories: (1) self-employment unskilled agricultural activities; (2) self-
employment skilled agricultural activities; (3) wage-employment unskilled non-agricultural
activities; (4) wage-employment skilled non-agricultural activities; (5) self-employment non-
agricultural activities (skilled and unskilled); (6) wage-employment agricultural activities
(skilled and unskilled). However, we joined skilled and unskilled self-employment non-
agricultural activities as well as skilled and unskilled wage-employment agricultural activities
because we did not find clear differences in their patterns.
The equations estimated were those representing the share of total rural income in each
of the above four income sources. The estimation method is Tobit double-censored estimation.
The equations were estimated as a system, dropping the last equation, as income shares must
sum to one.
The determinants include: (1) location variables (regional dummy variables, regional
land productivity, and local market size); (2) human capital variables (family size and composition,
age, gender, and years of schooling); (3) public assets (access to electricity and roads, approximated
by the distance to market); (4) agriculture-specific assets (land and cattle); (5) non-agriculture-
specific assets (wage labor experience); (6) financial assets (access to credit). Finally, regional
dummies were placed in the estimation in order to control for regional price variations.
Table 7.7 shows results. The table shows the number of left- and right-censored
observations in each equation as well as a likelihood-ratio test as a goodness-of-fit indicator.
Note that all equations fit the data reasonably well. Furthermore, an important number of
observations (over two-thirds) are either left- or right-censored, justifying the estimation method.
Table 7.7 shows that location, and ownership of private and public assets is a key determinant
of household income diversification in rural Peru.  For example, in poor agricultural zones
tend to be lower shares of non-farm incomes and skilled own-farming incomes in total incomes.
In effect, the higher the land productivity of the district, hence the stronger the agricultural
sector, the greater are non-farm income shares in overall incomes.
As expected, the ownership of fixed agricultural assets increases the share of own-
farm income in total household income, and reduces the need for undertaking wage-employment
in the farm and non-farm sectors. Credit access is also a key determinant of self-employment
(whether in farm or the non-farm sectors). However, it should be noted that non-farm income
sources relax the cash constraint as substitutes for credit or credit constraint.
Another key asset affecting income diversification sources is human capital. The effect
of education is very clear: the higher the education level, the lower the incentive to obtain
income from own-farming, and the greater the incentive to commit time to non-farm self-
employment activities as well as non-farm (but not agricultural) wage-employment.
It is interesting to note that we have not found any gender bias in the income
diversification strategies of rural dwellers in Peru. This is consistent with the evidence shown
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by Valdivia and Robles (1997),that even though there exist gender roles in farming, there is no
evidence of gender discrimination in Peruvian rural labor markets.
Finally, the role of some key public assets such as rural electrification and roads is
clearly shown in our results. Access to these public assets raises the profitability of both farm
and non-farm activities, but especially of non-farm businesses.
Family size 0.031 * -0.004 0.043 -0.267 *** -0.022 0.036
(1.7) (0.2) (1.6) (3.8) (0.9) (0.9)
Age of household head 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.002
(0.9) (1.2) (0.6) (0.7) (0.3) (0.3)
Gender of household head 0.01 0.261 -0.192 0.813 -0.045 0.251
(0.1) (1.4) (-0.9) (1.1) (0.2) (0.8)
Years of education (average) -0.95 *** -0.532 1.575 *** 4.373 *** 2.274 *** -0.272
(3.0) (1.4) (3.4) (4.3) (5.2) (0.4)
Labor Experience (years) 0.012 0.11 *** 0.041 0.209 *** -0.007 -0.141
(1.1) (2.9) (0.3) (3.2) (0.8) (1.1)
Access to electricity -0.205 ** 0.122 0.007 0.897 0.124  ** -0.073
(2.0) (0.9) ( 0) (1.4) (2.3) (0.3)
Access to credit 0.199 ** 0.278 *** 0.475 0.494 0.532 *** 0.274
(2.3) (2.6) (1.2) (1.3) (4.9) (1.6)
Livestock (in sheep equivalents) 0.972 *** -0.257 -1.082 *** 0.016 -0.866 *** -1.055 **
(6) (1.3) (3.4) (0) (3.1) (2.5)
Land size (has.) 0.356 ** 1.341 ** -0.175 0.115 -0.006 -1.183
(2.1) (2.5) (0.2) (0.1) (0.0) (1.1)
Distance to the Market (Km) -0.002 0 -0.003 -0.006 * -0.03 *** 0
(1.1) (0.2) (0.9) (1.8) (2.8) (0.1)
Local Market Size (population) 0.007 ** 0.005 0 0.014 * 0.005 -0.006
(2.6 ) (1.5) (0) (1.7) (1.3) (1.0)
Local Land Productivity
(Soles per ha.) -0.011 ** 0.014 *** 0.018 *** 0.008 0.018 *** -0.002
(2.6) (2.9) (3.5) (0.7) (3.5) (0.3)
Coast Dummy 0.641 ** -0.844 ** -1.498 *** -4.207 *** -1.689 *** -0.73
(2.4) (2.5) (3.5) (3.2) (4.0) (1.2)
Highland Dummy 0.902 *** -1.148 *** -1.057 ** -4.931 *** -1.611 *** -0.959
(2.8) (2.9) (2.1) (3.3) (3.3) (1.3)
Amazon Dummy 0.666 *** -0.723 ** -1.387 *** -3.827 *** -1.565 *** -1.424 ***
(2.8) (2.5) (3.7) (3.2) (4.2) (2.6)
Left-Censored observations 295 462 668 744 642 667
Right-Censored observations 334 70 4 1 5 22
Uncensored observations 149 246 106 33 131 89
Log likelihhod value -772.55 -670.02 -303.9 -124.17 -359.68 -359.14
Prob. ( L.R. Statistic) > chi2(35) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.031 ** 0.047 ** 0.021 ** 0.024 ** 
Note: This is a tobit double censored estimation. T-values in parenthesis.
The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected at 1%, 5% y 10% respectively.
Source: Own estimates
Table 7.7 Determinant of income diversification. Rural Peru - 1997
(Dependent variables: income shares)
Self- Self- Wage- Wage- Self- Wage-
employment employment employment employment non employment
Variables unskilled skilled unskilled non skilled non agriculturals agricultural
agricultural agricultural agricultural agricultural activities activities
activities activities activities activities
Income  Source:
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7.5 Impact of infrastructure complementarities over rural labor income
The relation between access to infrastructure and income generating strategies can also be
evaluated using the following definitional equation:
(1)
where L represents the total hours per week that rural household members use for labor income
activities; Sl
i
 stands for the share of labor time used for activity i and y
i
/l
i
 represents the average
wage for each type of activity.
If we define ∆Y as the additional income obtained by a rural household coming from
the access to new infrastructure services, we may decompose such impact as follows:
(2)
Here, the first term represents the impact (in income terms) that arises due to changes
in labor allocation between activities (allocation effect). The second term represents the impact
generated because of an increase in total labor time (employment effect). The last term is
simply the interaction effect, since the previous two effects may not be separable2.
Using equation (2) we can track the channels through which infrastructure impacts rural
labor incomes. Our main hypothesis here is that there are certain infrastructure combinations
that may induce rural households to engage in non-agricultural income generating activities.
We will follow here a propensity matching technique to compare those households that
have no access to key infrastructure services (i.e. improved road services, electricity, water
and sewerage or telephone services) with those that have access to one or more of these
infrastructure services.3  By using matching techniques we try to balance the sample between
those that have access to infrastructure and those that have not. The purpose of this balancing
exercise  is to assure that those structural characteristics that are not affected by infrastructure
(at least in the short run) are similar in both samples, so as to claim that the difference in labor
income or time allocation are due to the access to these infrastructure services.
The Probit equation, used to make the matching possible (and balance the samples), used
as control variables the age of head of household, years of education, maternal language, gender,
number of children under 14, number of adults over 65, value durable goods and  regional
2 Because of data availability we are holding constant the wages due to changes in infrastructure services. Obviously
this may not be the case if there are labor market effects.
3 A detailed description of propensity matching techniques and their used to evaluate the benefits of infrastructure is
done in Chapter 8.
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dummies. In addition, a number of district level variables where included:  population of the
district were this household is located, climate and geography related variables, average land
holding, percentage of the land allocated to market crops, area under irrigation and poverty rate.
7.5.1 Changes in total labor hours
When we apply propensity matching techniques to the total time allocated to labor activities
between those that have no access to key infrastructure services and those that have access to
one ore more infrastructure we can see that there is indeed a positive and significant difference.
Table 7.8 shows that after controlling for above mentioned observables, having access to two
or more infrastructure services, does make a difference. In particular there is an increase of
more than 3 hours per week of total labor time with respect to those households having no
infrastructure services or having just one of these infrastructure services (i.e. improved road
services, electricity, water and sewerage or telephone services).
Table 7.8 Effect of infrastructure complementarities on total labor time per week
in rural Peru: propensity matching estimation
(Base comparison group are those with no access to infrastructure services )
No. of Infrastructure Services
  ATT 1/ 95% confidence Interval
1 Infrastructure 0.32 -1.39 2.08
2 Infrastructure 3.69 0.43 6.71
3 or more 3.89 2.51 9.31
1/  ATT: Average Treatment Effect
***, **, * indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected at 1%, 5% y 10% respectively
Source: Own estimates
7.5.2 Changes in labor allocation
As it was previously mentioned, access to infrastructure services may also change the relative
profitability of the different labor income sources available to household. For example the
access to electricity may allow a household to allocate more time in particular self-employment
non-agricultural activities, like the production of handicraft or small scale industry. The access
to this type of infrastructure may also enhance the labor market in nearby towns thus, enhancing
wage-related opportunities in the non-farm sector.
As the rural households increase their access to infrastructure their dedication to non-
agriculture activities increases substantially. Thus for example, a household having access to
three or more infrastructure services allocated approximately 30 percentage points more of
his time to non-agriculture activities (20 percentage points more to wage activities m and 10
percentage points to self-employment non-agricultural activities). When analyzing the impact
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of each one of the assets under study we see that the greater individual impact occurs when
access to phone is combined with access to electricity. Additional complementarities are also
related to the combination of electricity with access to other infrastructure services.
Table 7.9 Effect of infrastructure complementarities on labor allocation in rural Peru.
Propensity matching estimation
(Base comparison group are those with no access to infrastructure services)
No. of Infrastructure Services
Wage-employment agriculture Wage-employment non-agriculture
ATT1/ 95% confidence Interval ATT1/ 95% confidence Interval
1 Infrastructure 0.41 -1.11 1.92 2.15 0.63 3.86
2 Infrastructure 2.20 -0.05 4.24 1.97 -0.34 4.81
3 or more 1.62 -0.94 4.45 11.21 5.34 15.53
No. of Infrastructure Services
Self-employment agriculture Self-employment non-agriculture
ATT1/ 95% confidence Interval ATT1/ 95% confidence Interval
1 Infrastructure -5.34 -7.89 -3.08 2.79 1.22 4.48
2 Infrastructure -11.79 -14.93 -8.61 7.62 5.31 9.81
3 or more -21.13 -27.07 -16.51 8.30 4.21 13.68
1/  ATT: Average Treatment Effect
Source: Own estimates
7.5.3 Aggregate impacts
When we combine the effects of the increase in total Labor time and the changes in time
allocation between sectors brought about by access to different combinations of infrastructure
services it is possible evaluate the impact of incremental access to infrastructure services in
rural labor income. As Table 7.10, shows having access to one or more infrastructure service
has a positive significant effect on total labor income. In addition, this impact rises as the
household have access to additional infrastructure services, reaching an additional 180 soles
per month (about US$ 50) when the household has access to three or more infrastructure
services.4
It is interesting to note that when we split the sample according to access to different
types of road infrastructure (access to motorized and non-motorized rural roads we can see
that the complementarity effects is larger in those areas connected to motorized roads. Such
effect will be evaluated in greater detail in the next chapter of this study.
4 For comparison purposes, we must note that US$ 50 per week represents 25 percent of an average household
income in rural Peru.
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7.6. Conclusions
In a world of complete certainty, where markets for all goods exist and are perfect, labor
allocation decisions tend to be driven by relative wages. However, in rural Peru, labor markets
are not perfect. Shadow wages can differ from market wages, and are determined by the
marginal productivity of labor, the price of consumption goods, time endowment, non-labor
income and private and public asset endowments. Labor allocation decisions between self-
employment and wage employment activities would then result from, inter alia, binding
constraints in the rural labor market or in the credit market or an insufficient provision of
public goods.
This chapter has shown that indeed access to public goods and services together with an
adequate endowment of private assets (especially education and credit) can improve access to
Table 7.10 Effect of infrastructure complementarities on per capita income in rural Peru:
propensity matching estimation
(Base comparison group are those with no access to infrastructure services )
No. of Infrastructure Services
ATT 1/ Std. Err.
1 Infrastructure 25.09 7.06 ***
2 Infrastructure 84.62 10.01 ***
3 or more 180.77 15.13 ***
Sample with access via Non Motorized Roads
No. of Infrastructure Services
   ATT 1/ Std. Err.
1 Infrastructure 32.67 8.53 ***
2 Infrastructure 78.07 13.09 ***
3 or more 207.85 26.35 ***
Sample with access via Motorized Roads
No. of Infrastructure Services
   ATT 1/ Std. Err.
1 Infrastructure -10.70 13.51
2 Infrastructure 58.23 26.51 **
3 or more 134.37 20.14 ***
1/  ATT: Average Treatment Effect
***, **, * indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected at 1%, 5% y 10% respectively
Source: Own estimates
Full Sample
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self-employment non-agricultural as well as wage- employment income sources in rural Peru.
We have also shown the importance for the rural sector of the activities that goes beyond
agricultural tasks within the farm, and that this importance has increased substantially during
at least the past decade. At present, 51 percent of the net income of Peruvian rural households
originates from activities other than own-farming. This suggests that the off-farm activities
should certainly no longer be considered as "marginal", as they have so often in past rural
debates. Although richer households tend to rely more on non-farm sources than do the poor,
the latter also participate in a substantial way in the non-farm sector; poverty might be even
more rampant were it not for these income sources.
We have also shown that as additional infrastructure services are provided, rural
households can have access to more diversified labor income portfolios, which in turn allows
for a higher household income. Nevertheless these labor income opportunities are somewhat
more visible between those who already have higher incomes, which are those that can take
advantage of their larger private asset holdings (for example greater education) to increase
their non-farm labor activities.  Matching techniques allow us to show that additional access
to infrastructure services increases both the total number of hours per week devoted to labor
income and the percentage of time allocate to non-farm activities. This result highlights the
fact that there are important complementarities in rural infrastructure investments.
Complementary simulations reported by Escobal and Torero (2004) show that poverty
rate reductions may be sizable as access to infrastructure services increases. When several
infrastructure services are combined the poverty rate can be reduced in as much as 20 percent,
a sizable contribution of infrastructure investment to rural development. The most important
complementarities detected in such exercise are those related to the combination of electricity
and water and sanitation services as well as the combination of electricity and telephone services.
The reasons to diversify income in rural Peru are various. A large group of farmers
complement their faring with farm wage employment and non-farm activities due insufficient
land or cattle or farm capital. Yet another group has sufficient education, skills, credit, and
access to roads and electricity to allow them to undertake non-farm wage employment (such
as making handicrafts, repairing and renting equipment, and commerce). Many of these non-
farm activities are indirectly linked to the farm sector, which is why one finds such high levels
of participation in the non-farm sector in the more dynamic agricultural areas.
A better understanding of why rural households diversify income sources can help us
to assess the likely impact of recent structural reforms on rural income diversification. During
the past decade, the Peruvian rural sector has been exposed to a major liberalization program.
These reforms swept away much of what had been highly interventionist policies. In addition
to macroeconomic reforms, the government implemented major structural reforms in the areas
of trade policy, privatization, and the financial sector. In agriculture, the reforms included
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substantial liberalization of agricultural trade, the elimination of price controls over agricultural
products, the liberalization of the land market allowing land ownership by domestic firms and
foreigners, the elimination of most agricultural input subsidies, and a severe downsizing of
most public agricultural institutions including the Ministry of Agriculture, marketing agencies,
the Agrarian Bank, and the agricultural research service. Together with these policy reforms,
there was a major investment effort undertaken in the rural areas, including rural roads,
electrification, and drinkable water and sewage systems.
Access to some of these public services (like electricity and roads) and access to credit
is important in explaining why some rural dwellers can access better income sources. For
example, more developed public infrastructure can help increase the size of rural towns and
small cities, especially in the Sierra region. Better infrastructure and denser population drive
down transaction costs and boost investment in both the agricultural sector and the non-
agricultural sectors.
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Chapter 8
Evaluating the Welfare Impact of Public Rural
Infrastructure: the case of rural roads
8.1 Introduction
We can asses the overall impact of a certain rural infrastructure by looking at key welfare
indicators like, income or expenditures. This chapter follows this path using as an example the
welfare impact that rural road rehabilitation and maintenance may bring to rural households.
A country’s rural road network is normally made up of tracks, trails, footpaths and
earth roads that link rural villages and towns among each other and, in many cases, connect to
secondary roads, which allow their residents to access product and factor markets as well as
social services their own communities do not provide. The tracks, trails and footpaths, which
will be defined here as ‘non-motorized (rural) roads’, allow the movement of people and
animals over typically steep terrain and are characterized by low quality standards and limited
transit. A second type of road studied here are the ‘motorized (rural) roads’ - also known as
country roads - which are engineered earth roads used to connect small towns and villages by
public transport or cargo trucks, which in optimal conditions allow fluid connection to secondary
roads and the articulation of rural population to urban areas.
The importance of rural road network in the national road system of most developing
countries is enormous but, even though it typically accounts for more than half of their transport
network, it only gets a marginal part of the national budget allocated to road construction,
rehabilitation and maintenance. In Peruvian case, in particular, its rugged topography and
great ecological and climatic diversity has led policymakers to acknowledge the importance
of investing in rural transport infrastructure. However, the importance assigned to these
investments does not necessarily translate to an appropriate allocation of public funds. The
high cost of construction and maintenance of this type of infrastructure - given the need to
incorporate measures against deterioration caused by frequent landslides and avalanches -
together with the marginal political representation of the potentially beneficiary population,
has led to displacement of such investment by other investments that politicians perceive as
more profitable in terms of votes.
To face this situation, there is an urgent need to document in the best way possible the
benefits that this kind of public investment brings about on the welfare of the population it
serves. This is so, not only to disseminate results among policymakers but also to generate
greater political support from the national population, which is typically concentrated in a few
urban areas of the country.
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Within this analysis and dissemination effort, the academic sector has an important
pending agenda regarding the study of the impacts that rehabilitated rural roads have on
household welfare; in particular, on aggregate indicators such as household consumption or
income. Whilst there is no major disagreement among academicians about the need of investing
in rural infrastructure in general - and road infrastructure in particular - as an effective component
of rural poverty eradication efforts, justifications presented tend to be based on its impact on
accessibility to public social services and markets, without establishing the effective welfare
changes households might be experiencing. Although indicators of access to health and
education services have an undoubtedly positive impact on household welfare, greater
accessibility to product and factor markets does not necessarily entails higher levels of welfare.
This is so because household income generation capacity could be threatened by increasing
levels of competition in the local market. Therefore, the analysis of the impact of road
rehabilitation on household income composition becomes an essential aspect in the impact
assessment of this type of public intervention.
Regarding available studies on the effects of rural roads infrastructure investment,
most specialized literature has just documented the different impacts that such investment
could have on accessibility to product and factor markets and key public (social) services,
without controlling the effects of other covariates that could be increasing or reducing the
positive impacts resulting from this investment. The methodological framework used in public
projects evaluation has been rehabilitated considerably thanks to the introduction of propensity
score matching techniques developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and extended by
Heckman, et al. (1998), which allows the construction of counterfactual scenarios, sufficiently
robust to enable researchers to claim causal relations. However, this methodological alternative
has not been yet incorporated to the analysis of social and economic impact deriving from
rural roads construction, rehabilitation and maintenance projects.
Aiming at contributing to fill this gap, this chapter explores some methodological
modifications necessary to adapt propensity score matching methodology when assessing the
benefits that investment in rural road rehabilitation may generate on welfare indicators. Since
many sample designs on which these studies and evaluations are based do not have a sufficiently
large sample size of households as to guarantee a minimum statistical representativeness at a
town level, it is not generally possible - using available information - to balance the two
household samples (those accessing to rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated rural roads) with
regard to observable characteristics. In this chapter it is suggested that, in such cases, it is
possible to balance both samples in two stages. First, ensuring that towns are comparable in
terms of certain basic characteristics, which would have determined whether or not the
intervention took place (i.e. community organizational capacity, economic activity indicators,
access to public services, length of road section or size of town); and second, simulating
welfare indicators that would correspond to observed households, if should all have the same
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assets endowment (human, organizational or physical capital), so that the assessment of
rehabilitation effects will account only for the differences in returns and non-observables that
differentiate an intervention scenario from a non-intervention one.
Following this introduction, this chapter is divided in four sections. The section below is
a brief literature review on what has so far been said about the benefits of rural roads. We show
there that most studies have focused on the access to product and factor markets as well as public
services, and that available documentation regarding the impact of road infrastructure
improvement on key welfare indicators - such as income and consumption - is very limited. The
third section describes the source and characteristics of the information used for this study, as
well as the methodology applied to estimate the impact of rural roads rehabilitation on the average
welfare of the treated households. In order to construct a counterfactual scenario, the propensity
score matching methodology is used here, after adapting it to the specific characteristics of the
data used. The fourth section presents the results of the counterfactual analysis and shows the
impact that rural roads rehabilitation in Peru would have had on rural household’s per capita
income and consumption. This section also shows the impact that rehabilitated rural roads would
have had on the different income sources of those households. Finally, the fifth section summarizes
the main findings and limitations of the analysis carried out, and suggests some of the pending
areas of research that need to be addressed in order to have a more accurate idea of the impacts
that road rehabilitation has on rural households’ welfare.
8.2 The benefits of rural roads : a brief bibliographic review
Even though the focus of infrastructure investment in developing countries has shifted away
from large-scale projects (highways, railways and big irrigation schemes) to smaller scale but
more locally important investments, such as rural roads or micro hydroelectric power plants,
impact assessments of such investments on poverty or the living standards of the local
population are still scarce.
The relation between poverty reduction and rural infrastructure provision has been
discussed from a macro perspective by various authors. Ahmed and Donovan (1992), World
Bank (1994), Lipton and Ravallion (1995), Booth, et al. (2000), among others, point out the
existence of strong linkages between rural infrastructure investment, agricultural growth and
poverty reduction. These studies draw evidence from South East Asian countries like Indonesia
or Malaysia, where a massive increase of rural infrastructure was followed by a long period of
economic growth and a dramatic reduction in rural poverty. Although the causal connection is
not clearly established, they suggest this would have happened as a result of the impact of
infrastructure investment on the rise of agricultural productivity and the creation of new job
opportunities.
More recently, authors like Jalan and Ravallion (2002) have highlighted the importance
of both the existence of rural infrastructure facilities as well as the complementarities among
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them, as an essential requirement for rural income growth and poverty reduction. These authors
find that in order to overcome poverty traps it is crucial assuring not only the access to some
particular key public facilities, like roads or electricity, but also the conformation of a critical
mass of complementary key public infrastructure facilities.
As Gannon and Liu (1997) pointed out the microeconomic mechanisms through which
road infrastructure investment generates positive impacts on economic growth and poverty
reduction have been recognized by specialized literature. According to these authors, rural
infrastructure investment allows, on the one hand, the reduction in production costs and
transaction costs, fostering trade and making possible division of labor and specialization, key
elements for sustainable economic growth. Furthering that kind of argument, Blocka and Webb
(2001) find that higher road density promotes specialization, enabling farmers to develop a
more intensive agriculture based on modern inputs. On the other hand, another mechanism
pointed out by Gannon and Liu (1997) is related to how rural infrastructure improvement
fosters increases on the profitability of public and private assets belonging to households that
have access to such infrastructure.
Although literature identifies properly many of the areas where the positive impacts of
such investments are foreseen (i.e. agricultural production, employment, income, health or
education), there are only few studies that have made progress in establishing a clear causal
link between infrastructure provision and any welfare indicator. Most studies have limited
their attention to document in more or less detail the role of accessibility to infrastructure
facilities by the rural poor, in terms of reductions of time and costs involved in accessing
product and factor markets or accessing social services, like health or education.
In the last few years, the research areas privileged by studies documenting, in an
empirical way, the positive impact of larger and better access to rural road infrastructure have
been related to two broad areas. On the economic side, privileged studies have been those
quantifying time savings, transport costs reductions and transaction costs reductions associated
to the articulation of rural households to product and factor markets, as well as those focusing
on the impact that larger provision of this kind of infrastructure generates on rural job
opportunities. On the social side, privileged studies have been those documenting the greater
access to basic services - like health and education - that follow the construction or rehabilitation
and maintenance of rural roads.
Among the studies that focus their attention on quantifying time savings and the
reduction of transport costs we can mention contributions like that of Lucas, Davis and Rikard
(1996), who assess the impacts of a rural roads reconstruction and rehabilitation program in
Tanzania, after seven years, by documenting traffic increases, passenger and freight cost
reductions and time savings in accessing markets. It could also be mentioned here Guimaraes
and Uhl (1997) who assess how transport mode, road quality and distance to markets affect
agricultural production costs in the federal state of Pará, Brazil; or Liu (2000) who carries out
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a study of production and transport costs comparing villages with permanent access to roads
to those with only seasonal access, in the state of Andhra Pradesh, in India.
Different studies have documented the importance of road infrastructure in expanding
rural labor markets. Smith, et al. (2001) show that, for the case of Uganda, the rehabilitation of
road infrastructure fostered the expansion of job opportunities in the service sector. Lanjouw,
et al. (2001) also find increased non-agricultural job opportunities in Tanzania due to
rehabilitated road infrastructure. However, Barrett, et al. (2001) acknowledge that this kind of
studies has not been able to estimate accurately the profitability of increased access to labor
markets provided by such infrastructure improvement, in terms of new job opportunities as
well as better job opportunities than those existing before the intervention.
In addition, several studies such as those by Corral and Reardon (2001) in Nicaragua,
De Janvry and Sadoulet (2001) in México, and this study, in chapter 6 for the Peruvian case,
has found significant relations between different road indicators and non-agricultural rural job
opportunities both in self-employment and waged activities. These studies have shown that
road access might even compensate the absence of other public and private assets.
What is happening with households’ wealth and welfare? The impacts of rehabilitated
road infrastructure on accessibility to product markets and new and better job opportunities,
referred above, should – though might not - be generating wealth or welfare gains. However,
there is not much work done in this research area. We can only mention the work of Jacoby
(2000)who shows, using data from Nepal, that there is a negative relation between farmland
value and its distance to agricultural markets. As indicated by this author, if farmland behaves
like any asset, its price would equal the net present value of the benefits its cultivation generates,
and therefore this relation - between farmland value and distance to agricultural markets - is
an indicator of the capital gains generated by the improvement of road infrastructure. In addition,
Jacoby (2000) identifies a significant but weak relation between agricultural wages and distance
to the market. This suggests that benefits of better articulation to labor markets are the result
of changes in time allocation between self-employment and waged activities, rather than the
result of increased wages due to rehabilitated rural roads.
Amongst the studies that have privileged the analysis of social impacts of rural road
infrastructure, we can mention those by Windle and Cramb (1996) and Porter (2002). Windle
and Cramb (1996) compare three areas in Malaysia with different degree of accessibility and
verify the positive impacts of rehabilitated road infrastructure in maternal healthcare, nutrition
and access to school; while Porter (2002) focuses on the impacts of road access over rural
poor population of Sub-Saharan Africa, showing the significant negative impacts of road
deterioration on accessing health services.
A common criticism of most of the studies referred above is related to their
methodological designs, which prevents them from assessing clear causal links between road
construction, rehabilitation and maintenance and the different impact indicators. Frequently,
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these studies just show associations between a greater provision of transport infrastructure and
reduced transport costs, increased access to markets and public services, or even greater economic
growth and lower poverty rates, without controlling properly for other covariates that might be
having an effect on the linkages under analysis. In some other cases, control variables are
incorporated, but this is not done systematically enough to allow the construction of a
counterfactual scenario, required by any serious causal study seeking to make such causal claims.
Only a few studies have moved forward in the direction of constructing counterfactual
scenarios. Ahmed and Hossain (1990) carried out the first study that sought to systematically
control for the most important covariates in order to estimate the impact of rehabilitated rural
infrastructure. With a sample of 129 villages in Bangladesh, this study finds that villages with
better road access have greater agricultural output, greater total incomes and better indicators
of access to health services, in particular in the case of women. This study also finds evidence
that suggests that roads would have increased wage income opportunities, especially for those
who have no farmland.
The study by Binswanger, et al. (1993) is also pioneering in this effort of constructing
counterfactual scenarios to study the welfare impact of rural infrastructure. Using time series
information in a random sample of 85 districts from 13 States in India, it shows that road
infrastructure investment fostered agricultural output growth, higher usage of fertilizers and a
larger credit supply. This study presents a conceptual framework that is helpful to overcome
simultaneity problems created when assessing the causal relations between infrastructure
investment and other variables of interest. To avoid the correlation of non-observable variables
with each district’s infrastructure endowment - which would bias impact estimates - Binswanger,
et al. (1993) implicitly construct a counterfactual scenario based on a random selection of districts.
Levy (1996) carried out another study in the same line, assessing the socioeconomic
impacts of road rehabilitation based on a sample of four rural roads in Morocco, comparing
pre-existing and post-rehabilitation conditions. To control for context covariates, different to
rehabilitation itself, which could have affected the outcome, Levy (1996) compares the data
on the performance of these four rehabilitated rural roads with that of two non-rehabilitated
roads. From this ‘before-after’ and ‘with-without’ comparison, the study finds that the impacts
from rural road rehabilitation were much more important than the expected reduction in transport
costs, showing significant increases in agricultural output as well as important changes in the
crops portfolio and usage of inputs and technologies. In addition, the study identifies very
clear causal linkages between rehabilitated road infrastructure and access to education,
particularly for girls, as well as a substantial increase in the use of public health services.
Although this is a case study, which does not pretend to be representative of a wider area, in
methodological terms it does manage construct sufficiently solid counterfactual scenarios to
move forward in establishing causal relations between rural roads investment and key variables
associated with rural household’s welfare.
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In the same line, research work done by Bakht (2000) for Bangladesh, comparing rehabilitated
roads to ‘controls’, finds considerable expansion in passenger and freight traffic and reductions
in transport costs. However, Bakht (2000) falls short of assessing impacts on welfare of
beneficiary households, as he does not construct a counterfactual scenario in which households
located in non-rehabilitated roads possess characteristics comparable to those of households
located near rehabilitated roads.
Finally, using the same primary database used in this study, Cuánto (2000) shows, for
the case of Peru, a set of indicators of the benefits that the national program of road rehabilitation
and maintenance would have had on beneficiary rural households after its three-year
implementation (1996-1999). In doing so, the study by Cuánto (2000) compares beneficiary
households and towns - located near roads rehabilitated by this public program - with households
and towns located in comparable rural roads, which had not been served by the program, and
finds important reductions in passenger and freight transport costs as well as increases in
access to key social services. However, due to not having appropriate ‘controls’ as much as
problems of the data - which will be discussed in the following section -, Cuánto (2000) does
not make the most of the existence of potential ‘controls’ to assess rigorously the impact of
road rehabilitation on beneficiary households’ welfare. Precisely, moving forward towards
this purpose will be the focus of the remaining sections of this chapter.
8. 3. Data and methodology
This chapter tries to measure the impact of rural road rehabilitation on household welfare,
focusing on two key indicators: household per capita consumption and household per capita
income. This is done by comparing the welfare level of households living near rehabilitated
rural roads with an estimate of the welfare level these same households would have should the
rehabilitation had not been implemented. Since this estimate is constructed based on the
information provided by households living near non-rehabilitated rural roads, the precision of
this impact assessment depends critically on how comparable are both types of households -
those living near rehabilitated roads (treated households) and those living near non-rehabilitated
roads (potential control households) -.
This section describes the source and characteristics of the information used, as well as
the methodology applied to estimate the impact of rural road rehabilitation on the average
welfare of treated households. As previously mentioned, this impact measurement focuses on
three indicators: (a) household per capita income level; (b) household per capita income
composition - considering four possible sources of income: agricultural self-employment
income -, agricultural wage income, non-agricultural self-employment income and non-
agricultural wage income; and (c) household per capita consumption level.
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8. 3.1.The data
The information used in this study comes from a set of household surveys and town-level
surveys (i.e. addressed to local authorities, police stations, magistrate’s courts and businesses),
regarding socioeconomic characteristics for the former and provision of public services and
socioeconomic characteristics for the latter. These surveys were carried out during March
2000, as part of the impact evaluation of the first phase of the current Peruvian Government’s
rural roads rehabilitation program, as reported by Cuánto (2000).
The Rural Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance Program (PCR) is part of a national
project of road infrastructure rehabilitation (Proyecto Especial de Rehabilitación de la
Infraestructura de Transporte), which was implemented since 1996 and regarded as a key
component of the strategy to reduce rural poverty in Peru. Although PCR’s program activities
essentially involved the rehabilitation of rural roads - non-motorized and motorized -,
complementary activities included strengthening the organizational and management capacities
of local micro-scale enterprises responsible for the maintenance of the rehabilitated motorized
rural roads.
The area of influence of the program includes rural areas of 314 districts with high
poverty rates, belonging to 12 from the 24 departments in Peru (Cajamarca, Ancash,
Huancavelica, Huánuco, Junín, Pasco, Apurímac, Ayacucho, Cusco, Puno, Madre de Dios
and San Martín). These departments continue to be served at present by the second phase of
the program, which started at the end of 2001, with the aim of ensuring the institutional and
financial sustainability of maintenance activities, which will gradually become a responsibility
of the respective local governments.
The surveys gathered information from 2,038 households, distributed among 384 towns;
1,150 surveyed households live in road sections rehabilitated by the PCR and 888 live in road
sections non-rehabilitated by PCR. On this regard, it is worth mentioning some characteristics
of the selection process for each group of households in the survey.1 On the one hand, the
selection process of households living near road sections rehabilitated by PCR, was at random
and three-staged, with systematic selection for the first stage, probability proportional to town
size for the second stage, and random selection for the third stage.  In addition, for those
households living in motorized roads, the selection process was stratified by geographic domain.
Within this sample design, rehabilitated road sections were selected in the first stage, towns in
the second stage (two, or in some cases three, towns per road section selected in the first
stage), and households in the third stage (between four and six households per town selected
in the second stage). In this way, 74 motorized road sections and 16 non-motorized road
sections were selected. On the other hand, information from households and towns located in
road sections that did not benefit from PCR activities was also gathered as a complement,
1 This process was followed separately for each type of road: motorized and non-motorized.
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with the purpose of using them as a control group during program evaluation. Consequently,
the selection process of this second group of households was not at random. In particular, the
evaluators sought that each control road section (non-rehabilitated by PCR) was similar to
one treated road section (rehabilitated by PCR) in agro-climatic conditions (like altitude),
hierarchy of the towns connected by the road (province or district capitals), road’s function
(connection to the same secondary road), distance to commercial circuits, and type of road
(motorized or non-motorized).
Despite the existence of these road section matching criteria, the sample included
inadvertently, as a part of the control group, households that had access to rehabilitated roads,
as far as such rehabilitation had not been implemented as part of the PCR program. Obviously,
these control households accessing rehabilitated roads could bias the PCR’s impact assessment.
In particular, 34 percent of control households located in non-motorized road sections and 38
percent of control households located in motorized road sections reported having benefited
from road rehabilitation activities, carried out by NGOs working in the area, their municipalities
or other public institutions.
To overcome this problem, we modified the data structure originally set out by the
program evaluators - pairs of road sections of rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated by PCR -
Cuánto (2000) to account for other rehabilitation programs. Thus, for the purpose of this study
treated households are those located in rehabilitated road sections (be that by PCR or any
other institution), and the group of potential controls are households located in road sections
that did not benefit from any rehabilitation work. It is worth mentioning that while maintenance
activities do take place in the case of motorized roads rehabilitated by the PCR, it was not
possible to establish if similar actions took place on the roads rehabilitated by other institutions
- non-motorized or motorized -. Table 8.1 shows the distribution of households and towns
classified by state of the road section (rehabilitated or non-rehabilitated) and type of road
(non-motorized and motorized).
We found systematic biases in key socioeconomic variables between the two groups,
the potentially control households and the treated households. These biases alerted us about
the need to establish appropriate controls before the estimation of the average effect of road
rehabilitation. These systematic differences are discussed in detail in Section 8.4. In the reminder
of this section, we concentrate on the methodology used to isolate such differences and hence
be able to estimate, in the most precise way, the effects of road rehabilitation.
8.3.2. Methodology
The choice of the methodology employed to evaluate the welfare impact of road rehabilitation
on rural households was based on the outcome parameter of interest - the mean effect of road
rehabilitation on treated households’ welfare - as well as on the specific characteristics of the
available data.
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Table 8.1 Distribution of the sample
(for households and towns)
State of the Road
Type of Road Total
Non-Rehabilitated Rehabilitated
Non-Motorized rural road
Households 106 214 320
Towns 21 43 64
Motorized rural road
Households 307 1411 1718
Towns 62 258 320
Total - households 413 1625 2038
Total - towns 83 301 384
Source: Own estimates
The need to estimate a population parameter such as the average welfare effect of
rehabilitation on the treated households in a non-experimental design framework, led us to
choice the methodological framework proposed by the literature on matching, in particular,
propensity score matching, widely used for non-experimental studies such as this one. This
methodological framework allows an efficient use of information from households with access
to non-rehabilitated roads (potential controls) to construct an estimate of the welfare level of
treated households if the road section they access would had not been rehabilitated. The
methodology detailed below is essentially based on studies by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
and Heckman, et al. (1998), as well as on Heckman, et al. (1999) comprehensive review of
evaluation methodologies for public projects.
Due to the characteristics of the available information, it was necessary to make some
adjustments within this methodological framework. In this regard, two characteristics from
the data laid down the guidelines for this adjustment:
a) The information provided by households is not representative at a town level.-  This
fact has direct implications on delineating the methodology, particularly on the election
of the analysis unit, for two reasons: (a) the mean effect of road rehabilitation on rural
households welfare can not be assessed at a town level (level at which the probability
of accessing a rehabilitated road is defined); and (b) matching households according to
the probability of access to a rehabilitated road can not be based on characteristics of
surveyed households, but rather on the town in which they live.
b) The information available is cross-sectional, and was gathered after road rehabilitation.-
The lack of a base line - allowing analysis of household welfare changes - and, in
particular, the lack of longitudinal information of households from both groups before
road rehabilitation, rules out the possibility of using a more precise estimator than that
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available for cross-sectional information, particularly the difference-in-difference
estimator.2
The methodology applied in this study, in consideration of the above, includes some
adjustments to propensity score matching standard methodology for cross-sectional data of
the kind available here.
First of all, the objective of this study is to estimate the welfare of a household in a
hypothetical scenario, different from that one in which it actually is. That is, answering the
question: what would the welfare level be if road rehabilitation had not taken place? In principle,
once this indicator is estimated, it is possible to establish the welfare gains derived from road
rehabilitation, which would be given by the difference between the reported welfare level
from an intervention scenario and the estimated welfare level in a non-intervention scenario.
However, it is worth emphasizing that due to the impossibility of simultaneously observing
any particular individual in both states (intervention and non-intervention), literature on
matching agrees on using as appropriate level of analysis that of population aggregates, while
recognizing the impossibility of constructing any impact estimates at the individual level. In
this sense, the indicator that this study aims at estimating is the mean welfare effect of
rehabilitation on treated households:
Rehabilitation effect on treated households = E ( Y
1i
 | d
i
=1 )  -  E ( Y
0 i
 | d
i
=1 ) (1)
where d
i
=1 indicates the group to which household i belongs in the observed scenario: the
treated group. The first component on the right hand side of the equation (1) indicates the
welfare expected value for treated households in scenario 1, in which rehabilitation was carried
out [Y
1i
 represents per capita income (or consumption) for household i in scenario 1, the
observed scenario]. Likewise, the second component represents the welfare expected value
for these same households in an alternative scenario: scenario 0, in which rehabilitation was
not carried out [Y
0i
 represents the per capita income (or consumption) for household i en this
scenario 0, a hypothetical scenario]. Evidently, this second component is non-observable,
since a household can only experiment one state of nature at a time.
This unobservable component may be constructed drawing information from the group
of households living in non-rehabilitated road sections (d
i
=0). If an experimental design, in
which potentially beneficiary households of rehabilitation efforts were randomly selected were
available, it would be possible to make a direct comparison between welfare indicators of
treated and control groups because the distribution of possible outcomes for treated and control
households would be the same in each alternative scenario (Y
0
 in the non-intervention scenario
2 Smith and Todd (2000) assess the performance of cross-section and longitudinal matching estimators and conclude
that the most robust estimator is the difference-in-difference estimator, as it eliminates bias sources that are invariable
along time. However, this estimator requires longitudinal information, not available for this study.
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and Y
1
 in the intervention one). Therefore, under an experimental design, the expected value
for treated households in the non-intervention scenario (the non-observable component) would
be the same as the expected value for the control households in the non-intervention scenario
(an observable component). However, the available information does not have these
characteristics. Therefore, it is necessary to make ex post adjustments to ensure comparability
between the group of households living near non-rehabilitated rural roads (potential controls)
and the group living near rehabilitated roads (treated).
Following the methodology proposed by Heckman, et al. (1998), this adjustment is
applied over a set of characteristics X. Such adjustment should ensure that the distribution of
the indicator Y
0
 (i.e. per capita income of any household if road rehabilitation does not take
place) within a subgroup of households - defined by their closeness in X - is the same for the
group of households living near non-rehabilitated roads as the distribution would be observed
for treated households group if rehabilitation had not taken place. That is:
E ( Y
0i
 | d
i
=1, X ) = E ( Y
0i
 | d
i
=0, X ) (2)
To ensure that both sides of this expression are well defined simultaneously, we need to
condition these expected values on a support region, over the set of characteristics X, common to
both groups (treated and potential controls). In this way, the outcomes obtained by those
households (from both groups) that belong to this common support will be comparable. Once we
control over the set of characteristics X, that defines the support region common to both groups,
it is possible to estimate the average outcome of the treated group – if it had not got access to a
rehabilitated rural road - by calculating the average outcome of the group of potential controls
(weighting each control household according to its closeness in X to each treated household).
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), it is possible to reduce the dimensionality of
the common support’s definition problem through the estimation of a propensity score, which
reflects the conditional probability of participating in the program (for this study, the conditional
probability of accessing a rehabilitated rural road), given the vector of characteristics X:
Pr(d=1 | X) = Pr(X) (3)
By incorporating the contribution of these authors and following the conceptual
framework proposed by Heckman, et al. (1998), it is possible establishing that if the distribution
of Y
0
 is independent of the conditional distribution of d on X, within the common support
defined on the set of characteristics X, the distribution of Y
0
 is also independent of the conditional
distribution of d on Pr(X) (within the referred common support).
Following the proposed methodological framework, one of the main tasks of this study
lies in finding a set of characteristics X that allows the construction of a common support
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within which both groups are comparable. Typically, these characteristics are those that influence
households’ probability to access a rehabilitated road, in such a way that it is possible to find
households with similar probabilities, and so be able to replicate the randomness associated
with experimental designs.
In the context of this chapter, these characteristics are defined at town-level. That is,
the probability of accessing a rehabilitated road is the same for all households that belong to a
town located in a rehabilitated road section. In this sense, it is town characteristics what is
relevant to construct the propensity score. If a representative number of households at town-
level were available, it would be possible to define households’ welfare indicators at that
aggregation level, in which case the mean effect of rehabilitation could be adequately assessed
at town level. However, given that the survey’s sample design only considered an average of
four to six households per town, it is not possible to pretend statistical representativeness at
that level. In consequence, it is necessary to establish two levels of analysis; on the one hand,
the town level, at which the common support is defined and the probability for each household
of the sample (treated or potential control) of accessing a rehabilitated road section is estimated.
On the other hand, an analysis at a household level is established, at which the average outcome
of road rehabilitation is measured (the welfare indicator, over which the rehabilitation effect is
estimated, is determined at this level).
The empirical specification of this study followed three stages: (1) Construction of the
common support; (2) Construction of the outcome variables to be assessed (households’ per
capita income or consumption, controlled by assets possession); and (3) Households matching
(based on the common support) and calculation of the means difference between the treated
and control groups. Next, we describe each of these stages:
First Stage. In this stage the common support is defined; i.e. the probability of a town
of accessing a rehabilitated road is estimated (propensity score), and the number of observations
to be incorporated in the evaluation is restricted depending on the intersection of the access
probability range of both treated and control groups. The probability of accessing a rehabilitated
road is the common support’s summary indicator, that is, a one-dimensional indicator that
reflects the multidimensional space of those characteristics that influence on whether or not
the road to which the town access has been rehabilitated. In that sense, this probability estimate
(propensity score) incorporates different kinds of variables that could have influenced the
decision of a third-party (or the community itself) to rehabilitate the road section that reaches
the town. These variables include variables like the community’s organizational capacity,
indicators of town’s economic activity, provision of education and health public services in
the town, size of the town, length of road section, or geographical domain within which the
town is located.
Second Stage. One of the study’s distinctive features lies on the fact that its analysis
unit is the household and not the town (level at which the probability of accessing a rehabilitated
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road is defined). It is worth pointing out that in this study the differences in characteristics
between the treated households group and the potential controls group are statistically significant
(these differences are detailed in the results section below). This implies that the critical variables
that ensure comparability between households, regarding the measured welfare indicator, are
not related solely to the household probability of accessing to a rehabilitated road. In fact, this
probability depends on the town’s characteristics, and - given the lack of household
representativeness at a town level - it is, for all practical purpose, a probability independent
from observed differences between households within towns. Therefore, it is obvious that the
household matching methodology - which works under the propensity score closeness criterion
- is not sufficient to construct a counterfactual scenario for treated households, as this indicator
is not sensitive to the differences among households characteristics (characteristics that influence
the assessed welfare level). Since it is not possible to overcome this problem by incorporating
the individual household characteristics in the propensity score estimate, it was necessary to
construct a welfare indicator that could isolate the differences in individual household
characteristics between both groups (treated and potential controls). This welfare indicator,
controlled by household individual characteristics, is the variable to be evaluated in the third
stage of the study.  The details related to how this indicator was constructed can be seen in
Annex A8.1 at the end of this chapter.
Third Stage. The last stage consisted in matching households living near rehabilitated
road sections to those living in non-rehabilitated sections, according to their closeness within
the common support; and proceeding next to calculate the difference between average outcomes
-controlled by differences in assets possession - of both groups. Matching the welfare outcomes
of both groups, controlled by assets possession, allows adequately balance both household
samples with regards to observable characteristics, which as indicated by Heckman, et al.
(1997) - in the context of job training programs - constitutes the main concern in estimating
the mean effect of a program. These authors point-out the relatively small importance of
differences in non-observables in biasing the mean outcome estimator, when compared to the
differences in observables between both samples.
Regarding the matching process, it is worth noting that there are basically two options
available: one-to-one matching and smoothed matching. 3  In both cases, the role of each
observation of the potential controls in the construction of the counterfactual scenario is defined
according to the propensity score obtained in the first stage. The practical difference is that
one-to-one matching uses only one control observation for each treatment (the observation
showing the propensity score closest to the treatment observation), while the smoothed matching
constructs a counterfactual observation, for each treated individual, according to all control
observations belonging to the common support, weighting each control observation according
3 See Heckman, et al. (1998), Heckman, et al (1999), and Sianesi (2001).
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to its closeness to the treated household. It is important to note that in econometric terms, the
first option allows minimizing the bias, while the second privileges efficiency.
In this study, considering the characteristics of the available data, the smoothed matching
option was chosen. In particular, the main problem to be faced was the scarce number of
control observations for each treatment; expecting, on the other hand, that potential bias
problems would be less important, as the selection of control road sections was done under
criteria that look after similar road sections in both groups.
It is worth noting that the smoothed matching option was used for both groups, i.e. the
income (consumption) observations - controlled by differences in assets possessions - used to
calculate the mean effect of rehabilitation for those households belonging to the common
support, are constructed both to estimate the mean outcome of the control group as well as to
the estimate the mean outcome of the treatment group. Therefore, matching allows estimating
the effect of rehabilitation, using:
• Households on non-rehabilitated road sections belonging to the common support, to
construct fictitious observations that allow estimating the controls’ mean effects.
• Households on rehabilitated road sections belonging to the common support, to construct
fictitious observations that allow estimating treated’s mean effects Finally, it should be
mentioned that the construction of the confidence interval of the mean effect of rehabilitation
is done by means of a bootstrapping procedure, which allows incorporating the propensity
score estimation error in the standard error of the estimated outcome effect (Sianesi, 2001).
8.4 Results
As mentioned in the previous section, in order to be able to estimate the mean effect of rural
roads rehabilitation, it is necessary to ensure comparability between the control household group
and the treated household group, regarding individual and group characteristics (different to
rehabilitation) that could have influenced the observed outcome. Table 8.2 shows the summary
statistics for both samples. This table helps us to evaluate the comparability of both households
groups - treated and potential controls - for each type of rural road (motorized and non-motorized),
focusing on those characteristics that influence the welfare level experienced by a household. In
particular, Table 8.2 shows the most important unbalances between both household groups from
a one-dimensional perspective (variable by variable). Here, the statistical significance of
differences in household individual characteristics is presented (with regard to average possession
of human capital, organizational, physical and public assets). In addition, the statistical significance
of differences in town-level characteristics is also depicted (with regard to indicators of the
community organizational capacity, town economic activity, endowment of public goods and
services, length of the road section reaching the town, among others).
The statistical significance of the means difference test between characteristics of treated
and non-treated households allows showing, in a simple way, the need for establishing controls
Chapter 8
184
in order to balance both samples - and then be able to use information from non-treated
households in the construction of the counterfactual scenario -. What follows are some examples
of household characteristics that, given the systematic differences between treated and potential
controls, could introduce distortions in the estimation of the average effect of rehabilitation if
they are not adequately controlled.
First, Table 8.2 shows that surveyed households living in towns articulated to non-
rehabilitated roads have greater access to basic public services. This outcome is the same
when accessibility to public services is assessed both based on household reports as well as
reports obtained at a town level. For instance, households of the potential control group have
more access to drinking water and electricity, whether they are connected through motorized
or non-motorized roads. In the case of non-motorized roads, the potential control group, they
also report a greater access to sanitation. In addition, human capital indicators show statistically
significant differences favoring households in non-rehabilitated rural roads. In particular, in
non-motorized roads, households articulated to non-rehabilitated sections have greater access
to secondary school education services, while for the non-motorized case, residents from non-
rehabilitated road sections report a higher average years of education for household members
- excluding the household head - than those reported for treated households. The verification
of these differences suggests the need for establishing controls that allow isolating the effects
of a differential endowment of public assets and human capital on the welfare of treated and
non-treated households, in order to make efficient use of the information about the welfare
level of control households as estimators of the counterfactual scenario. The intuition behind
this result is as follows: if it is accepted that greater accessibility to public goods and services
raises complementary public investment profitability (road rehabilitation in this case), or that
higher levels of education in the household offers more profitable income generation
opportunities, a direct comparison of the welfare level between both groups (treated and non-
treated) would be strongly underestimating the benefits of road rehabilitation activities.
On the other hand, there is a set of productive assets (like farmland, livestock, and
transport goods) that are significantly larger in households located in rehabilitated rural roads.
In this case, the potential bias would move in the opposite direction to that described in the
previous paragraph, as households with greater productive resources could accrue additional
benefits as a result of rehabilitation in contrast with those with smaller endowment of farmland,
livestock or transport goods. Finally, there are assets categories like human capital’s
demographics (i.e. size of the household, or age) or organizational capital, both at a household
and town level, where results are mixed.
To address this lack of comparability between households from rehabilitated rural roads
and households from non-rehabilitated rural roads, the three-stages of analysis detailed in the
previous section were carried out. In particular, the propensity score estimate was constructed
according to town-level variables before the rehabilitation took place like organizational
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Number of households 106 214 307 1411
Number of towns 21 43 62 258
Human capital (household level)
Household size 5.1 4.9 5.1 5.0
Gender of head-of-household (% Male) 84.9% 92.1% ** 89.5% 89.7%
Age of head-of-household 47.0 44.0 ** 45.6 43.8 **
Mother tongue of head-of-household (% Native) 56.6% 65.9% * 38.4% 45.7% ***
Years of education of head-of-household 6.3 6.5 7.3 7.2
Average years of education of other members 4.7 4.1 * 4.8 4.7
Organizational capital (household level)
Sent or received remittences (last 12 months) 39.6% 32.7% 37.8% 33.4% *
Monthly occurrences of social and community 0.5 0.8 * 0.8 0.8
activities (average per member)
Physical capital (household level)  2/
Privately owned house 81.1% 85.5% 83.4% 81.3%
House’s wall: wood 0.9% 0.6% 1.0% 6.1% ***
House’s roof: tile, tatched roof, or bamboo 43.4% 35.0% * 43.0% 37.8% **
Value of durable goods (US dollars) 128.9 81.3 *** 147.4 138.3
Value of transport goods (US dollars) 109.4 202.6 ** 188.8 189.0
Hectares of farmland (irrigated land equivalent) 1.6 3.6 *** 4.3 5.7 **
Value of the cattle (US dollars at baseline prices) 562.3 907.7 *** 664.1 839.3 **
Public capital (household level)
Access to electricity 44.3% 29.4% *** 55.0% 48.3% *
Acces to water: connected to public network 52.8% 40.7% ** 62.9% 56.3% *
Sanitation services: connected to public network 11.3% 8.6% 18.4% 16.4%
Sanitation services: septic or cess tank 47.2% 33.5% *** 46.8% 47.9%
Number of public programs accessed
by the household 4.4 4.9 *** 4.9 4.9
Infrastructure and socio-economic
indicators (town level)
Public Telephone 23.8% 11.6% 33.9% 27.1%
Community premise or club 66.7% 39.5% *** 50.0% 47.3%
Irrigation Canal 42.9% 20.9% ** 53.2% 47.3%
Community Assembly 71.4% 72.1% 74.2% 82.9% *
Local government premise 52.4% 48.8% 71.0% 67.1%
Primary school 90.5% 81.4% 93.5% 93.8%
Secondary school 33.3% 37.2% 69.4% 54.7% **
Business premises (per 100 inhabitants) 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.6 **
Credit institution 19.0% 20.9% 25.8% 29.1%
Police Station 14.3% 16.3% 43.5% 46.0%
Population 1,271.0 653.2 * 2,198.9 1,683.9
Length of the relevant road sections (km) 9.7 11.3 12.6 21.3 ***
Altitude (m.a.s.l.) 3263.8 3193.8 2613.4 2662.5
Road accessibility indicators (town level)
Percent variation of freight rates (US dollars/Kg) -2.8% -9.0% **
Percent variation of travel time
along the road section -3.8% -11.5% ** -11.5% -35.8% ***
1/ Significant at: * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level
2/  Exchange rate: 3.456 Nuevos Soles per US dollar
Source: Own estimates
Table 8.2 Summary statistics of main variables
(Mean values and statistical significance of their differences)
Variable
Non-Motorized rural road 1/ Motorized rural road 1/
Non- Non-
Rehabilitated Rehabilitated Rehabilitated Rehabilitated
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capacity variables (if the town had a community assembly, existence of water association,
local government office), economic activity indicators (number of commercial or productive
businesses per each 100 residents, average income of these businesses, credit availability),
access to public services, primary and secondary schools, road length, town size, and
geographical domain in which it is located.
Table 8.3 reports the estimates of the probit regression where the binary outcome takes
the value one if the town has access to a rehabilitated road and zero otherwise. The selection
of variables incorporated to each one of the estimations (for both non-motorized and motorized
roads) privileged the modeling criterion versus the statistical significance criterion. Thus, we
modeled the town’s probability of having its road section rehabilitated. Based on the propensity
scores estimates, it was possible to construct the common support region for both types of
households (treated and potential controls). In this process, 96 households from non-motorized
roads and 44 households from motorized roads were dropped from the sample, because they
fall outside the common support. These observations represent 30 percent and 3 percent of the
originally available sample of households from non-motorized and motorized sections,
respectively.
Finally, the construction of the welfare indicators to be evaluated required - as mentioned
earlier -establishing several controls over the indicators originally reported by households.
Those controls were based on parameters estimated by semi-logarithmic regressions of income
and consumption levels. It is worth noting that in the case of income composition, a Tobit
estimation was used for each income source indicator (agricultural self-employment income,
agricultural wage income, non-agricultural self-employment income, and non-agricultural wage
income), each of which was expressed in logarithms. In this case, the same set of variables
was used on the regressions estimated for each income source.
The variables used to control for the differences in assets possession between both
groups of households, reflect each household’s endowment in terms of (i) human capital:
household size, age, gender, mother tongue and years of education of the head-of-household,
average years of education of the household members; (ii) organizational capital: money
remittances - received or sent by the household -, monthly average of household participation
in social or communal activities; (iii) physical capital: house property status, characteristics of
the walls, roof and floor of the house, value of durable goods and transport goods, farmland
size, and value of livestock; (iv) financial capital: presence of credit institutions in the town
where the household lives; and (v) public capital: access and connection mode to public services
like electricity, water and sanitation services. Since this study evaluates the short-term impact
of rural roads rehabilitation, it seems reasonable to consider these variables as exogenous. It is
worth pointing out that the selection criteria for variables incorporated in each regression
were both, economic relevance - to identify the initial set - and statistical significance, as it
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was sought to establish controls that allowed us to make compatible both samples - treated
households and potential controls -. In this respect, it was verified that the signs of the relations
between individual characteristics and welfare indicators were intuitively reasonable4.
Variable Motorized Non-motorized
road road
Length of the road (km) 0.056 *** 0.046 *
(0.011) (0.025)
Town has a tourist attraction -0.156 -1.229 **
(0.206) (0.625)
Population (inhabitants) 0.000 -0.001 **
(0.000) (0.000)
Town has a police station -0.036 1.245 **
(0.223) (0.622)
Number of business units (per 100 hab) a 0.192 *** -0.963 ***
(0.072) (0.295)
Town has communal facilities -0.246 -1.440 ***
(0.174) (0.512)
Towns has some irrigation infrastructure -0.184 -1.649 ***
(0.215) (0.540)
In the Town operates a community assembly 0.327 0.979 *
(0.237) (0.527)
In the Town operates a municipal government 0.296
(0.236)
Town has a primary school 0.376
(0.361)
Town has a secondary school -0.583 ** 0.998 **
(0.241) (0.413)
Town has a credit institution -0.140 1.265 *
(0.221) (0.676)
Town has a titling and registry office -0.110
(0.208)
Town located in the central highlands -0.387 -1.223 **
(0.254) (0.549)
Constant -0.386 2.197 ***
(0.485) (0.636)
Number of Observations 1718 320
Wald chi2(14) 37.650 26.120
Prob > chi2 0.001 0.006
Pseudo R2 0.239 0.363
Log likelihood -613.8897 -129.4290
Note: number in parenthesis are the robust standard errors.
*** Significant at 1% level,  ** Significant al 5% level,  * Significant at 10% level
a These business units include manufacturing units or business that may provide transport communication, trade, personal or
community services.
Source: Own estimates
Table 8.3 Probit regression for access to a rehabilitated rural road
(Household-level estimates)
4 Estimated equations used to construct the simulated income and consumption outcome variables are available
upon request.
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The following subsection presents the results obtained from the estimation of the effects
of road rehabilitation on the annual per capita income - level and composition - and the annual
per capita consumption of households accessing such rehabilitated roads.
8.4.1 The impact of rural roads rehabilitation on households
income level and composition
Rural roads rehabilitation may affect the income of the beneficiary population through different
mechanisms. Firstly, reductions in transport costs and transaction costs - triggered by the
rehabilitation of rural roads - may increase the supply of agricultural products that are brought
into the market or the effective price paid to the farmer, any of which would result in increases
of agricultural income. However, as income generation opportunities may also increase, the
benefited economic agents could substitute agricultural self-employment income for other
income sources that have greater profitability or just become available after road rehabilitation.
For example, rural households could increase their non-agricultural self-employment income
by producing handicrafts, or increase their participation in agricultural or non-agricultural
labor markets. Besides, since road rehabilitation may allow the introduction of cheaper products
into the local market, competing with local agricultural production, this substitution of income
sources could be even greater. As shown by various authors reviewed in Section 8.2, the
recomposition of agricultural income resulting from a greater and better access to any
infrastructure will depend on the structure of private assets like education, available farmland,
access to credit, among others, as well as on the presence (or absence) of complementary
public infrastructure (i.e. electricity, telecommunications), which might increase (or diminish)
the expected impacts. At an aggregate level, changes in labor supply and demand might also
affect the local salary structure, especially if the road affects a labor market that was much less
dynamic before the rehabilitation took place.
In conclusion, the effects of road rehabilitation on income structure cannot be known a
priori, remaining an essentially empirical issue. In this study, by using the propensity score
matching technique, we have constructed a counterfactual scenario - which methodological
details have been referred in the previous section - that made it possible to compare the income
level and composition of households who benefited from the road rehabilitation with the
expected income they would have had in the hypothetical scenario, in which no rehabilitation
would have taken place. The results presented in Table 8.4 clearly show that, for the motorized
road case, the rehabilitation allowed beneficiaries to get over a US$ 120 increase in annual per
capita income. This increase is statistically significant and amounts to more than 35 percent of
the control households’ average income. In the case of non-motorized roads, the increase is
smaller and not statistically significant. This difference in welfare impact between households
articulated to product and factor markets through motorized roads and households articulated
through non-motorized roads is consistent with what was posed by Jalan and Ravallion (2002).
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Although comparability between households located near rehabilitated roads and households
located near non-rehabilitated roads is ensured by the methodology applied here, it is important
noting that households that access markets through motorized roads have in average higher
education, larger extents of farmland, and greater accessibility to complementary public
infrastructure - like telephone, electricity, drinking water and sanitation - than households
living near non-motorized roads. It is likely that the complementarities between these assets
and the rehabilitated road could explain the greater welfare increases observed in the group of
households articulated through motorized roads.
It is interesting to note that the breakdown of the estimated difference in outcomes
between rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated motorized rural roads, following equation (2),
suggests that the impact of rehabilitation is due mainly to differences in returns to assets that
those households possess, rather than to differences in non-observables characteristics. Table
8.4 shows that 88.5 percent of the difference in outcomes can be accounted for by the difference
in returns to assets. The fact that non-observables account for a small share of the differences
in outcomes can be viewed as a complementary indicator of a reasonable econometric
specification of the simulation model used to control for differences in assets holdings between
those living near rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated motorized roads.
The results also suggest that the road rehabilitation would have allowed for important
increases in non-agricultural wage incomes. This evidence is consistent with that reported by
Corral and Reardon (2001) for Nicaragua and by De Janvry and Sadoulet (2001)for Mexico. In
the case of Peru, areas that have poor road access have a very restricted labor market. Under this
condition, wage income represents a very small fraction of total income. Starting from such a
small base, road rehabilitation would have accounted for only moderate increase in wage income,
but this increase would be substantial if compared to wage income that existed before
rehabilitation: non-agricultural wage income would have more that doubled both in motorized
roads as in non-motorized roads. Data from Table 8.4 also shows that increases in non-agricultural
wage income for those households articulated to markets through non-motorized rural roads
would have occurred at the expense of non-agricultural self-employment activities (mainly
Outcome Variable
Non-motorized rural road Motorized rural road
Estimated effect Standard error Estimated effect Standard error
Agricultural self-employment -1.8% 5.2% -7.8% a 4.1%
Agricultural wage employment 4.4% 6.9% -0.6% 4.4%
Non-agricultural self-employment -9.6% 14.3% -5.8% 6.4%
Non-agricultural wage employment 9.1% 9.4% 8.8% * 4.1%
Note: Bootstrapped Standard Errors based on 200 replications of the data with 100% sampling
*** Significant at 1% level,  ** Significant al 5% level,  * Significant at 10% level
a Significant at 11% level
Source: Own estimates
Table 8.4 Effect of road rehabilitation on the probability of accessing labor markets
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associated to handicraft manufacture and retail commerce activities). However, in the case of
motorized roads, the increase of non-agricultural wage income is achieved without a decrease of
the other income sources; even more, a marginal increase of agricultural wage income was
observed. The fact that we observe a ‘trade-off’ between income sources in non-motorized roads
but this pattern does not appear in motorized roads could be attributed to either higher prices or
lower costs in self-employment income sources or, in the case of wage income sources, to a
greater access to higher valued job opportunities after rehabilitation.
These income increases resulting from road rehabilitation could be due to a greater
accessibility to labor markets, i.e. to the appearance of new job opportunities, or alternatively
to increased wage income among those who were already carrying out activities in the labor
market. Table 8.5 shows an estimate of the increase in the probability of accessing the labor
market because of rehabilitation. Since the analysis unit is the household, estimated increases
refer to households that before rehabilitation did not have access to such market. Results seem
to indicate that the appearance of new job opportunities would only be happening for non-
agricultural wage-employment in those areas articulated to markets through rehabilitated
motorized roads. A comparison between these results and the estimated income increases
shown in Table 8.4, suggests that for the case of non-motorized roads, larger incomes from
non-agricultural wage-employment and non-agricultural self-employment sources would be
associated with increases in the time allocated to such activities, rather than to the appearance
of new job opportunities for households that were not previously linked to the labor markets.
In the case of the increase registered for non-agricultural wage income, for those households
articulated to markets through motorized roads, the fact that the change in the probability of
accessing the labor market is statistically significant suggests that this market would have
become much more dynamic because of rehabilitation. Thus, not only wage income
opportunities among those who were already articulated to the labor market had been increased,
but also road rehabilitation would have increased the probability of new individuals to access
the labor market. In addition, it is worth noting that there would be complementary evidence
in the data that suggests that agricultural and non-agricultural wages in markets around
rehabilitated areas are not higher than what they would be if rehabilitation had not taken place.
This evidence is consistent with findings by Jacoby (2000) who identifies a significant but
very weak correlation between agricultural wages and market distance. Thus, the benefits
from a greater labor market insertion would rather come from a change in time allocated to
waged and self-employed activities than from an increase in wages resulting from an
improvement in road infrastructure.
8.4.2 Impact on consumption and savings
How much the estimated income expansion does translates into an increase in consumption?
The results reported in Table 8.6 may seem a bit disconcerting. By comparing the annual per
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Why did the significant increase in income estimated for the case of motorized roads
would not have translated to an increase in consumption?  Table 8.7 shows the estimated
changes resulting from rehabilitation, reflected in the main saving mechanism of these
economies, and suggests an explanation that may reconcile these differences. The literature
on savings has documented extensively that livestock is the main savings channel in Latin
American rural economies.5 In rural Peru, and especially in the area under study, the limited
development of the financial market makes of livestock and food stocks - and to some extent
durable goods - the main savings mechanisms for rural households. The purchase, breeding
and sale of livestock are the mechanisms used by these households to face inflation, family
emergencies or unfavorable climatic shocks. In order to analyze livestock changes (quantum
5 See Townsend (1995) or, more recently, Wenner (2001).
Table 8.5 Mean effect of road rehabilitation on household’s per capita consumption
(US dollars per year)
Outcome Variable
Non-motorized rural road Motorized rural road
Estimated effect Standard error Estimated effect Standard error
Per capita Consumption
Total Effect 47.62 55.01 12.29 31.74
     differences in returns 40% 92%
     differencies in non-observables 60% 8%
Note: Bootstrapped Standard Errors based on 200 replications of the data with 100% sampling
*** Significant at 1% level,  ** Significant al 5% level,  * Significant at 10% level
Source: Own estimates
Table 8.6 Mean effect of rural rehabilitation on households’ livestock
(US dollars at baseline prices)
Type of road Estimated effect Standard error
Motorized rural road 259.42 *** 96.60
Non-motorized rural road 271.05 224.57
Note: Bootstrapped Standard Errors based on 200 replications of the data with 100% sampling
*** Significant at 1% level,  ** Significant al 5% level,  * Significant at 10% level
Source: Own estimates
capita consumption from those households connected to product and factor markets through
rehabilitated roads against the per capita consumption they would have should the rehabilitation
had not happened, we observe an annual per capita increase of US$ 48 in the case of non-
motorized roads and US$ 12 for the case of non-motorized roads. These figures are quite
small and are not statistically significant.
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When livestock owned by households located in rehabilitated roads is compared with
the stock these same households would have had if road rehabilitation had not taken place, an
increase in US$ 259 is observed in the case of motorized roads. This change is statistically
significant and represents a 65 percent increase over the livestock that those household would
have had if the roads they have access to, had not been rehabilitated. To give an idea about
how substantial is this increase it is worth noting that this change in assets is equivalent to 56
percent of the annual per capita income that a treated household accrues in average. In the
case of non-motorized roads, although the average increase between treated and controls
appears somewhat larger (US$ 271), the within variance is such that statistically the outcome
is not different to zero.
It is worthwhile noting that when the impact of rural rehabilitation on income,
consumption and savings are looked at jointly, a rather consistent outlook appears. In the case
of non-motorized roads, the only changes that can be clearly identified in the short term, after
rehabilitation, are an increase in non-agricultural wage income and a marginal increase in
agricultural income. These increments do take place at the expense of a reduction in the income
changes), an aggregate indicator of all kinds of animals was constructed, valuing them with
the same set of prices, obtained from secondary sources6. Moreover, to ensure comparability,
controls over the differentiated possession of other assets were included in the estimation,
following an analogous procedure to that used while constructing welfare indicators.
6 The prices of each type of animal where obtained from Peru’s 2000 Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS).
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Table 8.7 Mean effect of road rehabilitation on household’s per capita income
(US dollars per year)
Outcome Variable Non-Motorized Rural Road Motorized Rural Road
Estimated Effect Standard Error Estimated Effect Standard Error
Per capita income
Total Effect 66.90 73.29 121.77 *** 40.81
     differences in returns 57.3% 88.5%
     differencies in non-observables 42.7% 11.5%
Per capita income composition
Agricultural self-employment income 73.33 a 54.03 24.64 15.13
Agricultural wage income 21.17 21.30 11.86 b 6.41
Non-agricultural self-employment income -97.81 *** 58.11 6.31 27.24
Non-agricultural wage income 60.75 * 40.42 114.78 *** 20.86
Note: Bootstrapped Standard Errors based on 200 replications of the date with 100% sampling
*** Significant at 1% level,  ** Significant al 5% level,  * Significant at 10% level
a Significant at 12% level
b Significant at 15% level
Source: Own estimates
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associated to self-employed non-agricultural activities like retail trade, handicrafts manufacture
or machinery repair. A hypothesis to explore here is that the market expansion derived from
road rehabilitation could have triggered a reduction in consumption of local products, which
would be substituted by products coming from out-of-region sources, with the subsequent
displacement of local small industry and a change of income generation strategies towards
waged activities.
In the case of motorized rural roads, where households have a larger set of public
assets that could complement the benefits of road rehabilitation, a significant increase in total
income does take place, mainly associated to a greater dynamism of the labor market. However,
the higher incomes generated by rehabilitation would have not been allocated to consumption
but rather to increase their savings. This suggests that income increase derived from road
rehabilitation is not being perceived as a change in their permanent income. Although the
PCR, under which most of the roads analyzed here were rehabilitated, includes in their planning
the permanent task of maintenance of motorized rural roads, beneficiary rural households
could be perceiving such maintenance tasks as temporary. In addition, in the case of roads
rehabilitated by other institutions different from PCR, permanent maintenance activities could
have not been planned or, if they were planned, they could have been deficiently implemented.
Under this perception, roads would eventually go back to their previous state, and transit
would be seriously affected by landslides and avalanches - so common in these areas -, which
could lead to a situation where the road would be closed during several months of the year. In
effect, if maintenance is not perceived as permanent, the optimal strategy for these households
will be that of taking advantage of new income generation opportunities and channel them to
increase their savings rather than to allocate that income increase to expand their consumption.
8.5 Conclusions
In general, most studies that have analyzed the benefits of rehabilitated rural roads have focused
on impacts related to greater mobility and greater access, measured in terms of reductions in
monetary costs or time needed by beneficiaries to access output markets or key public social
services like health and education. This chapter has complemented this view by looking at the
impact that rural road rehabilitation would have on key welfare indicators such as per capita
income and per capita consumption. Using information from rural households living in some
of the poorest districts of Peru, this study has compared households that benefited from a rural
road rehabilitation program with households that were not subjected to any similar rehabilitation,
controlling for differences in assets endowment between both groups.
In order to build such controls and thus to be able to estimate the rehabilitation effect,
this chapter follows the propensity score matching methodology, with some small variations
introduced to make it compatible with the characteristics of the available data. Namely, the
fact that the information provided by households was not representative at a town level forced
Chapter 8
194
to using the household, instead of the town, as the unit of analysis. In operative terms, this
type of restriction, common in many program evaluations similar to the one that justified
collecting this data, forced us to work in two stages. First, we looked at town-level representative
variables, which allow the construction of a common support to those households potentially
comparable. Next, we looked at household level variables that were used, through a simulation
exercise, to control for those factors like education, farmland size, etc., among which households
from rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated households might differ.
Results of this study show that short-term impacts from rural roads rehabilitation could
be linked to changes in income-generation sources, as road improvement enhances off-farm
employment opportunities, especially in non-agricultural waged activities. This information could
be used in the Cost Benefit Analysis of rural road rehabilitation projects. In addition, the study
finds that the income expansion generated after rural roads rehabilitation, especially in those
areas articulated to product and factor markets through motorized roads would not have produced
similar increases in consumption. This apparent contradiction could be reconciled by verifying
that additional income would have been allocated to savings, through livestock accumulation.
Such behavior is consistent with an economic rationale whereby road quality improvement would
not be perceived as permanent by the beneficiaries, who in turn would be facing incentives to
save the transitory gains that road rehabilitation might bring about. This could be happening
because some of those rehabilitated roads do not get maintenance, or this is deficient; or,
alternatively, to the fact that those permanent maintenance activities contemplated in the programs
are not perceived by the beneficiaries as sustainable in the long term.
Even though this study recognizes, due to limitations of the available data, that the
results obtained for the group of households articulated by motorized roads are more robust
than those obtained for the case of non-motorized roads, it is important noting that there is
some evidence that households near motorized roads tend to benefit more from rehabilitation
than do those in non-motorized roads. In the case under study, households from rehabilitated
motorized roads had in average higher education, larger farmland size, and greater access to
public infrastructure than those located in non-motorized rehabilitated roads, so probably the
greater gains from rehabilitation obtained by households who live near motorized rehabilitated
roads are due to the complementarities between these larger endowment of assets and road
rehabilitation. Given the limitations of the data used for this study, it was not possible to carry
out a comparative analysis of the benefits obtained by households living near each type of
rehabilitated road (motorized and non-motorized). However, this is a crucial research area
that could allow moving forward in understanding the complementarities between public and
private assets that could contribute to the design of public programs in rural areas.
This study also presented evidence of the impact of road rehabilitation on the importance
of waged sources in rural household’s income generation strategy. Furthermore, it recognizes
non-agricultural wage income as the main source of positive impact of both motorized and
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non-motorized roads rehabilitation in the short-term. It is worth noting that the available
information only allowed evaluating changes at a household level; hence, the impact on
household accessibility to new sources of income generation could be established, but it was
not possible to analyze in depth the impact on job opportunities and its returns at individual
(household-member) level. In this sense, it seems important to complement this analysis with
another that could look at the changes this type of public intervention generates in time allocation
strategies within the household.
In addition to the study of short-term impacts of road rehabilitation, it is necessary to
highlight the importance of other impacts such as those related to changes in crops portfolios,
technological changes at both agricultural activities level and non-agricultural activities level,
and the change in consumption patterns, all of which require longer periods of observation.
This type of longer-term analysis should become an essential research area in order to contribute
to the formulation of public policies focused on sustainable strategies of poverty reduction in
rural areas.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that although this study has not been designed to establish
policy recommendations, it presents clear evidence of the strong impact that rural roads
improvement has on the beneficiary population. In addition, it alerts on the importance of
ensuring that rehabilitation activities are not transitory but rather that maintenance is guaranteed,
in order to allow rural households to make long-term decisions about investment and
consumption that could maximize the positive impact of road rehabilitation.
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Annex A8.1: Construction of the Welfare Indicator
Before going into the third stage of methodology, we must construct an estimated
welfare indicator that properly controls for the differences in individual household
characteristics between both groups (treated and potential controls. In particular, a semi-
logarithmic regression was used to control for individual characteristics or assets possession.
This equation has the following form:
(1)
Where Y is the logarithm of the household welfare indicator (i.e. household per capita
income), X is the set of j household assets, b
j
 is the return from each of those assets, d indicates
the group to which the household belongs (1 if it is a treated household an 0 if it is a potential
control), and µ is the error term. It is worth noting that this equation is useful as long as there no
correlation between the non-observables (µ) and those assets included as covariates (X), which
implies that estimated parameters are unbiased. If these parameter estimates were biased, we
could not guarantee that the assessed variable adequately isolates the welfare differences derived
from differences in assets endowment between households from both road sections. To ensure
this condition was fulfilled, separate equations were estimated for each type of road: motorized
and non-motorized, and the X set of variables were carefully selected. The variables that where
considered to estimate equation (1) to control for the differences between both groups due to
assets possession, included variables related to human capital, organizational capital, physical
capital, financial capital and public capital. As far as this study measures the short-term impact
of road rehabilitation, it is reasonable to consider these variables as exogenous.
In addition, it is important noting that the first two elements on the right side of the
equation (1) are orthogonal. If a household lives in a rehabilitated road section, d=1, the
second element of the equation is null. This specification allows capturing the difference in
returns estimated for each one of the variables, between rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated
road sections. Even though these parameter estimates are the same than those that could be
obtained if two separate equations were estimated (one for treated and the other for potential
controls), standard errors differ from each other. Thus, the specification laid down in (1) allows
maximizing efficiency of b
j
 estimators. It is also worth noting that the econometric specification
incorporates a heteroskedasticity correction, and acknowledges possible sources of correlation
between non-observable characteristics of households located within the same road section.
Regarding the observations used and those excluded at this stage of the study, it is
important to emphasize on the need to restrict the household sample to be incorporated in the
estimation of (1) to the sub-group of households (treated and potential controls) that make up
the common support (calculated in the first stage). By doing so, the process of controlling for
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differences in assets possession is done only for those households that will be considered as
possible matches in the third stage.
After estimating (1) it is possible to establish the following identity:
(2)
The left side of (2) represents the means difference between the group of households
that had access to rehabilitated roads (R) and the group that had access to non-rehabilitated
roads (NR), controlling for the difference in assets possession between both groups. The right
side of this identity, reflects the two components of the rehabilitation effect: the first component
measures the rehabilitation effect due to the difference in assets returns and the second
component measures the rehabilitation effect due to the differences in non-observables. These
two components are the ones that will be estimated in the third stage, after matching of
households under the propensity score’s closeness criterion is performed.
With the purpose of constructing the welfare indicator for each household, controlled
by the difference in assets possessed, that allows calculation of (2) in the third stage, the
following specification is used:
    (3)
for household i living in a rehabilitated road section; and,
      (4)
for household i living in a non-rehabilitated road section.
Finally, to obtain an estimate, in the same units, of logarithm of per capita income
(consumption), the predicted average of the log income (consumption) for the households
group living in a non-rehabilitated section is added to (3) and (4):                     . This is equivalent
to simulating the logarithm of per capita income (consumption) for each household, assuming
that all households have an identical level of assets, which equals the average level of the
group that has no access to road rehabilitation. This variable is transformed from logarithms
to income (consumption) levels, before proceeding into the third stage. This transformation
facilitates the interpretation of the road rehabilitation’s mean outcome estimator.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Analytical and Policy Implications
Although there is little disagreement that infrastructure is a vital component in the
development of remote rural areas, it has long remained a neglected research topic. Most of
the research on the linkages between infrastructure investment and development has
concentrated in describing changes in access to different infrastructure services, as well as
reporting the macroeconomic or industry-wide impacts that it may have brought about. The
problem with this highly aggregated analysis is that, although it has been useful to show the
positive effect of infrastructure investment on economic growth, it has not shown the specific
underpinnings that connect infrastructure investments with improved market efficiency and
through those mechanisms to growth and poverty alleviation.
As we have seen in Chapter 2, connections between rural infrastructure provision,
market development and economic growth could be direct, increasing output by shifting the
production frontier or by increasing the rate of return of private investment in rural activities;
or may be indirect, through changes in the relative price structure of inputs and outputs. These
connections may occur at the market level, through lower transaction costs, higher spatial
market integration and changes in relative prices, or they may occur at the household or
individual level, as a response to these market changes. In this later case, household specific
impacts may be related to changes in factor allocation (labor allocation, land usage, crop
choice or input mix) or changes in marketing patterns (sale mix or marketing channels). All of
this pathways, through which infrastructure affects market development, may ultimately have
an impact on the welfare of rural inhabitants, shaping poverty and income distribution in the
areas where such investment is allocated.
The aggregate analysis misses most of these connections and hence does not provide
specific guidance for policy interventions that may be aimed to improve market efficiency
and market access for the rural poor. At the same, time most of the econometric analysis done
focuses on one kind of public infrastructure at a time, sidestepping the critical issue of
complementarity that arises in public infrastructure investment.
The most important goal of this study has been to develop a complete and consistent
framework of analysis that connects infrastructure investment to rural market development
and, consequently, to income and asset enhancement for rural poor. It is in this framework of
analysis that our main research questions can be adequately addressed.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study has focused in four inter-connected research
questions:
1. Why and how is rural infrastructure important for fostering income generation,
income diversification and ultimately rural poverty alleviation?
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2. Are there any complementarities in rural infrastructure investment? What are the
impacts of different combination of public infrastructure investment on the income
of the rural poor?
3. Can rural infrastructure investment help overcome an adverse geography, and allow
the poor accumulate assets and escape from the poverty trap they may be facing?
4. What kind of public infrastructure investment is better suited to improve market
integration and efficiency reducing transaction costs for the rural poor?
Although these research questions are relevant for most if not all developing countries
they have been addressed in a specific context, which is that of rural Peru. As we have
mentioned, Peru is one of the most diverse countries in the world.  Probably because of this
heterogeneity, infrastructure is not homogeneously distributed through out rural Peru. Most of
the infrastructure investment has concentrated in the coastal areas, leaving the highland and
amazon basin areas with little or no infrastructure services.
Despite Peru’s geographic diversity, the connection between infrastructure and rural
development under different geographic conditions has not been studied. Geography can be a
blessing or a curse. It may help foster productivity, crop diversity and allow all year long
cultivation to attend domestic and export markets; or it may increase the cost of providing
infrastructure or become a restriction to the development of land and other factor markets.
Thus, the exact relationship between a particular geographic endowment and the livelihood
outcome it generates has to be evaluated at the empirical level.
Infrastructure may also be critical to determine how markets operate. Although market
efficiency and market integration has been thoroughly studied in Peru, there have been very
few attempts to connect policy variables (in particular infrastructure investment) to market
efficiency outcomes. Tus, this work should also be envisaged as a contribution to the policy
debate in Peru on this regard.
When we look at the relevant literature that connects rural infrastructure and poverty in
Peru, what we see is more of a poverty profile than a clear connection between infrastructure
investment, market development and poverty reduction. As we have shown through out different
chapters (especially chapters 3 and 4) there are some distinct features that characterized the
rural poor in Peru:
• They are more likely to have larger families than rural non-poor and urban poor.
• They tend to have higher dependency rates, which mean there are more members
in household that do not work per each working member.
• They usually are older than rural non-poor
• Their education degree is lower. This is associated not only with a lower schooling
participation rate but also with a higher desertion rate.
• Most of rural poor have assets (particularly land) of which property rights are not
secured and clearly defined (low adequate registered titling); or if property rights
are in some way clear and safe it is at the expense of higher transaction costs.
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• Land owned by rural poor has not benefited from the large-scale public irrigation
projects.
• Health indexes are worse among rural poor; in particular, they have a higher infant
mortality rate.
• In general, the rural poor tend to have a diversified income portfolio, between
farm and non-farm activities, and also, within each group of activities. This is a
well-known strategy in response to the high vulnerability levels to which they are
exposed, and which actually depend of the quantity and quality of public and private
assets. Typically the poorest segments of rural sector are only able to diversify
within agriculture.
• Although the poor tend to receive a small portion of subsidies, the share of subsidies
in their income rises as rural poverty levels are higher.
• They have less access to public infrastructure (roads) and services (especially
electricity and sanitation)
• Poverty is less sensitive to growth in poorly infrastructure – endowed areas
We believe that this research effort allows connecting infrastructure investment to the
different mechanisms that are shaping this profile. More generally, the study has a number of
conclusions and contributions that can be grouped in three distinct areas: (1) theoretical and
content contributions; (2) methodological contributions; and, (3) implications for policy. We
will address in turn each of these areas.
9.1 Theoretical and content contributions
One of the effects of infrastructure investment is that of increase the rate of return of assets. As
we have seen in chapter 3, If we perform a Taylor series approximation for the income or
expenditure function G (A) around the observed level of Assets (A*) we may relate the rate of
return of a certain asset A
i
 – after certain investment in A
j
 has been made - to the level and
composition of assets that the household had access to. Such relationship can be portrayed
through the following equation:
(1)
Where r* represents the rate of return of assets at the initial (observed) level. The second
term in equation (1) depicts the changes in the rate of return of infrastructure due to the new
investment. Finally, the third and last term depicts the changes in the asset return due to
complementarity effects.
Shaping the rate of return of rural investments
In equation (1) we can see several of the effects that we have traced along the study and that
we have summarized in our first two research questions. Here we see how Infrastructure may
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raise the return to private assets. In addition it may increase the rate of return of other public
assets. Finally, when combined with other complementary investments it may trigger additional
effects. Chapters 3, 7 and 8 of this study tackle these two research questions, by evaluate both
the income effect and diversification pattern that infrastructure investment may generate, and
the potential benefits that may arise from complementary investments.
We have shown that marginal rates of return to key assets are lower for poorer households
than for those that are less poor. Increasing returns to assets can only exists in the presence of
restrictions that prevent the poor from accumulating more income and assets. This been the
case, initial conditions reflected by how assets endowments are distributed, matter for
understanding income and poverty dynamics. This result is consistent with Barret et al. (2004)
research on Kenya and Madagascar and Jalan and Ravallion (2002) work on China.
Regional distributional issues are also of crucial importance when we look at the rate
of return of different assets. As has been shown in Chapter 3, not only access to assets is
higher in urban settings in comparison to rural areas but rate of return also are higher. Further,
within urban and rural areas there is also evidence that those which are better off have higher
average rates of return than those who are positioned in the lower segment of the income
distribution. As mentioned before and reflected in equation (1), the rate of return of any asset
depends critically on the combination of assets that the household has access to. If, for example,
there is a low or null access to key complementary infrastructure, the household may not
develop the full potential of the private assets it has already been endowed with or the public
assets it has already accessed to. Chapter 3 shows that returns to education and returns to land
are higher when the household has access to better roads or electricity. We have also shown
that these complementarities tend to be greater in the richest strata.
These results are in apparent contrast with the work of Fan and Hazell (1999), Zhang
and Fan (2000), Fan, et al. (2000a), Fan, et al. (2000b), and Fan, et al. (2002) in India and
China. These authors show that the marginal returns of public investments to production and
poverty reduction differs according to geographic settings but tends to be higher in the poorest
regions. Thus, infrastructure investments may be not only poverty reducing, buy may well be
equality enhancing. However, this study shows that those rural households with more private
access or having access to better public assets can do better. Thus public investments may
affect negatively income distribution within a targeted poor area.
One way of reconciling both research efforts is to recognize that the level of other
assets is not the same across household and needs to be taken into account in the estimation of
the marginal rates of return to infrastructure. If, for example, regional differences (with respect
to a key complementary assets) are smaller than within regional differences then it is likely
that that the differences in the rate of return will be driven by difference in infrastructure
allocation. Then, decreasing marginal return for infrastructure will prevail. However, if there
are large differences in complementary assets the decreasing marginal return history may not
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be observed unless we properly control for the differences in those other assets. As can be
seen in figure 9.1, if we observe two different marginal rates of return (MRR) for infrastructure
A
i
 (r
i
’ and r
i
’’) for two different rural household having different level of a complementary
asset j (A
j
0 and A
j
1), we can have a positive relation between rural infrastructure and assets
despite the fact that marginal rate of returns continue to have a downward slope, reflecting
decreasing returns as assets increase. The fact that these authors have not estimated the effects
of complementary private and public assets makes it difficult to disentangle the effect of
access to other assets, in the estimation of the marginal rate of return to infrastructure.
Is geography destiny?
Geography plays also a critical role in determine the rate of return to different assets, it may be
thought as a central element of the mediating factors that relate the livelihood base to the
livelihood strategies in the conceptual framework laid out in Chapter 1.
Chapter 4 shows how geography interacts with rural infrastructure, which is the focus
our third research question. Geography may hinder or boost the income effects of rural
infrastructure. However, we have shown that what seem to be sizable geographic differences
in living standards in Peru can be almost fully explained when one takes into account the
spatial concentration of households with readily observable non-geographic characteristics,
in particular public and private assets. In other words, the same observationally equivalent
household has a similar expenditure level in one place as in another with different geographic
characteristics such as altitude or temperature. This does not mean, however, that geography
is not important, but that its influence on expenditure levels and growth differential comes
Figure 9.1 Marginal rate of return to infrastructure
(Under alternative asset allocations)
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about through a spatially uneven provision of public infrastructure. Furthermore, when we
measure the expected gain (or loss) in consumption from living in a particular geographic
region (i.e. Costa) as opposed to living in another geographic region (i.e. Sierra), we found
that most of the difference in log per capita expenditure between Sierra and Costa can be
accounted for by the differences in infrastructure endowments and private assets. This is an
indication that the availability of infrastructure could be limited by the geography and therefore,
the more adverse geographic regions are the ones with less access to public infrastructure.
The overall effect of infrastructure investment on income inequality will depend on
within and between income effects. We have shown in chapters 3 and 4 that infrastructure will
enhance rural income, however when these benefits are captured by those better-off it may
have a negative effect on income distribution.
Other issues that we have covered in chapters 3 and 4 are the dynamics of poverty and
asset accumulation and the role that infrastructure may play in this relationship. We have
shown that access to assets of human, physical, social and financial capital as well as access to
infrastructure will not only raise the return on private assets but will also have an effect on the
process of asset accumulation. Thus, the original possession of assets, their process of
accumulation and the existence of external shocks would be critical determinants of the
likelihood of poor household escaping out of poverty.
Short run panels (where asset accumulation does not show as strongly as it will be seen
in longer panels or under large shocks), are good to tell us why somebody remains in poverty
(lack of assets) or why he/she is poor. However, these panels may not be very appropriate to
explain transitions out or into poverty. Here, we may recognize that the short-run nature of the
panels we use affect our conclusions since we may expect more important changes in larger
spans of time, as the long run impact of asset investment may show their full potential only
after some time. Having no access to long panel prevents us for pursuing this topic further. It
is, however, a critical area of research that needs to be tackled as information becomes available.
Barrett, et al. (2004) shows that as the panel cover a larger time span, income volatility becomes
lower and initial asset condition increasingly show its effect on poverty dynamics. These
results are consistent with the poverty trap hypothesis.
Improving market efficiency through rural infrastructure investments
Rural Infrastructure also plays a major role shaping markets trough the reduction of transport
and transactions costs and by improving spatial market integration. All this issues affect market
efficiency which is our central concern of our fourth and last research question. Infrastructure
is not allocation neutral since it affects relative prices. As mentioned in chapters 5 and 6,
transaction costs can be fixed or proportional. Fixed transaction costs are independent of the
amount of output exchanged, and can be related, for example, to information costs which may
be accrued independently of the amount the producer will eventually sell in a market. Although
fixed and proportional transaction costs affect the supply of goods the rural household may
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decide to allocate to a market, fixed transaction costs are critical in the sense that if they are
prohibitive large they may prevent a producer from entering the market.
Transaction costs can also be household specific. Transaction costs can be seen as
transaction costs originated from one or more of the following activities: a) the search for
price and quality information for the goods or inputs to be traded, as well as the search for
buyers and/or potential sellers ; b) the negotiation necessary to identify the relative negotiating
power of buyers as well as the establishment of contractual agreements; c) the monitoring of
parties to the contract to verify their compliance; and d) the protection of property rights
before third parties.
Chapter 5 measures how large are these transaction costs in the context of the potato
market in rural Peru. We estimated them by comparing extreme situations, where differences
in transaction costs are evident: for example, having or no access to a motorized rural roads or
other equally important rural infrastructure. We showed here that those connected to markets
through non-motorized rural roads have substantially higher transaction costs. The magnitude
of these transaction cost is equivalent to an implicit 60% tax over the value of output. This
value is much higher than that reported by other researcher, like Renkow, et al. (2004), which
situated transaction costs for Kenya at around 15%, Although the relationship between
infrastructure endowment (proxied by the distance to markets) and transaction costs is the
same in both research works, we find that this estimate of transaction costs is remarkably low,
and deserves closer scrutiny.
Our results showed that besides distance and time to the market, key variables for
explaining the market integration strategy (i.e. when to sell and to what market) include several
indicators associated with how much experience farmers have with the market in which they
operate; how stable their relations are with the different agents they trade with, and; how
much of an investment they make to obtain relevant information and to monitor compliance
with implicit contracts associated with the transactions completed. Thus, this research shows
that, through lowering transaction costs, access to an improved rural road system can improve
substantially the incomes of the rural poor in Peru. Infrastructure may have a critical role in
allowing farmers to connect to more complex and impersonal contractual relations and benefit
from them. Thus, lowering transaction cost is at the heart of increasing specialization and
division of labor and hence is a driving force for improving efficiency and income generating
opportunities for the rural poor.
If transportation and transaction costs are low, marketing integration is possible. If
not, autarchy will prevail. We have estimated market integration in Peruvian agriculture using
as a case study the Peruvian potato market (see Chapter 6). Market integration is measured
using the speed of adjustment of prices in spatially related markets after they faced an
exogenous shock. We showed as most of the literature in this area has shown that agriculture
markets are indeed integrated, at least in the long run. However, we also showed (something
that so far has not been tested in the literature) that infrastructure endowments available to
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those cities trading which each other do affect the speed of adjustment of prices and, thus,
affects market integration.
Putting together the results obtained in chapters 5 and 6 will allow us to connect rural
infrastructure investment with higher spatial market efficiency, As Fackler and Goodwin (2001)
correctly point out spatial market efficiency encompasses both the size of transaction costs of
trade and the level of spatial market integration. Since we have proven that transaction costs
will be lowered as a consequence of infrastructure investment and that this same investment
will improve market spatial integration, we may be confident that there is a clear and strong
linkage between infrastructure investment and market efficiency.
Household specific impacts
At the microeconomic level, as we discussed in Chapter 1, infrastructure changes behavior at the
household and plot levels. We may distinguish between direct and indirect effects. The first ones
come about when public infrastructure increases output by shifting the production frontier and
marginal cost curve, and by increasing the rate of return of household investment in economic
activities. At the same time, infrastructure investments change the relative price structure of
inputs and outputs, reducing their transaction costs, and generating a completely different set of
price signals that reshapes the connection of producers with the market.
This study has concentrated its effort in evaluating labor allocation effects of rural
infrastructure. This is not because we believed that the impacts on other factor market were not
important but mainly because we understand that labor allocation choices are the most important
short term effects of rural infrastructure investment.  As we have found in Chapter 7, and is
consistent with the evidence presented by Cuánto (2000), changes in crop choice, land use or
input mix do not occurred in the short run, but only when the changes in relative prices.
One of the main impacts that we have identified is that of infrastructure affecting the
economic opportunity cost of time for rural households. Both in chapters 7 and 8 we have
shown that there are important changes in the rural labor market as we improve the access of
infrastructure services in rural Peru. One of the most important conclusions of this study is
indeed that rural infrastructure opens new income generating opportunities.
The ultimate goal of infrastructure investment is to increase livelihood security
expanding income opportunities, allowing for asset accumulation and reducing vulnerability.
In Chapter 8 we look at these issues using as an example a particular infrastructure investment:
that related to the rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads.
We showed that road infrastructure (rehabilitation and maintenance) does have an impact
on income, improving off-farm income generating opportunities for the poor. However, this
income increase does not induce a consumption increase, as those that benefit form the road
improvement prefer to save the extra income. They do not believe that the road maintenance
will be sustainable. This finding is critical, since it shows the importance of institutional factors
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that may play a significant role in allowing that the full benefits of an infrastructure investment
are transmitted to the beneficiaries.
Finally, in the last two chapters (7 and 8) we also found evidence that that promotion of
nonfarm activity, even if it may reduces poverty, is not necessarily consonant with improvement
in the income distribution, and for it to do so, specific policy interventions may be needed.
This is, again, a reflection of increasing returns to assets that we have found through out this
study. Those that have higher levels of education, land or other critical private assets may
benefit relatively more from those new labor opportunities that infrastructure investments
may be generating.
9.2 Methodological contributions
Some of the contributions of this study lie on the methodological side, either by creatively
combining different data sets to solve a research question, suggesting methodological
innovations to measure elusive concepts like transaction costs, or by adapting project evaluation
methodologies to account for the particularities of rural infrastructure.
Several chapters of this study have combined household level data with community data
bases so as to be able to provide indicators of the supply of infrastructure available to those
households. By measuring the supply infrastructure and not what the household is demanding,
we were able to overcome the problem of endogeneity bias in some of our estimations.
An interesting feature on several chapters, but especially in chapters 3 and 4, is the
simultaneous usage of many different databases to evaluate the effect of infrastructure on
rural income growth, controlling for the effect of geography. To do so, we have been able to
combine altitude, soil depth, soil slope, temperature among other geographic related variables
with census and household level socioeconomic data. We have used the Population and
Household Censuses of 1972, 1981 and 1993 to construct a set of variables that allow us to
analyze the kind of changes that have emerged in the geographical pattern of Peru’s most
important socioeconomic variables during the last three decades. We also used cross-sectional
LSMS household surveys, and panel data between 1991, 1994 and 1997 using as well the
LSMS surveys to enrich our analysis. The advantage of having panel data with time invariant
fixed effects on households, allowing for latent household heterogeneity, is that it will protect
us against spurious geographic effects that arise solely because geographic variables proxy
for omitted non-geographic, but spatially autocorrelated, household characteristics.
The usage of spatial econometric estimation to evaluate the robustness of our estimates
is another distinctive feature of our analysis. By modeling the spatial dependence of the
potentially omitted variables, we can be sure that the importance of infrastructure investments
in helping overcome an adverse geography remains valid even if we correct for possible spatial
autocorrelation due to possible omitted non-geographic spatially correlated variables. As far
as we know, this is the first study that ascertains how geographic variables interact with
infrastructure when explaining per capita expenditure differentials across regions within Peru.
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In relation to the microeconomic impacts of infrastructure investments very little effort
has been directed toward the measurement of transaction costs in rural markets. Following the
pioneering work of De Janvry, et al. (1991) a second area where we believe this study has
generated methodological contributions is in the measurement of transaction costs. Most the
literature in this area tends to overcome the measurement problem by following Williamson
(1979) strategy. Instead of directly evaluating transaction costs associated with each observed
organizational or contractual arrangement, the differential costs of conducting transactions in
one arrangement relative to the other is studied looking at certain observable attributes that
may differ between transactions. Instead of following this approach, in  chapter 5 we model
the decision of selling at the farmgate or selling at market using the standard model developed
by De Janvry, et al. (1995) with one crucial addition: we associate transaction costs to the
effective price each farmer receives introducing a hedonic price equation. The word "hedonic"
is normally used in the economics literature to refer to the underlying profit that is obtained
when consuming a good or service. A good that has several characteristics generates a number
of hedonic services. We interpret the model somewhat differently. The price the farmer receives
has a set of "premia" or "discounts" for a series of services that have been generated, or
perhaps omitted. From the literature of hedonic price functions, we know that this function
does not strictly represent a "reduced form" of the functions of supply and demand that could
be derived from the production or utility functions of the economic agents involved in the
transaction.  Rather, it should be seen as a restriction in the process of optimization of sellers
and buyers. The introduction of a hedonic price function helps us to account for the transaction
costs differences and through this device we are able to measure transaction costs related to a
specific transaction. Further, by relating these "premia" or "discounts" to specific characteristics
of the reported transactions we have been able to divide this transaction costs in information,
negotiation and monitoring costs.
Another methodological contribution in the area of market specific impacts of
infrastructure development is that of using spatial integration measures to connect differences
in infrastructure allocation with the speed at which markets can absorb exogenous shock. It is
important to note that there are already a number of papers in the international literature that
measures spatial integration. Recent analysis on the determinants of market integration has
gone from bivariate cointegration analysis to multivariate cointegration. At the same time, as
have been mentioned in Chapter 6, there is research that has explicitly connected key public
infrastructure with bivariate measures of integration. However, this has not been done yet in a
multivariate cointegration framework. This is the area where chapter 6 makes a contribution.
Finally, one important methodological contribution generated by this study is that of
adapting the project evaluation methodology based on propensity score matching developed
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and further enhanced by Heckman, et al. (1998) to welfare
evaluation of rural infrastructure investments. Matching techniques allow us to identify proper
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counterfactual scenarios that are the cornerstone for identifying causal relationships in non
experimental research Kluve (2001). In this way, we may not only assess the impact of a
certain investment but we can understand how this effect has been brought about.
Although achieving clear causal links between infrastructure investment and market
efficiency outcomes or household welfare outcomes is obviously a difficult task, the use of
appropriate counterfactual scenarios provides a good approximation to this issue. In this area,
the study has also a methodological contribution, suggesting a two-step procedure to evaluate
the impact of certain investment. Identify first the group (town or region) that may constitute
a possible "match", and then use a simulation technique to further control for those household
specific characteristics that, although may not be important for the decision-maker to allocate
an investment, they certainly affect the outcome variables.
In the area of impact assessment and the evaluation of the welfare impact of infrastructure
investment, our work does several methodological modifications necessary to adapt propensity
score matching technique for assessing the benefits that investment in rural road rehabilitation
may generate on welfare indicators. Since many sample designs on which these studies and
evaluations are based do not have a sufficiently large sample size of households as to guarantee
a minimum statistical representativeness at a town level, it is not generally possible - using
available information - to balance the two household samples (those accessing to rehabilitated
and non-rehabilitated rural roads) with regard to observable characteristics. In this chapter it is
suggested that, in such cases, it is possible to balance both samples in two stages. First, ensuring
that towns are comparable in terms of certain basic characteristics, which would have
determined whether or not the intervention took place (i.e. community organizational capacity,
economic activity indicators, access to public services, length of road section or size of town);
and second, simulating welfare indicators that would correspond to observed households,
should all have the same assets endowment (human, organizational or physical capital), so
that the assessment of rehabilitation effects will account only for the differences in returns and
non-observables that differentiate an intervention scenario from a non-intervention one.
9.3 Implications for policy
As Fafchamps (2004) correctly states, drawing policy prescriptions from research is a
complicated endeavor. Although the analysis reported in this study is based on scientific
principles, policy prescriptions need to be adapted to the context in which they are applied. By
doing so, the researcher cross over to a minefield, where another range of aspects enters into
the picture including political consideration, institutional and coordination failures, etc. Because
of these considerations, we prefer to think that research creates "reserves of knowledge" where
policy makers may draw upon, as policy needs arises.
However, being a strenuous activity, getting solid research into policy is of the outmost
importance to improve the quality of the policy choices. An example, related to this research
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may help understand this. While we were working on Chapter 8, we discussed with Peruvian
public officials the role of infrastructure in improving access to day care centers for recently
born children. We were told that the program may be closed because it had "too much leakage";
that is too many non-poor households were benefiting from the program. The fact that several
mothers using the program came from non-poor household made them believe they should
not be part of the program. A published work from a colleague (Cortez, 2000) made them
realize that what they were seen was not leakage but the rate of success of the program, as a
causal model (with a proper counterfactual) would show that many of those households had
increased their income thanks to accessing the day-care center, something that the rehabilitation
of the road made possible. Not been able to distinguish between "leakage" and "success" is
just one example on how research can inform policy.
The stubborn persistence of rural poverty especially in the Sierra and Selva regions is
one of Peru’s most pressing social, political and economic problems and needs to be addressed
urgently. Even if Peru made some progress in poverty reduction in the 1990s (basically before
1997) most of it was concentrated in urban areas and on the Costa.  In spite of the modest
economic growth attained since 2000, there is little evidence that rural poverty is improving.
Experience shows that the poor in the Sierra and the Selva are not well linked into the modern
economy as those of the Costa. Whatever is that has generated growth in the past in Peru has
not generate growth in income for the poor in those areas. Thus, it is not reasonable to expect
that Peru will be able to solve its rural poverty problem simply by generating a rapid rate of
growth at the national level. As we have seen through out this study, rural income expansion
in rural Peru is severely constraint by lack of infrastructure. Thus, it is obvious that any
development program aimed at reducing rural poverty will need to include increasing
investments in roads, electricity, telecommunication, and water and sanitation services.
The challenge is to identify infrastructure investment opportunities that generate a
multiplier effect by attracting additional public and private investments to rural economies.
We also need to take into account the complementarities between different types of public
infrastructure and between public infrastructure and private asset endowments (human capital
physical and financial capital or social capital) that are already in the hands of rural dwellers
so as to maximize the impact of public infrastructure development. Finally we also have the
challenge of understanding what bottlenecks (physical or institutional) undermine the full
potential of public infrastructure investment. Knowing the relative profitability of each type
of public infrastructure is critical; that is, knowing where and in what type of infrastructure
development should each additional dollar should be spent. This study provides information
on this regard, showing that there are indeed high positive complementary effects and positive
increasing returns to infrastructure investment. The different methodologies applied in this
study can be used as "toolkit" so as to evaluate the relative importance of each type of rural
infrastructure investments in different geographic contexts.
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Although the study has not focused in detail in infrastructure access issues, as they
have been extensively covered by the literature (see Chapter 2), chapters 3 and 8 have mentioned
the importance of accessing public goods and services through the provision of rural
infrastructure.  Regarding access to rural infrastructure services we want to point out although
dull as it may sound; we can not get tired to repeat that access is the first step to build a large
range of capabilities within any rural community. From our (at this point) extensive field
experience, we have seen in the face of people what rural infrastructure does for their lives. By
reducing transport and transaction costs infrastructure not only improves market relationships
but also connects people with their communities building social capital and paving de the way
for rural development. Our research on rural roads (chapters 5 and 8) shows that as road
improve and access to markets and social services increases, the range of livelihood
opportunities increases dramatically. This may range from such distinct areas like more income
coming from non-agricultural waged related sources or allowing the farmer to invest in more
complex market relationships as transaction costs get lowered. But it may also have direct
influence in intra-household allocation of resources as better road infrastructure may, for
example, reduce the risks for girls to travel alone to distant schools as happened in the research
area where chapter 8 focused its analysis.
First, the obvious
Obviously the first and most important policy recommendation we advance is that of a larger
budget for rural infrastructure investment. Given the low penetration of key infrastructure
investments in rural areas, additional resources need to be devoted. This may come not only
from central government resources but also from local resources through rehabilitation and
maintenance activities. For this to happened institutional mechanisms directed to co financing
need to be consolidated since, given the national budget constraint, universal access is likely
to be impossible.
A critical issue in all infrastructure programs is that of targeting given the above
mentioned budget constraint. With such high poverty rates, as the ones currently prevailing in
rural Peru, the risk of leakage is relatively low. In this context, targeting to the poor is relatively
less important than assuring that the programs or projects are well designed and cost-effective,
in terms of reducing vulnerabilities of the rural poor and creating the conditions for enhancing
income opportunities especially in the Sierra and Selva regions, where most of the rural poor
live. To tackle the scarcity of funds, targeting should be approached as to invest in those areas
where complementary infrastructure investments will have the largest impact in welfare
measured by income, expenditure or asset accumulation.
However, we need not only to consider higher aggregate wealth as a benchmark to
allocate public infrastructure but we also need to take into consideration equity issues. As we
have seen, the presence of positive and increasing marginal returns will push us into a low-
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level equilibrium or "poverty trap" in the areas where the rural poor are concentrated. For
example, as reported in Chapter 6, better infrastructure improves market efficiency and improves
market integration. However, market development takes time. If infrastructure allocation is
concentrated, because of budget considerations in a few areas, it will exacerbate regional
disparities. Thus, on efficiency and equity grounds, efforts to provide a more equitable
distribution of infrastructure investment across the territory are needed.
Although Peru has moved away from large scale infrastructure projects (highways,
railways and big irrigation schemes) to smaller scale but more locally important investments,
such as rural roads or micro hydroelectric power plants, there is still a lot of political pressure
to push for more investment in these highly visible projects. The marginal political
representation of the potentially beneficiary population of rural infrastructure has led to the
displacement of such investment by others that politicians perceive as more profitable in terms
of votes. As much as we can pulled away from costly large scale investments the limited
resources available can be dedicated to small scale infrastructure investments that, as we have
seen, have very high rates of return.
While the role of rural capital-intensive infrastructure (roads, electricity, water for
irrigation and telephones) in linking rural inhabitants to markets and the effect on poverty
alleviation has been documented throughout this study, the size of the impact of alternative
types of rural investment and the key role of complementary interventions depends on local
conditions and circumstances which can not be grasped fully by national or regional authorities.
Although we have measured some of these complementarities in chapters 3 and 4, we have
also recognized that they are site specific, so they need to be evaluated at the local level so as
to determine which infrastructure combination suites best to each region
Complementary investments
Another area we have covered in this study and needs to be addressed in the policy arena is
that of fully taking advantage of the complementarities found between public infrastructure
investments and between them and the private assets that are already in the hands of the poor.
In the seventies, the dominating approach to rural development projects was that of Integrated
Rural Development. Projects were supposed to be carried out in a way that infrastructure
investments, financial support and training components were integrated in a manner to provide
support for each other. At the same time, following this approach, not only one sector, e.g.
agricultural production, was supported, but also others such as processing, marketing, industrial
transformation, manufacture of key input, machinery, etc. The fundamental idea was that the
developments of the different sectors would allow synergic effects in the sense that the
development of one sector would help to develop other sectors in the same region.
These rural development strategies were based on integrated interventions, which rarely
incorporated market mechanisms, so decisions were vertically designed taking advantage of
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centrally planed mechanisms with little or none community participation). However, as this
type of project did not resulted in rural market development nor they achieve substantial
reductions in rural poverty, their implementation was stopped.
Since the structural adjustment programs come into play, new rural development strategy
starts dominating. This strategy, which has been in place during the nineties, can be characterized
by increasing the role of beneficiaries (by establishing demand driven priorities) and has
enhanced the role of market mechanism. This kind of interventions, although incorporate
such positive features, lost the integrated nature of past rural development intervention strategies.
As we have seen in this study, there is much to gain from complementary infrastructure
interventions. Recently, yet another rural development strategy is appearing in the horizon,
which heavily relies in decentralization mechanisms which will may have a profound effect in
the way infrastructure priorities are set and on the institutional mechanisms that will be put
forward to assure the sustainability of the infrastructure services that would be provided.
From both recent and previous rural market development strategies, we can envisage
new interventions that may combine the positive characteristics of both: a) they should recover
a integrated approach (multiple interventions designed in a way that takes into account the
particularities of the area where they will be applied), b) a vision related to identifying market
failures and the role of infrastructure investments to solve those failures, c) a more participative
strategy where the "demand driven" focus be complemented with participative mechanisms
that allow those excluded to be taken into account so as to assure a balance between efficiency
and equity considerations.
It is evident from the main results of this study that rural Peru may be in what is
typically called a low level equilibrium, where markets and governments do not work in a
coordinated fashion to take advantage of the positive externalities arising from different sectors
(not only between infrastructure investments but also between them and other so called "soft"
infrastructure as education, technical assistance etc.. This was what Rosenstein-Rodan (1943)
was referring to when he discussed the bottlenecks to industrialization that Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe were facing during the postwar era. These bottlenecks arising from insufficient
and synchronized rural infrastructure investments are what we have called in this study
"complementary interventions".
Complementarities are not only present among infrastructure investments, but also
between them and private investments. Positive complementarities between public
infrastructure and private investment reflect that there is a "crowding in" effect which is strong
and very significant. Since it is larger for those areas that already better endowed in terms of
public infrastructure, to avoid path dependency and been pushed into a poverty trap,
infrastructure investments needs to be carefully evaluated. Disparities in the distribution of
assets (and power), which are often based on the social as well as the economic structure,
must be recognized, and prompt initiation of targeted  programs that ensure access to
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infrastructure to those typically excluded. As we have mentioned, in general our data supports
significant complementarity between rural infrastructure investment and private investment.
However, the robustness of this result is lower in those specifications that control for ethnicity
background.  This result is basically pointed to the direction of low level of asset accumulation
may even break the complementary potential of rural infrastructure investments. For a rural
dweller, excluded in many ways to access to assets (not only infrastructure services but also
education or health services), an "additional unit" of a particular infrastructure may do very
little to improve his or her well being if a full fledge strategy moving him or her to higher asset
level is not work out.
Another key complementary to infrastructure investment are those related to education
and technical assistance. The more hostile is the environment and the less rich is the natural
resource base, the higher the mobility of the assets and capabilities that need to be transferred.
This been the case a massive transfer of resources to education is absolutely essential. In all
areas, a key element in the strategy will be improving education and health care. Regardless of
how successful the basic development strategy is, many inhabitants of the rural-farm economy
will have to leave agriculture.  Improving education by increasing the numbers who finish
primary and secondary school will permit the children of farm families to move into urban
activities, either in the Sierra and Selva or on the Costa. It will also help those who stay in
agriculture to market their products more effectively, to access credit markets and to absorb
technical assistance.
Institutional requirements
The only way rural infrastructure will be provided in an efficiently and equitably is if it comes
together with institutional development. Improvements in institutions and building mechanisms
for coordination together with more and better focused rural infrastructure investment should
be the way to go to break out of the "poverty trap" in which more rural Peruvian now live. The
lack of institutional mechanisms to establish priorities and coordinate interventions is very
obvious in rural Peru. It is very likely to find two or more government offices doing the same
work in the same area, without any coordination. We have witness in one of our field trips that
the road was been rehabilitated by two institutions, each of them fixing one of two contiguous
segments: one paying for the labor needed while the other doing it through an exchange
mechanism. In other cases, when the road, the irrigation canal or the sanitation system is
constructed or rehabilitated by a national level office, local authorities do not pay attention to
maintenance problems, as they also expect that the central government will take care of them.
The final outcome of those coordination problems is the infrastructure investments deteriorates
rapidly, affecting the well being of those  related to these services.
At the national level, there tends to be a lack of coordination between ministries.
Agricultural ministries generally regard rural development as a strictly agricultural issue, thereby
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hindering coordination with the other ministries that also play a significant role in questions of
rural development. Smith (1997) documented various studies suggesting that the provision of
local public goods is given insufficient attention by the central government. So it is that local
rural infrastructure - such as the construction and improvement of rural roads, the establishment
of small rural electrical power systems or the provision of drinking water on a small scale - is
a priority for localities that lack such services, but is ultimately far less important to institutions
within the national hierarchy whose priorities are based on the demands of more powerful
interest groups.
For the allocation of infrastructure and public services a combination of planning at the
national and regional level as well as the local (municipal) level. The success of this type of
investment reconciliation depends fundamentally on involving local governments and
communities in decisions about what to invest in, where and how. Coordination between
different levels of Government is a major undertaking. As Kydd and Dorward (2003) mention
coordination failures lead to market failures. This is clear the case of infrastructure investment
and of the maintenance of such investments.
The need for a good analytical based approach also faces the challenge of raising the
quality of human capital in charge of designing and implementing rural infrastructure
investments. If adequate institutions and mechanisms for coordination are not in place, then
investment in rural infrastructure may provide only transitory benefits. We have seen in Chapter
8 that if rural road maintenance is not perceived as permanent it will trigger different reactions
from the beneficiaries than those expected if the same road maintenance is perceived as
permanent. In the former case, household will take advantage of windfall profits, changing
labor allocation to take advantage to the new market opportunities. However they may not go
into more complex or long term livelihood strategies as it may be costly to get back to their
original strategies once the road is not operative and transportation and transaction cost have
increased again. The same will happen with the impact of many other infrastructure services,
like telecommunication infrastructure or electricity where long term investments that may
change the livelihood profile would not be considered given the high risk involved. Institutional
innovations will certainly reduce those risks, allowing that the full benefit of infrastructure
investments be attain.
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Summary
Despite the fact that accessing public and private assets continues to be restricted and
unevenly distributed in rural Peru, changes in asset ownership and access during the last
fifteen years have been quite dramatic. In the case of basic services infrastructure (electricity,
telephone services and water and sewerage), levels of access were low and highly inequitable
in 1985. In contrast, in 1997, at least in the case of water and electricity, access had doubled:
27 percent and 24 percent of households had access to these services, respectively. However,
dispersion in access by spending deciles turned now to be much more pronounced than fifteen
years ago. This is so because the pattern of invest in public infrastructure had been biased
against the poorest segments in rural Peru, leaving them in a poverty trap.
Despite the obvious importance of infrastructure investments, it has not grown at the
pace needed for reshaping Peru’s poverty profile. As it has happened in many developing
countries, infrastructure investment has stagnated or fallen in response to fiscal difficulties
associated with structural adjustment. They may have also decreased because international
cooperation has identified it as a "low priority" in their agendas. Diminishing budgets for rural
investments puts an additional pressure to governments: they need to do "more with less".
However, the institutional setting does not help for making this possible. Usually national and
local bureaucracies do not coordinate and even compete in infrastructure allocation. The final
outcome of such an institutional setting is that the country misses the benefits of a coordinated
infrastructure investments and a better integrated rural development.
This study has focused in four inter-connected research questions:
1. Why and how is rural infrastructure important for fostering income generation,
income diversification and ultimately rural poverty alleviation?
2. Are there any complementarities in rural infrastructure investment? What are the
impacts of different combination of public infrastructure investment on output and
labor rural markets?
3. Can rural infrastructure investment help overcome an adverse geography, and allow
the poor accumulate assets and escape from the poverty trap they may be facing?
4. What kind of public infrastructure investment is better suited to improve market
integration and reduce transaction costs for the rural poor?
To properly tackle these research questions, Chapter 2 does a literature review on the
main theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of the relation between rural
infrastructure investments, market development and poverty alleviation. We conclude that
although evidence does exist for improved household welfare coming from rural infrastructure
investments, relatively little evidence can be found of studies that provide concrete linkages
between specific investments in rural infrastructure and increased welfare of the rural poor.
We also looked at how the literature has discussed the way geography may interact with rural
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infrastructure. We have seen that for some authors geography may hinder the positive effects
of increased access to infrastructure services. For others it may provide the natural capital
needed to improved rural incomes. We believe that pursuing this interaction further, as we do
through out this study, is critical given the particular geographic diversity that a country like
Peru has.
In this chapter we also point out that household and market specific effects brought
from infrastructure investment can be critical to reduce transaction costs and improve market
integration. By doing so the literature review shows that we may achieve greater market
efficiency which in turn may have an important impact in rural income growth.
Very few papers in our literature review have discussed the effect of complementary
interventions so as to avoid the well known problem of diminishing marginal return to
infrastructure investments. We believe that this is a crucial and promising area of research.
This study looked at this issue showing at the microeconomic level that it is perfectly possible
to raise the marginal rate of return to rural infrastructure investment by investing simultaneously
in more than one infrastructure service or combine public infrastructure with private assets.
Finally, this chapter reviews the literature addressing the distributional impact of
infrastructure investments.  For some it is perfectly possible to have a "win-win" situation,
where infrastructure investments are beneficial to rural household both on efficiency and equity
grounds. For others, it matters the asset endowment and institutional base that both the rural
poor and non-poor have to answer whether or not those better off will obtain or not larger
benefits from infrastructure investments. We believe whether there is a trade off or not between
efficiency and equity on the provision of rural infrastructure is an empirical question; one that
this study also addresses.
Chapter 3 analyzes the possession and access to assets on the part of the poor in Peru.
It finds that during the last two decades the average level of access to education increased
while and inequality of access to this asset decreased. The access to other public services has
also increased, though the inequality levels are still very high. The same happens with the
access to credit and other assets that can serve as collateral. The econometric analysis shows
a positive effect of the access to public assets on the profitability of key private assets like
education and land, evidencing the role of the provision of public services and infrastructure
as a mechanism for boosting the profitability of private assets. It is also found that changes in
assets tenure are not sufficient to explain transitions toward and outside poverty, thought they
are crucial to explain the permanency in poverty or the permanency out of this state. Finally,
this chapter looks at how complementarities affect the rate of returns of key assets. Our results
show a positive effect of public assets on these returns, which is evidence that private and
public assets are complementary. This shows the role of public policy in terms of provision of
services and infrastructure as a mechanism to strengthen the return from private assets and
thus facilitate reduction of poverty.
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Peru is a country with an astonishing variety of different ecological areas, including 84
different climate zones and landscapes, with rainforests, high mountain ranges and dry deserts,
the geographical context may not be all that matters, but it could be very significant in explaining
regional variations in income and welfare. The major question Chapter 4 tries to answer is:
what role do geographic variables, both natural and manmade, play in explaining per capita
expenditure differentials across regions within Peru? How have these influences changed
over time, through what channels have they been transmitted, and has access to private and
public assets compensated for the effects of an adverse geography? We have shown that what
seem to be sizable geographic differences in living standards in Peru can be almost fully
explained when one takes into account the spatial concentration of households with readily
observable non-geographic characteristics, in particular public and private assets. In other
words, the same observationally equivalent household has a similar expenditure level in one
place as another with different geographic characteristics such as altitude or temperature. This
does not mean, however that geography is not important but that its influence on expenditure
level and growth differential comes about through a spatially uneven provision of public
infrastructure. Furthermore, when we measured the expected gain (or loss) in consumption
from living in one geographic region (i.e., coast) as opposed to living in another (i.e., highlands),
we found that most of the difference in log per-capita expenditure between the highland and
the coast can be accounted for by the differences in infrastructure endowments and private
assets. This could be an indication that the availability of infrastructure could be limited by the
geography and therefore the more adverse geographic regions are the ones with less access to
public infrastructure. It is important to note that there appear to be non-geographic, spatially
correlated omitted variables that need to be taken into account in our expenditure growth
model. Therefore policy programs that use regional targeting do have a rationale even if
geographic variables do not explain the bulk of the difference in regional growth, once we
have taken into account differentials in access to private and public assets.
In Chapter 5 we empirically assess the determinant factors of market access for poor
farmers in rural Peru. In particular, we evaluate the role of key public assets like rural roads in
reducing transaction costs and, through that channel, in improving the incomes of rural
households. The chapter presents and implements a methodological proposal to quantify
transaction costs. The results show that transaction costs in the area under study equal 50% of
the sales value, being appreciably higher (60%) for producers who are connected to the market
via non-motorized tracks. These figures are larger than those provided by other studies. The
results demonstrate that besides distance and time to the market, key variables for explaining
the market integration strategy (i.e. when to sell and to what market) include several indicators
associated with how much experience the farmer has with the market in which he operates;
how stable his relations are with the different agents he trades with, and; how much of an
investment he makes to obtain relevant information and to monitor compliance with implicit
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contracts associated with the transactions completed. The study shows that, through lowering
transaction costs, access to an improved rural road system can improved substantially the
incomes of the rural poor in Peru.
Next, in Chapter 6 we evaluated how infrastructure endowments may affect the speed
of adjustment of spatially distributed agricultural markets. To our knowledge, this is the first
time that the connection between infrastructure endowments and market integration has been
empirically assessed in a multivariate setting. As we have described in the literature review
section there is research that has explicitly connected key public infrastructure with bivariate
measures of integration. However this has not been done yet in a multivariate cointegration
framework.  We shown that an increase in road and electrical energy infrastructure as well as
a higher access to local media and telecommunication facilities in the cities under analysis
will lead to reductions on transaction costs as well as on the average time that prices take to
adjust to their equilibrium levels when facing an exogenous shock. Consequently, the degree
of spatial integration of rural markets will increase in the long run. With these findings we can
state that the road and electric infrastructure as well as the access to local media and
telecommunications facilities are key factors for the reduction of transaction costs and the
improvement of spatial integration between markets.
Putting together the results obtained in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 allow us to connect
rural infrastructure investment with higher spatial market efficiency, spatial market efficiency
encompasses both the size of transaction costs of trade and the level of spatial market
integration. Since we have proven that transaction costs will be lowered as a consequence of
infrastructure investment and that this same investment will improve market spatial integration,
we may be confident that there is a clear and strong linkage between infrastructure investment
and market efficiency.
Chapter 7 shows that in Peruvian rural areas, there has been substantial growth over
the past decade in household employment outside of own-farming. At present 51% of the net
income of rural households comes from these off-farm activities, and thus they certainly cannot
be considered as "marginal". The reasons households diversify their incomes are several.
Access to public assets such as roads and private assets such as education and credit is an
important factor in diversification. Increasing access to these assets will help rural households
to increase their self-employment as well as wage employment in the non-farm sector.  We
have also shown that as additional infrastructure services are provided, rural households can
have access to more diversified labor income portfolios, which in turn allows for a higher
household income. Nevertheless these labor income opportunities are somewhat more visible
between those who already have higher incomes, which are those that can take advantage of
their larger private asset holdings (for example greater education) to increase their non-farm
labor activities.  Matching techniques allow us to show that additional access to infrastructure
services increases both the total number of hours per week devoted to labor income and the
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percentage of time allocate to non-farm activities. This result highlights the fact that there are
important complementarities in rural infrastructure investments.
The reasons to diversify income in rural Peru are various. A large group of farmers
complement their farming with farm wage employment and non-farm activities due insufficient
land or cattle or farm capital. Yet another group has sufficient education, skills, credit, and
access to roads and electricity to allow them to undertake non-farm wage employment (such
as making handicrafts, repairing and renting equipment, and commerce). Many of these non-
farm activities are indirectly linked to the farm sector, which is why one finds such high levels
of participation in the non-farm sector in the more dynamic agricultural areas.
The study of the welfare impacts of rural road rehabilitation done in Chapter 8 serves
as a case study to explore new methodologies to asses the benefits of investing in rural
infrastructure.Most studies have measured the benefits of rehabilitated rural roads by focusing
on reductions in monetary or time costs needed to access product and factor markets or key
public social services. This chapter complements these studies by evaluating their impact on
key welfare indicators such as income or consumption. Looking at rural households living in
some of the poorest districts of Peru, we compare (using propensity score matching techniques)
households located near rehabilitated roads to suitable controls. Results show that rehabilitated
road accessibility can be related to changes in income sources, as the rehabilitated road enhances
non-agricultural income opportunities, especially from wage-employment sources. The study
also finds that income expansion is not been matched by an equivalent consumption increase;
apparently because the additional income is allocated to savings, through increments in
livestock, most likely because road quality improvement is being perceived as transitory.
Finally, Chapter 9 brings together all the other chapters to answer our four research
questions. This chapter highlights the fact that our research has shown that marginal rates of
return to key assets are lower for poorer households than for those that are less poor. Increasing
returns to assets can only exists in the presence of restrictions that prevent the poor from
accumulating more income and assets. This been the case, initial conditions reflected by the
how assets endowments are distributed matter for understanding income and poverty
dynamics. This result is consistent with Barret et al. (2004) research on Kenya and Madagascar
and Jalan and Ravallion (2002) work on China. These results are in apparent contrast with
the work of Fan and Hazell (1999), Zhang and Fan (2000), Fan et al. (2000a), Fan et al.
(2000b), and Fan et al. (2002) in India and China. These authors show that the marginal
returns of public investments to production and poverty reduction differ according to
geographic settings, but tend to be higher in the poorest regions. Thus infrastructure
investments may be not only poverty reducing, buy may well be equality enhancing. However
this study shows that those rural households with more private access or having access to
better public assets can do better. Thus public investments may affect negatively income
distribution within a targeted poor area.
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This chapter points out that some of the contributions of this study lie on the
methodological side, either by creatively combining different data sets to solve a research
question, by suggesting methodological innovations to measure elusive concepts like transaction
costs, or by adapting project evaluation methodologies to account for the particularities of
rural infrastructure. Finally, we summarize the policy implications of this study, not without
mentioning first that although the analysis reported in this study is based on scientific principles,
policy prescriptions need to be adapted to the context in which they are applied. By doing so,
the researcher cross over to a minefield, where another range of aspects enter into the picture
including political consideration, institutional and coordination failures, etc. Because of these
considerations, we prefer to think that research creates "reserves of knowledge" were policy
makers may drawn upon as policy needs arises.
Obviously the first and most important policy recommendation we advance is that of a
larger budget for rural infrastructure investment. Given the low penetration of key infrastructure
investments in rural areas additional resources need to be devoted. This may come not only
from central government resources but also from local resources through rehabilitation and
maintenance activities. For this to happened institutional mechanisms directed to co financing
need to be consolidated since, given the national budget constraint, universal access is likely
to be impossible.
While the role of rural capital-intensive (roads, electricity, water for irrigation and
telephones) infrastructure in linking rural inhabitants to markets and the effect on poverty
alleviation has been documented throughout this study, the size of the impact of alternative
types of rural investment and the key role of complementary interventions depends on local
conditions and circumstances which can not be grasped fully by national or regional authorities.
Although we have measured some of this complementarities in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we
have also recognize that they are site specific so they need to be evaluated at the local level so
as to determined which infrastructure combination suites best to each region. From both recent
and previous rural market development strategies, we can envisage new interventions that
may combine the positive characteristics of both: a) They should recover a integrated approach
(multiple interventions design in a way that takes into account the particularities of the area
where they will be applied, b) a vision related to identifying market failures and the role of
infrastructure investments to solve those failures, c) a more participative strategy were the
"demand driven" focus be complemented with participative mechanisms that allow those
excluded to be taken into account so as to assure a balance between efficiency and equity
considerations.
The only way rural infrastructure will be provided in an efficient and equitable way is
if it comes together with institutional development. Improvements in institutions and building
mechanisms for coordination together with more and better focused rural infrastructure
investment should be the way to go to break out of the "poverty trap" in which more rural
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Peruvian now live. The lack of institutional mechanisms to establish priorities and coordinate
interventions is very obvious in rural Peru. You can find two or more government offices
doing the same work in the same area, without any coordination. We have witness in one of
our field trips that the road was been rehabilitated by two institutions, each of them fixing one
of two contiguous segments:  one paying for the labor needed while the other doing it through
an exchange mechanism. In other cases when the road, the irrigation canal or the sanitation
system is constructed or rehabilitated by a national level office, local authorities do not pay
attention to maintenance problems, as they also expect that the central government will take
care of them. The final outcome of those coordination problems is the infrastructure investments
deteriorates rapidly, affecting the well being of those   related to these services.
The need for a good analytical based approach to overcome these coordination problems
also faces the challenge of raising the quality of human capital in charge of designing and
implementing rural infrastructure investments. If adequate institutions and mechanisms for
coordination are not in place, then investment in rural infrastructure may provide only transitory
benefits. We have seen in chapter 8 that if rural road maintenance is not perceived as permanent
it will trigger different reactions from the beneficiaries than those expected if the same road
maintenance is perceived as permanent. In the former case, household will take advantage of
windfall profits, changing labor allocation to take advantage to the new market opportunities.
However they may not go into more complex or long term livelihood strategies as it may be
costly to get back to their original strategies once the road is not operative and transportation
and transaction cost have increased again. The same will happen with the impact of many
other infrastructure services, like telecommunication infrastructure or electricity were long
term investments that may change the livelihood profile would not be considered given the
high risk involved. Institutional innovations will certainly reduce those risks, allowing that
the full benefit of infrastructure investments be attained.
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Ondanks het feit dat de toegang tot publieke en private goederen nog steeds beperkt en
ongelijk verdeeld is in ruraal Peru, zijn de veranderingen in eigendom en toegang van
productiemiddelen gedurende de voorbije vijftien jaar nogal dramatisch geweest. In het geval
van de basisinfrastructuur (elektriciteit, telefoon, water en riolering) waren de toegangniveaus
in 1985 beperkt en sterk ongelijk verdeeld. Daarentegen is in 1997, in ieder geval voor water
en elektriciteit, de beschikbaarheid verdubbeld: 27 en 24 percent van de gezinnen hadden
respectievelijk toegang tot deze diensten. Echter, de verdeling in toegang over uitgavendecielen
bleek meer uitgesproken dan vijftien jaar geleden. Dit komt doordat het investeringspatroon
van publieke infrastructuur tegen de armere segmenten in ruraal Peru is gekeerd, waardoor zij
terecht kwamen in een armoedeval.
Ondanks het overduidelijke belang van investeringen in infrastructuur, zijn zij niet
gegroeid in een tempo dat nodig is om Peru’s armoede profiel te veranderen. Zoals ook gebeurde
in vele andere ontwikkelingslanden, zijn de investeringen in infrastructuur gestagneerd of
verminderd als gevolg van fiscale moeilijkheden die voortkomen uit structurele aanpassing.
Ze kunnen ook gedaald zijn omdat internationale samenwerking het in hun agenda gedefinieerd
heeft als van "lage prioriteit". Verminderde budgetten voor rurale investeringen leiden tot
bijkomende druk op overheden: ze moeten "meer doen met minder middelen". De institutionele
omgeving is echter nauwelijks behulpzaam om dit mogelijk te maken. Nationale en locale
bureaucratieën zijn weinig gecoördineerd niet en concurreren om toewijzing van infrastructurele
werken. Het uiteindelijk gevolg van deze institutionele organisatie is dat het land de baten van
gecoördineerde investeringen in infrastructuur en een beter geïntegreerde rurale ontwikkeling
misloopt.
Deze studie richt zich op vier onderling gerelateerde onderzoeksvragen:
1. Waarom en op welke wijze is rurale infrastructuur belangrijk voor het versterken
van de inkomensvorming, de diversificatie van inkomens en uiteindelijk het
verminderen van rurale armoede?
2. Bestaan er enige complementariteiten in investeringen in rurale infrastructuur?
Wat is de impact van verschillende combinaties van publieke investeringen in
infrastructuur op de productie en de rurale arbeidsmarkten?
3. Kunnen investeringen in rurale infrastructuur behulpzaam zijn om een ongunstige
geografische omgeving te ondervangen en toe te laten dat de arme bevolking bezit
kan accumuleren en ontsnappen aan de armoedeval waarmee ze worden
geconfronteerd?
4. Welke vorm van investeringen in publieke infrastructuur is het meest aangewezen
om marktintegratie te verbeteren en transactiekosten te verminderen voor de
rurale  armen?
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Teneinde deze onderzoeksvragen systematisch te bestuderen, verschaft Hoofdstuk 2
een literatuur overzicht van de voornaamste theoretische en empirische bijdragen tot het
bestuderen van de relatie tussen investeringen in rurale infrastructuur, marktontwikkeling en
armoedebestrijding. We stellen daarbij vast dat - ondanks het feit dat er voldoende bewijs is
van verbeterd welzijn van gezinnen voortvloeiend uit investeringen in rurale infrastructuur -
er relatief weinig bewijs kan worden gevonden in studies die de concrete verbindingen tussen
specifieke investeringen in rurale infrastructuur met een verhoogde welvaart van de arme
bevolking blootleggen. We zijn ook nagegaan op welke wijze de literatuur omgaat met de
interacties tussen de geografische ligging en rurale infrastructuur. We zien daarbij dat volgens
sommige auteurs de geografische ligging de positieve effecten van verbeterde toegang tot
infrastructuur kan belemmeren. Voor anderen kan het echter een bron zijn van natuurlijk kapitaal
dat nodig is voor het verhogen van rurale inkomens. We zijn ervan overtuigd dat de verdere
bestudering van deze interactie, zoals gedaan in deze studie, van groot belang is gezien de
bijzondere geografische diversiteit dat een land als Peru kenmerkt.
In dit hoofdstuk tonen we ook aan dat huishoud- en marktspecifieke effecten die
resulteren uit investeringen in infrastructuur kritisch kunnen zijn voor het verlagen van
transactiekosten en voor het verbeteren van de marktintegratie. De literatuurstudie geeft
zodoende aan dat een grotere marktefficiëntie bereikt kan worden welke op zijn beurt weer
een belangrijke invloed kan hebben op rurale inkomensgroei.
Een klein aantal artikelen in ons literatuuroverzicht bediscussieert het effect van
complementaire interventies gericht op het voorkomen van het welbekende probleem van
dalende marginale opbrengsten van investeringen in infrastructuur. We zijn ervan overtuigd
dat dit een cruciaal en tegelijkertijd veelbelovend onderzoeksterrein is. Deze studie bekijkt dit
vraagstuk en toont aan dat op micro-economisch niveau het goed mogelijk is om de marginale
rendement van investeringen in rurale infrastructuur te verhogen door tezelfdertijd te investeren
in meerdere infrastructurele diensten, of door het combineren van publieke infrastructuur met
private goederen.
Tenslotte bespreekt dit hoofdstuk de literatuur inzake de impact van investeringen in
infrastructuur op de inkomensverdeling. Volgens sommige auteurs is het goed mogelijk om
een ‘win-win’ situatie te bereiken, waarbij investeringen in infrastructuur voordelen opleveren
voor rurale gezinnen zowel op het terrein van de efficiëntie als de gelijkheid. Voor anderen is
het belangrijk uit te gaan van de hoeveelheid goederen en de institutionele basis in het bezit
van arme en niet-arme segmenten van de rurale arme bevolking om na te kunnen gaan of aan
hen die over meer of minder middelen beschikken ook proportioneel de voordelen van
investeringen in infrastructuur toevallen. We denken dat het zich al dan niet voordoen van een
tegenstelling tussen efficiëntie en verdeling bij de voorziening in rurale infrastructuur een
empirische vraag is die verder wordt bestudeerd in deze studie.
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Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert het bezit en de toegang tot goederen voor de arme bevolking
in Peru. Gedurende de laatste twee decennia is het gemiddelde niveau van toegang tot onderwijs
gestegen, terwijl de ongelijke toegang is verminderd. De toegang tot andere publieke goederen
is eveneens gestegen, alhoewel het niveau van ongelijkheid nog steeds erg groot is. Hetzelfde
gebeurt voor de toegang tot krediet en andere goederen die als onderpand kunnen worden
gebruikt. De econometrische analyse toont het positieve effect aan van de toegang tot publieke
goederen voor de rentabiliteit van belangrijke private goederen zoals onderwijs en land, daarmee
illustrerend welke rol de voorziening van publieke diensten en infrastructuur speelt als
mechanisme voor het verhogen van de rentabiliteit van private goederen. Voorts kon worden
aangetoond dat veranderingen in eigendom van goederen onvoldoende verklaren hoe de
transities naar of uit armoede verlopen, terwijl deze wel van cruciaal belang zijn om de
permanente armoedestatus te begrijpen.. Tenslotte bekijkt dit hoofdstuk hoe
complementariteiten een effect hebben op de productiviteit van belangrijke activa. Onze
resultaten tonen het positieve effect aan van publieke goederen op deze productiviteit, hetgeen
aangeeft dat private en publieke goederen complementair zijn. Dit wijst op de rol van publiek
beleid in termen van het leveren van diensten en infrastructuur als een mechanisme voor het
versterken van de opbrengsten van private goederen en daarmee bij te dragen aan een
vermindering van de armoede.
Peru is een land met een verbazingwekkende diversiteit aan ecologische regio’s met
ondermeer 84 verschillende klimaatzones en landschappen, met regenwouden en hoge
bergkammen tot droge woestijnen; deze geografische context mag dan niet het enigste zijn
wat telt, maar kan erg belangrijk zijn voor het verklaren van de regionale verschillen in inkomen
en welvaart. De centrale vraag die Hoofdstuk 4 tracht te beantwoorden is: welke rol spelen
deze geografische variabelen, zowel natuurlijk als door mens gemaakt, in het verklaren van
de verschillen in per capita uitgaven tussen de regio’s in Peru. Hoe zijn deze invloeden
geëvolueerd over de tijd, door welke kanalen werden ze doorgegeven en compenseert de
toegang tot publieke en private goederen voor de effecten van ongunstige geografische locatie?
We hebben aangetoond dat omvangrijke geografische verschillen in levenstandaard in Peru
bijna volledig kan worden verklaard  - rekening houdend met de ruimtelijke concentratie van
de gezinnen met eenvoudig meetbare niet-geografische karakteristieken - uit het bezit van
publieke en private goederen. Met andere woorden, een equivalent huishouden met dezelfde
karakteristieken heeft een vergelijkbaar uitgavenniveau in verschillede locaties met dezelfde
geografische karakteristieken zoals hoogte en temperatuur. Dit wil echter niet zeggen dat
geografische ligging niet belangrijk is, maar dat de invloed ervan op het uitgavenniveau en de
verschillen in groeivoet voortvloeit uit een ongelijke ruimtelijke verdeling in publieke
infrastructuurvoorzieningen. Daarnaast hebben we berekend wat de te verwachten winst (of
verlies) in consumptie is van het wonen in één geografische regio (bv. de kust) ten opzichte
van het wonen in een andere regio (bv. de hooglanden); het grootste verschil in log per-capita
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uitgaven tussen de kust en het hoogland kan worden verklaard uit de verschillen in toegang tot
infrastructuur en private goederen. Dit kan een aanduiding zijn dat de aanwezigheid van
infrastructuur beperkt is door de geografie en dat hierdoor de achtergebleven regio’s de minste
toegang hebben tot publieke infrastructuur. Het is hierbij belangrijk om aan te geven dat er
niet-geografische, ruimtelijk gecorreleerde weggelaten variabelen blijken te zijn die in acht
genomen moeten worden in ons inkomensgroeimodel. Daarom zou een gebiedsgericht beleid
toch rationaliteit kunnen hebben, zelfs als de geografische variabelen niet het grootste deel
van de regionale groeiverschillen verklaren, zodra we rekening houden met verschillen in
toegang tot private en publieke goederen.
In Hoofdstuk 5 maken we een empirisch studie van de determinanten van markttoegang
voor arme boeren in rurale Peru. In het bijzonder analyseren we de rol van de belangrijkste
publieke goederen, zoals rurale wegen, voor het verminderen van transactiekosten en hierdoor
voor het verbeteren van de inkomens van rurale gezinnen. Dit hoofdstuk ontwikkelt en
implementeert een methodologische aanpak voor het kwantificeren van transactiekosten. De
resultaten tonen aan dat de transactiekosten in het onderzoeksgebied equivalent zijn aan 50%
van de verkoopwaarde, en merkbaar hoger blijken te zijn (tot 60%) voor producenten die
toegang hebben tot de markt via een niet-gemotoriseerde weg. Deze cijfers zijn beduidend
hoger dan uitkomsten van andere studies. De resultaten tonen aan dat - naast afstand en tijd tot
de markt - er nog andere belangrijke variabelen zijn die de strategieën van marktintegratie
(d.w.z. wanneer te verkopen en op welke markt) verklaren, zoals hoeveel ervaring de boer
heeft met de markt waarop hij actief is; hoe stabiel de relaties zijn met de verschillende
handelspartners, en hoeveel hij investeert voor het verkrijgen van relevante informatie en voor
het monitoren van de afspraken in de impliciete contracten voor de feitelijke transacties. De
studie toont aan dat met het verlagen van transactiekosten, de toegang tot een verbeterd ruraal
wegennet de inkomens van rurale arme Peruvianen substantieel kan verhogen.
In Hoofdstuk 6 bestudeerden we vervolgens hoe infrastructurele voorzieningen invloed
kunnen hebben op de aanpassingssnelheid van ruimtelijk verspreide landbouwmarkten. Voor
zover wij kunnen nagaan is dit de eerste keer dat het verband tussen de staat van infrastructuur
en marktintegratie empirisch wordt onderzocht in een multivariate context. Zoals we hebben
beschreven in het literatuuroverzicht, is in voorgaand onderzoek het expliciete verband legt
tussen de belangrijke publieke infrastructuurwerken met behulp van bivariate maatstaven van
integratie. Het werd echter tot hiertoe nog niet geanalyseerd in een multivariaat co-integratie
model. We tonen aan dat een verhoging van de wegen- en elektriciteitsinfrastructuur, evenals
een verbeterde toegang tot locale media en telecommunicatie in de steden, de transactiekosten
zullen doen verminderen, evenals de gemiddelde tijd waarmee prijzen zich aanpassen aan het
evenwichtsniveau na het ondergaan van een exogene shock. Als gevolg hiervan zal het niveau
van ruimtelijke integratie van de rurale markten op lange termijn vergroten. Op basis van deze
bevindingen kunnen we stellen dat wegen- en elektriciteitsinfrastructuur evenals de toegang
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tot lokale media en telecommunicatiediensten sleutelfactoren zijn voor het verlagen van
transactiekosten en het verbeteren van ruimtelijke integratie tussen markten.
De resultaten verkregen uit Hoofdstuk 5 en Hoofdstuk 6 samenbrengend, kunnen we
het effect van investeringen in rurale infrastructuur in verband brengen met een hogere
ruimtelijke marktefficiëntie; de ruimtelijke efficiëntie van de markt betreft zowel de hoogte
van de transactiekosten in de handel alsook het niveau van ruimtelijke marktintegratie. Omdat
we konden aantonen dat transactiekosten zullen dalen als gevolg van investeringen in
infrastructuur en dat dezelfde investeringen de ruimtelijke marktintegratie zullen bevorderen,
kunnen we ervan overtuigd zijn dat er een duidelijk en sterk verband bestaat tussen investeringen
in infrastructuur en de efficiëntie van de markt.
Hoofdstuk 7 geeft aan dat in de rurale gebieden in Peru de werkgelegenheid buiten het
eigen bedrijf de laatste tien jaar substantieel is gegroeid. In de huidige situatie wordt 51% van
het netto inkomen van rurale gezinnen verdiend uit activiteiten buiten het bedrijf en dus mag
het zeker niet worden beschouwd als een marginaal verschijnsel. De redenen waarom de
gezinnen hun inkomen diversifiëren zijn verschillend. Toegang tot publieke goederen zoals
het wegennet en tot private goederen zoals onderwijs en krediet zijn belangrijke factoren in de
diversificatie. Beterde toegang tot deze goederen zal rurale gezinnen kunnen helpen tot vergroten
van zelfstandig werk evenals het vinden van loonarbeid in sectoren buiten de landbouw. We
konden eveneens aantonen dat als in bijkomende infrastructurele diensten wordt voorzien,
rurale gezinnen toegang kunnen krijgen tot een meer diverse inkomensportefeuille uit arbeid,
die op zich weer aanleiding geeft tot een hoger gezinsinkomen. Toch zijn deze
werkgelegenheidsmogelijkheden duidelijker zichtbaar onder hen die reeds een hoger inkomen
hebben en die voordeel kunnen halen uit een groter bezit aan private middelen (bijvoorbeeld
betere opleiding) om de activiteiten buiten de landbouw te doen toenemen. Matching technieken
staan ons toe aan te tonen dat een verbeterde toegang tot infrastructurele diensten aanleiding
geeft tot een hoger aantal werkuren per week en hoger percentage tijdsbesteding aan activiteiten
buiten het landbouwbedrijf. Uit deze resultaten blijkt duidelijk dat er belangrijke
complementariteiten bestaan bij de investeringen in rurale infrastructuur.
De redenen voor inkomensdiversificatie in ruraal Peru zijn van uiteenlopende aard.
Een grote groep boeren vullen hun inkomen uit de landbouw aan met agrarisch loonwerk of
met niet-landbouwactiviteiten omdat ze over te weinig land, dieren of bedrijfskapitaal
beschikken. Een andere groep genoot voldoende onderwijs en heeft genoeg vaardigheden,
krediet en toegang tot wegen en elektriciteit om hen geld te verdienen met werk buiten de
landbouw (zoals ambachten, reparatie of verhuren van gereedschappen, en handel). Vele van
deze activiteiten buiten het landbouwbedrijf hebben indirect te maken met de landbouwsector
en daarom wordt een hoge participatiegraad in niet-landbouwsector doorgaans gevonden in
regio’s met meer dynamische landbouwsector.
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De studie van welvaartseffecten van rurale wegenherstel vindt plaats in Hoofdstuk 8 en dient
als een casestudie voor het verkennen van nieuwe methodologieen voor het bepalen van de
voordelen van investeringen in rurale infrastructuur. De meeste studies berekenen de baten
van het herstellen van wegen in rurale gebieden door zich te richten op de besparingen in geld
en tijd die vereist zijn voor het bereiken van product en factor markten of belangrijke publieke
sociale diensten. Dit hoofdstuk vult deze studies aan door de gevolgen voor belangrijkste
welvaartsindicatoren zoals inkomen en consumptie te evalueren. Kijkend naar de rurale
gezinnen die leven in enkele van de armste districten van Peru, vergelijken we (gebruik makend
van propensity score matching technieken) gezinnen die dichtbij de herstelde wegen wonen
met een geschikte controlegroep. De resultaten tonen aan dat de toegang tot herstelde wegen
kan worden gerelateerd aan veranderingen in inkomenssamenstelling, omdat  de herstelde
weg de kansen bevordert voor het verwerven van een inkomen buiten de landbouw,
voornamelijk vanuit loonarbeid. Uit de studie blijkt eveneens dat inkomensgroei niet
automatisch leidt tot een equivalente stijging van de consumptieve uitgaven, vermoedelijk
omdat het extra inkomen wordt belegd in besparingen, door aangroei van de veestapel, omdat
de verbetering in de kwaliteit van de wegen van tijdelijke aard wordt beschouwd.
Tenslotte brengt Hoofdstuk 9 alle andere hoofdstukken samen om een antwoord te
geven op onze vier onderzoeksvragen. Dit hoofdstuk belicht het feit dat ons onderzoek heeft
aangetoond dat de marginale rendementsvoet van belangrijkste goederen lager is voor armere
gezinnen dan voor hen die minder arm zijn. Stijgende meeropbrengst van goederen kunnen
zich alleen voordoen als er beperkingen zijn die de arme bevolking verhinderen om hun inkomen
en goederen te doen stijgen. Onder dit gegeven blijkt dat de initiële condities die aangeven
hoe het bezit van goederen is verdeeld, belangrijk zijn om de dynamiek van inkomen en
armoede te kunnen verstaan. Dit resultaat stemt overeen met onderzoek in Kenya en Madagascar
in Barrett et al. (2004) en in China door Jalan en Ravallion (2002). Deze resultaten zijn echter
in duidelijke tegenspraak met werk van  Fan and Hazell (1999), Zhang and Fan (2000), Fan et
al. (2000a), Fan et al. (2000b), and Fan et al. (2002) in India en China. Deze auteurs tonen aan
dat de marginale bijdrage van publieke investeringen aan productiestijging en
armoedebestrijding verschillen naar gelang de geografische omgeving, maar dat deze wel
neigen hoger te zijn in de armste regio’s. De investeringen in infrastructuur kunnen dus niet
alleen armoede verminderen, maar ook gelijkheid bevorderen. Onze analyse toont echter aan
dat de rurale gezinnen die over meer private goederen beschikken of toegang hebben tot betere
publieke goederen het beter doen. Publieke investeringen kunnen dus een negatief effect hebben
op de inkomensverdeling binnen een arm gebied.
Dit hoofdstuk duidt op sommige bijdrages van deze studie op methodologisch vlak,
zowel door het creatief combineren van verschillende gegevenssets teneinde de
onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden, door nieuwe innovatieve methodes voor te stellen om
moeilijk te benaderen concepten zoals transactiekosten te meten, of door het aanpassen van
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methodes voor projectevaluatie rekening houdend met specificiteit van rurale infrastructuur.
Tenslotte vatten we de implicaties van deze studie voor het beleid samen, niet zonder te
vermelden dat - alhoewel de analyses die in deze studie zijn verricht gebaseerd zijn op
wetenschappelijke principes - de voorgestelde beleidsmaatregelen moeten worden aangepast
aan de context waarin ze worden toegepast. Hierbij begeeft de onderzoeker zich wel in een
mijnenveld, waar een andere reeks aspecten eveneens een rol spelen, zoals politieke
overwegingen, institutionele problemen en gebrekkige coördinatie. Vanuit deze beschouwingen,
verkiezen we onderzoeksresultaten te beschouwen als "kennisreserves" waaruit de
beleidsverantwoordelijken kunnen putten indien er beleidsvragen opduiken.
Vanzelfsprekend is de eerste en belangrijkste aanbeveling voor beleid die wij voorstellen
dat een groter budget moet worden uitgetrokken voor investeringen in rurale infrastructuur.
Gegeven de beperkte verspreiding van investeringen in belangrijke infrastructuur in de rurale
gebieden moeten hieraan additionele middelen worden besteed. Deze kunnen niet alleen komen
vanuit de centrale overheid maar ook uit locale bronnen, bv. door herstel- en
onderhoudsactiviteiten. Om dit te laten gebeuren dienen institutionele mechanismen te worden
opgezet voor medefinanciering omdat - bij gegeven beperkingen in het nationaal budget -
universele toegang onmogelijk te bereiken lijkt.
Terwijl de rol van kapitaalsintensieve infrastructuur in rurale gebieden (zoals wegen,
elektriciteit, water voor irrigatie en telefoonverbindingen) voor het verbinden van rurale
bevolking met de markt en de effecten daarvan op armoedebestrijding uitgebreid zijn besproken
in deze studie, is de impact van alternatieve vormen van rurale investering en de sleutelrol van
complementaire interventies afhankelijk van de lokale randvoorwaarden en omstandigheden
die niet volledig kunnen worden gecontroleerd door nationale en regionale autoriteiten. Terwijl
we deze complementariteiten hebben gemeten in het Hoofdstuk 3 en Hoofstuk 4, erkennen
we ook dat deze plaatsgebonden zijn, waardoor ze geëvalueerd moeten worden op lokaal
niveau om te bepalen welke combinaties van infrastructuur het beste zullen uitwerken in iedere
regio. Op basis van zowel recente als eerdere strategieën voor rurale marktontwikkeling kunnen
we nieuwe interventies beschouwen die de volgende positieve karakteristieken combineren:
a) Ze moeten gebaseerd zijn op een geïntegreerde aanpak (ontwerp van verschillende
interventies die rekening houden met de bijzonderheden van het gebied waar ze zullen worden
toegepast); b) een visie waarin de oorzaken van de gebrekkige werking van de markt worden
geïdentificeerd en de rol van investeringen in infrastructuur voor de oplossing van deze
problemen; c) een meer participatieve strategie waarin een "vraaggestuurde" oriëntatie wordt
aangevuld met participatieve mechanismen die rekening houden met hen die anders uitgesloten
worden, teneinde een balans te vinden tussen overwegingen van efficiëntie en gelijkheid.
De enigste manier waarop rurale infrastructuur kan worden aangeleverd op een efficiënte
en gelijkwaardige manier is als het wordt aangevuld met institutionele ontwikkeling. Het
verbeteren van instituties en de opbouw van coördinatiemechanismen, samen met meer en
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beter gerichte investeringen in rurale infrastructuur zouden de manier zijn om te ontsnappen
uit de armoedeval waarin veel rurale Peruvianen nu leven. Het gebrek aan institutionele
mechanismen voor het beslissen over prioriteiten en het coördineren van interventies is zeer
evident in ruraal Peru. Het is mogelijk om twee of meer overheidsdiensten te vinden die
ongeveer hetzelfde werk doen in eenzelfde gebied, zonder enige vorm van coördinatie. Tijdens
een van onze bezoeken in het veld zagen we dat een weg werd hersteld door twee instituties,
waarbij elk werkte aan één van de twee aangrenzende segmenten van de weg: de ene institutie
betaalde voor de arbeid terwijl het andere het deed via een uitwisselingssysteem. In andere
gevallen, wanneer een weg, een irrigatie kanaal of een sanitaire voorzieningen werd gebouwd
of hersteld door een dienst op nationaal niveau, gaven de locale autoriteiten weinig aandacht
aan het onderhoud ervan omdat zij verwachtten dat de centrale overheid daar wel voor zou
zorgen. Het uiteindelijk gevolg van deze coördinatie problemen is dat de investeringen in
infrastructuur snel achteruit gaan, waarbij vooral het welzijn zij die gebruik maken van deze
diensten wordt aangetast.
Naast de noodzaak van een goed analytisch kader om deze coördinatieproblemen op te
lossen, komt ook de uitdaging om de kwaliteit van het menselijk kapitaal te verhogen van hen
die verantwoordelijk zijn voor het ontwerp en de uitvoering van investeringen in rurale
infrastructuur. Indien de instituties en mechanismen voor coördinatie niet toereikend zijn dan
kunnen investeringen in rurale infrastructuur hooguit tijdelijke baten opleveren. We zagen in
hoofdstuk 8 dat als het onderhoud van de rurale wegen niet wordt beschouwd als iets permanent,
het verschillende reacties zal uitlokken bij de begunstigden vergeleken met de verwachtingen
indien dezelfde herstelwerken als permanent worden beschouwd. In het eerste geval zullen
gezinnen gebruik maken van de buitenkans door de inzet van arbeid te veranderen en gebruik
te maken van mogelijk nieuwe markten. Toch kunnen zij geen grote veranderingen doorvoeren
op lange termijn of overgaan naar complexere strategieën om te voldoen in hun levensonderhoud
omdat het erg kostbaar kan zijn om terug te keren naar de originele strategie zodra de weg niet
meer toegankelijk is en transport en transactiekosten weer zullen stijgen. Hetzelfde geldt voor
de impact van verschillende andere infrastruc-turele diensten zoals telecommunicatie of
elektriciteit, waar investeringen op langere termijn die het profiel van levensonderhoud kunnen
veranderen niet in beschouwing worden betrokken omdat de risico’s te hoog zijn. Institutionele
innovatie zal deze risico’s zeker verminderen waardoor de baten van de investeringen in
infrastructuur ten volle kunnen worden bereikt.
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